The Sky is the limit: Developments in relation to damage under CAR policies

On 16 December 2024 the Court of Appeal delivered judgment in the case of (1) Sky UK Ltd and (2) Mace Limited vs Riverstone Managing Agency Ltd and Others, a decision which will provide welcome clarity to the construction community, as well as being of interest to the insurance market more widely in terms of its analysis of the nature of an indemnity policy. The judgment discusses a number of important points, notably the rights of insured parties under a Construction All Risks (“CAR”) policy to recover in respect of “deterioration and development damage” which occurred after the policy period as a result of damage which had occurred during the policy period.

The factual background

The claims were in respect of extensive water damage to the roof of Sky's global headquarters building in West London, which was constructed for Sky in 2014 to 2016 by Mace as main contractor under a JCT 2011 Design and Build Contract dated 17 March 2014. Sky and Mace were named insureds under the Policy.

The roof was comprised of 472 wooden cassettes, into a substantial number of which water had entered before final waterproofing had taken place and had remained for periods of construction, leading to wetting and, so Sky and Mace alleged, irreversible swelling and structural decay by the end of the period of insurance (or “POI”, which ran from commencement of the project to one year after practical completion).

In the period between expiry of the POI and the drying out works (which arrested any further damage) the condition of the timber already damaged had worsened, and moisture had spread to other parts of the roof construction. The Court of Appeal termed these types of damage as “deterioration damage”; i.e. damage, such as further swelling, in parts of the timber already damaged, and “development damage”; i.e. damage to additional, previously undamaged timber by way of spread.

It is important to note, as the Court of Appeal stated, that the vast majority of water ingress had occurred during the POI and there was little, if any, ingress after the POI. Secondly, there was no allegation by the defendant insurers that Sky or Mace had failed to mitigate their loss prior to the hearing, given the complexity of designing, agreeing and implementing a remedial scheme.

The underlying decision

In the underlying decision, HHJ Pelling held that Sky was only entitled to damage which had occurred during the POI, and not development or deterioration damage which occurred thereafter. In reaching this decision, the Judge relied on the House of Lords decision in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] and statements in that decision that in a policy covering losses occurring during a policy period, the cover does not extend to damage occurring before or after the policy period.

The Judge had found that the entry of moisture into the cassettes during the POI was a tangible physical change to the cassettes as long as the presence of water, if left unremedied, would affect the structural strength, stability or functionality of the cassettes during the POI.

The arguments on appeal

All of the parties were granted permission to appeal on numerous grounds, but in this article we discuss the primary point of contention, which was whether Sky could claim for deterioration and development damage.

On this point, the cover identified in the insuring clause of the policy was in respect of “damage to Property Insured occurring during the Period of Insurance” and insurers argued that damage occurring after the POI was not covered. Insurers relied on the decision in Wasa as authority for the proposition that, under “time policies”, the cover is in respect of damage occurring during the period of cover, and not occurring before or after.

In summary, Sky and Mace’s arguments in reply were that:

  1. An insurance claim is a claim for unliquidated damages and, as such, the measure of recovery is for all the loss suffered by reason of the insured peril occurring during the POI, including loss caused after the POI.
  2. The Policy contained a Basis of Settlement clause, as below, and the measure of recovery contended for was supported by the underlined words in the clause:

“Basis of Settlement

In settlement of claims under this Section of the Contract of Insurance the Insurers shall, subject to the terms and conditions of the Contract of Insurance, indemnify the Insured on the basis of the full cost of repairing, reinstating or replacing property lost or damaged (including the costs of any additional operational testing, commissioning as a result of the physical loss or damage which is indemnifiable hereunder) even though such costs may vary from the original construction costs …."

The Court of Appeal decision

Development and deterioration damage

Lord Justice Popplewell delivered the leading judgment, which was rooted in the principle, long established in the authorities, that a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity, often described as a contract to hold someone harmless. Such a contract was not, however, a promise by the insurer to pay money upon the happening of the insured event, but rather a promise to hold harmless, i.e. a promise that the insured will not suffer the damage in the first place. This promise to hold harmless was the insurer’s primary obligation and, when breached, it was under a secondary obligation to pay damages for breach of the primary obligation.

In light of this, damages payable under an insurance policy fell to be assessed on the basis of established common law principles as to foreseeability, remoteness and mitigation that applied to any other contract; namely damages to put the innocent party in the position it would have been but for the breach, subject to express terms in the policy modifying the general position (e.g. limits or deductibles, exclusions such as for consequential loss or if caused by certain perils), but only if such modification was excluded by clear wording.

Lord Justice Popplewell found that the temporal limit in the insuring clause was insufficiently clear to modify the ordinary rule that insurers were liable to pay the reasonably foreseeable costs of remedying development and deterioration damage.

This conclusion was supported by the wording of the Basis of Settlement clause.

Further, Lord Justice Popplewell found that the authorities, including the House of Lords’ decision in Wasa was distinguishable on the facts, predominantly because it did not relate to development or deterioration damage of the type suffered in this case.

Investigation Costs

Mace also claimed the costs of “lifting the lid”, namely the upper surface of the cassettes in the roof upslope above the gutters, as reasonable investigation costs. The trial Judge, at first instance, denied these costs as being recoverable under the Policy and characterised them as “speculative opening up works”. Additionally, the Judge found that any investigation costs not revealing physical damage would not be recoverable under the CAR Policy.

Nevertheless, based on the normal common law principles that apply to contractual damages claim, aimed at putting the innocent party back in the position it was before the breach (to hold harmless), the Court of Appeal found that reasonable costs of investigation were recoverable if they were reasonably incurred in determining how to remediate the insured damage which has occurred. This was the case, even if the result of the investigation may be to identify the absence of damage in certain areas.

Meaning of physical damage

On a separate point, the Court of Appeal also rejected insurers’ appeal in relation to the meaning of “damage”, and upheld the trial Judge’s findings that damage meant any change to the physical nature of tangible property which impaired its value or usefulness to its owner or operator. There was no need for the physical change to compromise the performance of an individual cassette, as insurers argued.

Retained Liability

The Policy contained a deductible (or “Retained Liability”) of £150,000 “any one event but this will only apply to those claims which are recoverable under DE5…”. It was common ground that the claim was recoverable under DE5 by reason of defective design being a proximate cause, and the trial Judge had found therefore that a single deductible of £150,000 applied to the whole of the claim, as opposed to applying separately in respect of damage to each cassette.

The Court of Appeal also upheld the trial Judge’s findings on this point that, based on the long established authorities, an event refers to the cause of the damage, and not the damage itself, supported by the fact that the deductible was specifically linked to the cause of the loss being defective design.

Comment

As the Court of Appeal stated, on the principal point of contention, the fact that development and deterioration damage was recoverable, would accord with business common sense. In the context of a major construction claim, an insured party would reasonably expect to be compensated for the consequences of insured damage which occurred during the policy period, to a part of the works already damaged (deterioration) or to some other part of the building not yet damaged (development), after this period had expired, in the absence of any policy terms limiting recovery. This is especially so in relation to complex claims where a remediation scheme may not be finalised until sometime after expiry of the policy period, and where the state of the building may deteriorate in the meantime.

Of course, development or deterioration damage would be unlikely to be covered under a buildings policy, since this would exclude damage which first occurred prior to the building policy period, meaning the Court of Appeal judgment is crucial in helping insureds to transfer this risk to the insurance market.

The outcome is consistent with the approach taken in recent cases on non-damage business interruption claims, that provided the policy “trigger” occurs within the indemnity period, the totality of  loss is covered including that which continued to be suffered after the policy period  (UnipolSai Assicurazioni SPA v Covea Insurance plc [2024]).

The Court of Appeal decision will therefore be welcomed by employers and contractors alike. It remains to be seen whether permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted.

Author:

Chris Ives, Partner


Camden Contribution Curtailed: TPRA 2010 Developments

Recent cases highlight potential difficulties for insurers in handling claims under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (“the TPRA”).

By way of reminder, the TPRA allows a third party claimant to pursue a recovery directly against an insolvent insured’s liability insurer, both to establish the insured’s liability to the claimant, and coverage under the policy, in the same action, without the need to join the insured to the proceedings. In relation to the underlying liability claim, the insurer is permitted to rely, as against the third party, on any defences that would have been available to the insolvent insured.

In Riedwig v HCC International Insurance plc & another [2024], the High Court (Master Brightwell) dismissed a liability insurer’s application to bring a Part 20 claim against the claimant’s professional advisors, seeking a contribution in respect of the insurer’s potential liability to the claimant under the TPRA.

The claim arose from alleged negligence by Goldplaza Berkeley Square Ltd (“Goldplaza”) in producing a valuation of property on Camden High Street. The claimant sought to recover her consequent losses from Goldplaza, and subsequently its professional indemnity insurers, HCC, following Goldplaza’s insolvency in 2021.

HCC applied to join the solicitors who had acted for the claimant on the original property transaction to the TPRA proceedings. The parties agreed that Goldplaza and the solicitors were potentially liable for the “same damage”, based on section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (“the CLCA”), which provides that:

“any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise)”    

However, the Court held that the insurer and the solicitors were not liable for the same damage. The insurer was potentially liable under the policy, while the solicitors were allegedly liable for financial loss resulting from the property transaction. Following Bovis Construction v Commercial Union [2001], approved by the House of Lords in Royal Brompton Hospital v Hammond [2002], “an insurer does not inflict damage on anyone … the only damage it is capable of inflicting is in refusing to meet its obligations under the policy of insurance”.

The Judge noted that the purpose of the TPRA is to enable a claimant to pursue an insurer directly in respect of the liability of its insured, and for the claimant to stand in the insured’s place for that purpose, not the insurer. The insurer does not become liable for damage caused by its insured, and the fact that the insured might have a contribution claim against third parties does not mean that the insurer also has that right.

Depending on the type and stage of insolvency proceedings, insurers may be able to apportion loss with third parties by a more convoluted route of joining the insolvent insured to TPRA proceedings (as HCC had intimated an intention to do) or else by way of subrogated recovery, after settling a policy claim. Alternatively, an assignment of the insured’s contribution rights could potentially be made to the insurer, through policy wording or subsequent agreement.

Liability insurers are generally required nowadays to take a more proactive approach to defence of litigation against an insolvent insured, since judgment in default may suffice to establish liability under the TPRA, even if it does not follow consideration on the merits of the underlying claim. This was confirmed by the Scottish Inner House, Court of Session, in the recent appeal decision Scotland Gas Networks plc v QBE [2024], upholding the first instance findings considered in our previous article.

While the intention behind the CLCA is to broaden the class of potential contributing parties, where a number of defendants share responsibility for a claimant’s loss, the ability of an insurer to seek contribution from third parties is limited in the context of TPRA claims.

Authors:

Amy Lacey, Partner


Reinsurance Cover for Covid BI Losses Upheld on Appeal

In UnipolSai Assicurazioni SPA v Covea Insurance PLC [2024] EWCA Civ 110, the Court of Appeal has upheld the first instance finding that the reinsured (Covea), having paid out substantial sums in respect of Covid business interruption (BI) losses, were entitled to indemnity under property catastrophe excess of loss policies with reinsurers. The decision provides clarification on the operation of aggregation clauses and the proper interpretation of a “catastrophe” in treaty reinsurance arrangements.

Covea provided cover for a large number of children’s nurseries which were forced to close between 20 March 2020 and July 2020, as a result of the pandemic. The factual background and outcome at first instance are explained in detail in our earlier article. The decision was appealed by reinsurers and the following questions arose for re-evaluation:

1. Whether Covid-19 losses arose out of, and were directly occasioned by, a “catastrophe”; and

2. Whether the “Hours Clause” - by which the duration of any “Loss Occurrence” was prescribed depending on the nature of the underlying peril - meant that:

(i) an “individual loss” occurs on the date the covered peril strikes, including where the insured peril is the loss of ability to use premises; and

(ii) where the (re)insured first sustains indemnifiable BI loss within a nominated 168-hour period, subsequent losses after that period fall to be aggregated as part of a single “Loss Occurrence”.

Meaning of Catastrophe

At first instance, Mr Justice Foxton held that Covid-19 did amount to a “catastrophe,” as required under the reinsurance wording. On appeal, the reinsurers argued that a catastrophe must be a sudden or violent event, capable of causing physical damage, whereas the pandemic was an ongoing state of affairs.

The Court of Appeal rejected these submissions, highlighting the absence of any reference to an “event” within the policy wording, and noting that the unities test in Axa v Field [1996] is merely an aid to be used with broad application. Their Lordships also rejected the argument that “suddenness” was a pre-requisite for all catastrophes, and, in any event, the “exponential increase in Covid 19 infections in the UK […] did amount to a disaster of sudden onset.” The attempt by reinsurers to rely on an ejusdem generis argument, in relation to the alleged need for physical damage, was flawed, as the types of catastrophes mentioned in the policy were not intended to be a prescribed class. The expert evidence that BI cover may include cover for non-damage BI was unchallenged.

Operation of the Hours Clause

The central question for consideration under the Hours Clause was when the relevant loss occurred. If it fell outside the period stipulated, then it would not be recoverable. It was also noted that the term “Loss Occurrence” was defined in the policy to mean “individual losses”. Discussing this further, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the term “occur” means when a loss first happens during a period of time. In relation to BI specifically, it was held that when the covered peril is the loss of an ability to use the premises, the individual loss occurs at the same time, regardless of how long the financial loss continues - consistent with the approach taken by Mr Justice Butcher in Stonegate and Various Eateries. Provided the individual loss occurs within the indemnity period, the totality of that loss is covered and all of its financial consequences. An apportionment of financial loss would give rise to considerable practical difficulties and was deemed to be incorrect.

Implications for Policyholders

The decision is welcomed by cedants with the benefit of similarly worded reinsurance policies. The implications are far-reaching, with total payouts for Covid BI claims estimated in the region of £2 billion, according to the Association of British Insurers. This policyholder-friendly precedent is particularly helpful, since most reinsurance disputes are resolved in confidential arbitrations.

Authors:

Amy Lacey, Partner

Pawinder Manak, Trainee Solicitor


Climate Risks Series, Part 3: Aloha v AIG - Liability Cover for Reckless Environmental Harm

Aloha v AIG - Liability Cover for Reckless Environmental Harm

Increasing numbers of claims are proceeding around the world alleging that the public were misled about the risks associated with climate change, resulting from fossil fuels and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.

A recent decision in the Supreme Court of Hawaii, Aloha Petroleum Ltd v National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh and American Home Insurance Co. [2024], held that an “occurrence” in this context included the consequences of reckless conduct, and GHG emissions were a “pollutant” for purposes of a pollution exclusion under a commercial general liability policy.

Background

The Appellant, Aloha Petroleum Ltd (“Aloha”), was insured with two subsidiaries of AIG under a series of liability policies, in respect of its business as one of the largest petrol suppliers and convenience store operators in Hawaii.

The counties of Honolulu and Maui sued several fossil fuel companies, including Aloha, claiming that the defendants knew of the effects of climate change and had a duty to warn the public about the dangers of their products. It was alleged that the defendants acted recklessly by promoting climate denial, increasing the use of fossil fuels and emitting GHGs, causing erosion, damage to water infrastructure and increased risks of flooding, extreme heat and storms.

Aloha sought indemnity under the policies and AIG refused to defend the underlying claims, alleging that the harm caused by GHGs was foreseeable and therefore not “accidental”; and alternatively, seeking to rely upon an exclusion to cover for losses arising from pollution.

Aloha issued proceedings seeking a declaration that the policies would respond, and the District Court of Hawaii referred the following questions to the Supreme Court, to assist with determining the parties’ motions for summary judgment:

  • Does an “accident” include recklessness, for purposes of the policy definition of “occurrence”?
  • Are greenhouse gases “pollutants” within the meaning of the pollution exclusion?

Policy Wording

The policies provided occurrence-based coverage, with two different definitions of “occurrence” for the relevant periods:

  • an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions”, or
  • “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured”

The pollution exclusion clauses varied across the policies, but the differences were immaterial for purposes of the issues before the Supreme Court.

The 2004-2010 policy excluded cover for:

“Bodily injury” or “property damage” which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of “pollutants” at any time.

. . . .

“Pollutants” [mean] “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.”

Is Reckless Conduct Accidental?

Aloha argued that it was entitled to indemnity, as the allegations of recklessness were sufficient to establish an “accident” and therefore an “occurrence” under the policies. Aloha relied on Tri-S Corp v Western World Ins. Co. (2006), which held - in the context of unintentional personal injury resulting from proximity to high voltage power lines - that reckless conduct is accidental, unless intended to cause harm, or expected to with practical certainty.

AIG claimed that Aloha understood the climate science, and the environmental damage was intentional, not fortuitous. It relied on AIG Hawaii Ins. Co. v Caraang (1993), which held - in the context of torts involving obvious physical violence - that an “occurrence” requires an injury which is not the expected or reasonably foreseeable result of the insured’s own intentional acts or omissions.

The Supreme Court agreed with Aloha, ruling that:

when an insured perceives a risk of harm, its conduct is an ‘accident’ unless it intended to cause harm or expected harm with practical certainty … interpreting an ‘accident’ to include reckless conduct honors the principle of fortuity. The reckless insured, by definition, takes risk.” 

Are GHGs “Pollutants”?

Aloha argued that GHGs are not pollutants, because they are not “irritants” (applicable in the context of personal injury, not property damage) or “contaminants”. The drafting history was said to indicate that the exclusion should be limited to clean-up costs for traditional pollution caused by hazardous waste from the insured’s operations, not liability resulting from its finished products.

The Supreme Court held that a “contaminant”, and therefore “pollutant” for purposes of the exclusion, is determined by whether damage is caused by its presence in the environment. Although a single molecule of carbon dioxide would not be viewed as pollution, a fact-specific analysis is required, and the Supreme Court was satisfied that Aloha’s gasoline production is causing harmful climate change. This approach was supported by the regulation of GHG emissions in Hawaii and the federal Clean Air Act.

Not all of the policies contained a pollution exclusion clause, however, and the question of whether AIG is required to indemnify Aloha for that policy period (covering 1986 to 1987) will now be considered by the District Court.

Impact On Policyholders

The finding that reckless conduct is covered by liability policies in the context of climate harms is highly significant and will be welcomed by energy companies.

While the issues are yet to be fully explored in European jurisdictions, it is interesting to compare the UK Supreme Court decision in Burnett v Hanover [2021], where merely reckless conduct was insufficient to engage a ‘deliberate acts’ exclusion in a public liability policy; and the recent decision in Delos Shipping v Allianz [2024], confirming that a defence based on lack of fortuity requires the insurer to establish that consequences of the insured’s actions were inevitable, i.e. “bound to eventuate in the ordinary course”.

The precise wording of any pollution or climate change exclusion should be carefully considered prior to inception of the policy period. The causative language used can significantly alter the scope of coverage and prospects of indemnity (see, for example, Brian Leighton v Allianz [2023]). 

Authors:

Amy Lacey, Partner

Ayo Babatunde, Associate

Climate Risk Series:

Part 1: Climate litigation and severe weather fuelling insurance coverage disputes

Part 2: Flood and Storm Risk – Keeping Policyholders Afloat


Will someone think of the Lenders? Co-insurance issues for funders

Recent Court decisions such as Sky UK Ltd & Mace Ltd v Riverstone Managing Agency Ltd (which we wrote about previously in more detail here) have discussed “Project Insurance” policies taken out by employers in relation to construction projects, confirming the principles by which contractors, sub-contractors and other consultants may become insured under these policies. However, such policies normally also name lenders as insured parties (either specifically by name, or by general description) and in this article we discuss how these principles apply to lenders and what lenders need to do to ensure they are entitled to claim under the policies.

By way of recap, a Project Policy or OCIP normally covers insured parties in respect of physical damage to the “works”, as well as providing third party liability cover (both in respect of negligence and “non-negligence” under JCT 6.5.1). The employer, and/or any lenders, will frequently also want the policy to provide Delay in Start Up cover, which covers financial loss in the event that practical completion is delayed by damage[1] to the works.

A policy will normally define the “Principal Insured” as the employer, being the party who contracts with insurers when the policy is taken out. As I say, contractors, sub-contractors and lenders may also be named under the policy although, as was stated by Eyre J in RFU v Clark Smith Partnership [2022]:

Being named as an insured does not without more make a person a party to the insurance contract. A person who is named as an insured but who is not otherwise a party to the insurance contract does not become a party to the contract simply by reason of having been named in it. That person remains a third party unless and until it becomes a party in a way recognised as constituting it in law a party to the insurance contract or obtains the benefit of the policy in question in some other way. … Similarly, the editors of Colinvaux rightly say at 15-018 “the mere fact that a policy states that it covers the interests of named or identifiable third parties does not of itself give those third parties the right to enforce the contract or to rely upon its terms (e.g. the benefit of a waiver of subrogation clause)”.

Where a third party insured, such as a contractor or lender, becomes an insured by agreement between an insurer and a Principal or contractual insured, the existence and scope of the cover the third party insured enjoys under the policy depends on the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the Policy and the terms of any contract between the contractual assured and the relevant third party insured.

In a construction context, the Courts have stated that a third party insured contractor can become a party to the policy:

  1. If the employer taking out the policy is authorised to insure on the third party’s behalf (the “agency” route); or
  2. On the basis there is a standing offer from the project insurers to insure persons described in the policy such as “Main Contractor” or “Sub-Contractor”, which offer is capable of being accepted by those persons upon execution of a building contract, provided it is not inconsistent with the standing offer (this was the approach which the Court said was relevant in Haberdashers’ Aske Federation Trust Ltd v Lakehouse Contracts Ltd).

Whether a (sub) contractor becomes insured because of agency principles or accepting a standing offer, as well as looking at the policy, it will therefore be necessary to look at the (sub) contract to determine the extent to which the (sub) contractor is entitled to claim, and also to determine the extent to which the (sub) contractor will benefit from a waiver of subrogation.

For similar reasons, a lender will not be insured under a project policy where that policy has been arranged by a principal insured, unless the lender has provided authority to the principal insured to arrange insurance on its behalf and, even then, the lender will only be insured to the extent of the authority provided (even if the cover provided under the policy is wider than the authority provided).

In many cases, this will not cause any issues for a lender to a development finance project since the loan agreement with the borrower will authorise the borrower to arrange insurance in respect of the works, naming the lender as co-insured and first loss payee. Where the borrower is the principal or contracting insured in these circumstances, it will have the requisite authority to insure and the lender will be insured to the extent that the policy reflects the authority.

However, if for some reason the borrower is not the contracting insured, the lender may need to grant authority to the contracting insured via means other than the loan agreement. Further, if the lender wants to benefit from certain bespoke coverage not normally catered for in standard LMA facility agreement drafting (such as DSU cover), it will need to ensure that the principal insured is specifically authorised to obtain such cover on its behalf, and to the extent required.

A final point to note is that these principles will also apply where lenders are looking to be insured under other types of insurance policy in addition to project policies, which the lender has not taken out directly with insurers, such as latent defects or rights of light policies.

Christopher Ives is a Partner at Fenchurch Law

[1] Policies normally contain certain non-damage triggers as well, such as murder, suicide and disease.


Fenchurch Law grows insurance disputes teams in Leeds and London with two new appointments

Fenchurch Law, the UK’s leading firm working exclusively for insurance policyholders and brokers, has announced the expansion of its coverage disputes teams in Leeds and London, with Chris Ives joining as Partner at its Leeds office and Pawinder Manak bolstering its London team as a Trainee Solicitor.

Chris Ives, who will help strengthen the firm’s Financial and Professional Risks practice group serving clients in the North of England, brings with him over 20 years of experience in resolving complex and high-value claims for corporate policyholder clients across a range of different risks. Chris joins Fenchurch Law from Eversheds Sutherland, where he held the position of Principle Associate for over seven years. Prior to this, Chris was an Associate at DAC Beachcroft and an Associate at Addleshaw Goddard.

Pawinder Manak will join Fenchurch Law’s London office as a Trainee Solicitor specialising in coverage disputes, initially within the firm’s Financial and Professional Risks team. Having completed a diverse range of work experience and internships throughout her undergraduate degree, Pawinder studied at University College London where she completed the LLB.

This announcement comes at a time of continued expansion for Fenchurch Law, with the recent opening of its Singapore office and the announcement of its plans to open an additional office in Denmark in November 2024.

Managing Partner at Fenchurch Law, Joanna Grant, commented: “We are delighted to welcome Chris and Pawinder to the team. Their combined legal and insurance knowledge will be invaluable in helping Fenchurch Law continue to level the playing field for policyholders in the UK and around the world.”

Chris Ives added: “I was attracted to Fenchurch Law due to its top tier reputation in the field, clarity of vision, simplicity of business model and the array of experts I will be working alongside. I look forward to helping the firm provide even more policyholders in the North of England with access to first-class legal support.”

Pawinder Manak added: “I was attracted to Fenchurch Law because of the culture at the firm. Every member of the team supports one another to create a positive environment, and everybody is made to feel welcome with their friendly attitudes.”

Visit Chris' profile

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Climate Risks Series, Part 2: Flood and Storm Risk - Keeping Policyholders Afloat

Introduction

Extreme rainfall and storms have become increasingly prevalent in the UK. Figures from the Association of British Insurers (“ABI”) show that storms and heavy rain have contributed to driving up property insurance payouts to the highest level in 7 years.

During floods in September 2024, several areas of the UK experienced significant property damage. This included AFC Wimbledon’s grounds, where a sinkhole caused the football pitch to collapse, after a nearby river burst its banks due to the excessive rainfall.

This article will discuss:

  1. The coverage issues that policyholders could face in relation to cover for damage caused by flood and storm.
  2. How stakeholders can increase resilience to floods and storms.

Coverage Issues

Where policies do not clearly define what constitutes a “flood” or a “storm”

Extreme weather comes in various forms and severities. In the absence of a clear definition of “flood” or “storm”, insurers may seek to rely on metrics such as the Beaufort wind force scale, ABI definition of storm, or previous case law, to support arguments limiting the scope of policy cover depending on the particular facts.

Recent decisions from the US have held that flood exclusions did not apply to: water damage from backed-up drainage following Hurricane Ida (GEMS Partners LLC v AmGUARD Ins Co (2024), in the New Jersey district court); and water accumulating on a parapet roof after a severe storm (Zurich v Medical Properties Trust Inc (2024), in the Massachusetts Supreme Court); based on the meaning of “flood” and “surface waters” in the relevant policy wordings.

In FCA v Arch Insurance Limited [2021] UKSC 1, the UK Supreme Court confirmed that, when looking at the construction of a policy, it is necessary to consider how a reasonable person would understand the meaning of the words used, in light of the commercial context. Therefore, policyholders should ensure, prior to inception, that the policy contains appropriate and clear definitions of “flood” and/or “storm”, to prevent ambiguity in the event of a claim.

Where the weather event is a combination of “flood” and “storm”

Where a weather event may appear to be a combination of both a flood and a storm, identifying the proximate cause of the loss, i.e. the dominant cause, may be difficult without meteorological expert evidence. This can raise two separate issues.

Firstly, policies contain different sub-limits for flood or storm damage. For example, if “flood” has a lower sub-limit compared to “storm” perils, a policyholder would likely seek to argue that storm damage has occurred, to maximise cover under the policy.

Secondly, if a policy excludes either flood or storm damage, the principles derived from Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd v Employers Liability Assurance Corp Ltd [1974] QB 57 and The Miss Jay Jay [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 32 may apply. This means that where two concurrent proximate causes operate together to bring about a loss, if one is insured under the policy and one is excluded, the loss will not be covered. If one concurrent proximate cause is an insured peril and the other is not insured, but not excluded, the loss will be covered.

Flood management measures

After the damage to its pitch, AFC Wimbledon was reportedly exploring ways to improve its flood management and infrastructure, to reduce the risk of future floods. It is likely that insurers will seek to introduce more conditions within property insurance policies, requiring certain flood management measures to be in place as a prerequisite to cover.

Flood resistance measures aim to “resist” or reduce the amount of water that enters a property. This can include the installation of flood gates or airbrick covers. Flood resilience measures purely mitigate the level of damage to property. This would include having concrete floor tiles, as opposed to carpets, and placing plug sockets away from entrances close to water.

Some property policies will contain a stillage condition precedent to liability. This will state that a policyholder will not be covered for loss caused by a flood, storm or escape of water, if it does not keep stock or other items a certain distance above floor level.

Furthermore, insurers could potentially restrict cover offered to policyholders whose buildings are situated in areas at a higher risk of flooding, or where businesses do not have mechanisms in place to deal with potential flood damage.

Why is Climate Change causing more Floors and Storms?

It is thought that the increase in the number of extreme weather events is a result of climate change.

Climate change contributes to more floods and storms because the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has allowed carbon dioxide to trap the sun’s rays. This has resulted in an increase in the planet’s temperature and the level of moisture that is held in the atmosphere. The warmer the atmosphere, the quicker the water can evaporate and fall, resulting in more intense and voluminous rainfall.

Improving Industry Resilience to Floor and Storm

The increase in natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and hurricanes has  led to some insurers pulling out of international catastrophe insurance markets. This is because of the unpredictable nature of these events and the severity of the losses suffered. This has resulted in limited options and more expensive premiums for catastrophe policies available to policyholders.

Similarly, insurers in the UK are becoming more reluctant to provide cover for damage caused by storm and flood, as the number of these types of claims increases, giving rise to the risk of a protection gap for policyholders.

Parametric Insurance

One of the tools available to help mitigate this effect is parametric insurance. This is a type of insurance cover where claims are paid on a predetermined basis. For example, cover for a storm would have parameters such that, if there is damage to property and a certain wind-speed or water depth is reached, then the policy would be triggered.

Traditional insurance policies are based on the actual loss that is sustained by the policyholder, whereas parametric insurance policies are triggered by the occurrence of an event and when certain parameters are reached. One of the main benefits of parametric insurance is the greater certainty of insurers paying out. This is especially important where there is a need for an urgent financial resource, allowing for a quicker payment to be made to policyholders.

Flood/Storm specific reinsurance schemes

For flood damage in the UK, there is a scheme in place for homeowners known as Flood Re. This scheme operates in a way where insurers can pay a premium to reinsurers and they would have access to a “pool” of indemnity when a claim arises. If the pool is exhausted, then the government can step in to pay the remainder of any losses.

The scheme is expected to provide cover until 2039 as Flood Re anticipates there will then be a “free market” for flood risk insurance. However, one can argue that this is unlikely if we see a similar pattern in the increase in extreme weather events and insurance claims over the next decade. Therefore, an alternative scheme may be needed, for businesses as well as homeowners, to ensure all policyholders have a safety net in the event of claims arising out of floods and storms.

Broader Risk Management

Increased industry resilience is likely to come from broader risk management. Currently, the UK does not have a robust plan in place to tackle flood risk. It is the responsibility of organisations such as the Environment Agency, the UK Climate Change Committee and DEFRA to collaborate and mitigate flood risk.

There have been calls for the Government to set specific flood risk targets as a result of climate change and the increase in extreme weather events. This would be an example of an initiative where input from a variety of organisations could help to reduce the risk of property damage and lead to increased resilience.

Conclusion

With the rise in extreme weather events, insurers will look to mitigate exposures and robustly defend claims arising from flood and storm damage, leaving policyholders in a potentially vulnerable position.

A collaborative response is needed to ensure that the insurance industry can adapt to emerging risks and ensure that appropriate cover is available for policyholders, in the event of floods and storms.

Author

Ayo Babatunde, Associate


The elephant in the room: and it’s not the Secretary of State

In this, the latest in a series of recent Covid-19 BI appeals, the Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in International Entertainment Holdings Limited & Ors v Allianz Insurance Plc [2024] EWCA Civ 1281. A copy of the judgment can be found here.

The central issue here turned on whether the restrictions brought in by the government, preventing or hindering access to the claimants’ theatres around the country, were those of a “‘policing authority”.

In concluding that they were not, the Court of Appeal held that, “It is sufficient to say that the term does not extend to the Secretary of State. To adapt Lord Justice Scrutton’s famous remark about the elephant (Merchants Marine Insurance Co Ltd v North of England Protection & Indemnity Association (1926) 26 Ll LR 201, 203), the reasonable policyholder might not be able to define a “policing authority”, but he would know that the Secretary of State was not one.”

That finding notwithstanding, the judgment brings some welcome news for the wider policyholder market with the finding that Covid-19 can be an “incident” and that, in the absence of clear wording to the contrary, cover can be available on a “per premises” basis.

The Underlying Proceedings

The issues on appeal in this matter were first heard by Mr Justice Jacobs as part of a group of cases (see Gatwick Investment Ltd v Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe SE [2024] EWHC 124 (Comm)).

The claim concerned the interpretation of a non-damage denial of access (“NDDA”) clause for losses arising out of the closure of venues, following the 21 March Regulations made by the Secretary for Health and Social Care.

The relevant wording read as follows:

Denial of Access Endanger Life or Property

Any claim resulting from interruption of or interference with the Business as a direct result of an incident likely to endanger human life or property within 1 mile radius of the premises in consequence of which access to or use of the premises is prevented or hindered by any policing authority, but excluding any occurrence where the duration of such prevention or hindrance of us [sic.] is less than 4 hours, shall be understood to be loss resulting from damage to property used by the Insured at the premises provided that

i) The Maximum Indemnity Period is limited to 3 months, and

ii) The liability of the Insurer for any one claim in the aggregate during any one Period of Insurance shall not exceed £500,000

At first instance, the Judge concluded that the Secretary of State was not a “policing authority”, which was sufficient for the policyholders’ claims to be dismissed.

The Appeal

While accepting that the term “policing authority” was not limited to the police, and that it could encompass restrictions imposed by a similar body performing policing functions in circumstances likely to endanger human life or property, the Court of Appeal felt it unnecessary to decide how widely the clause may extent on the basis that it was sufficient to say it did not include the Secretary for State.

That decision was ultimately determinative of whether or not the policyholders in this case were able to claim for losses arising out of the Covid-19 pandemic, however, there were three further issues on appeal which will be of interest to the wider policyholder market: (i) whether or not Covid-19 was capable of being an incident; (ii) whether the extension applied on a “per premises” basis; and (iii) whether policy wording referring to “any one claim in the aggregate” contained a mistake capable of correction.

Can Covid-19 be an “incident”?

The Court of Appeal was asked to consider whether, in the context of the relevant clause, Covid-19 could be an “incident likely to endanger human life.”

The Court of Appeal accepted that the word “incident” can be used synonymously with “event” or “occurrence” but, in ordinary usage, it would generally connote something more dependent on the context in which the word is used. In the context of this wording, “incident” was qualified by something that “endangers human life or property,” so as to require a response from a “policing authority”

It was common ground that “Covid-19 endangered human life because of the infectious nature of the disease; and taken together with all the other cases of Covid-19 in the country, it called for a response by the Secretary of State”.

Further, in this clause, it was clear that the terms “incident” and “occurrence” were being used interchangeably. Therefore, a case of Covid-19 could properly be regarded as an “incident,” and could amount to an “event” or “occurrence”.

Although this analysis differs from that of the Divisional Court in the FCA Test Case, where it was held (in the context of the Hiscox NDDA clause) that “it is a misnomer to describe the presence of someone in the radius with the disease as “an incident” for the purposes of the clause”, the Court of Appeal did not find that the point was wrongly decided by the Divisional Court.  Rather, its decision was based on the wording of the clause before it.

The finding that Covid-19 can be an “incident,” in certain contexts, is a potentially significant outcome for other policyholders with “incident” wordings. There are likely to be a number of claims out there that have been in cold storage due to an “incident” wording, which should now be revisited given this apparent thawing on the issue.

Per premises

The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court’s finding that this wording provided cover on a per premises basis.

When considering whether the wording provided for cover on a per premises basis, the Court of Appeal focused on the specific wording of the clause, and in particular the fact that the insured peril was specific to each of the premises insured. A prevention or restriction of access to each premises would, therefore, give rise to a separate claim to which a separate limit would apply. The insurer’s focus on the defined term “Business” (i.e. that it would not “make sense to speak of the business of the premises as distinct from the business of the policyholder”) was found to place more weight on the definition that it would bear.

Further, the Court of Appeal noted that the policy drew no distinction between policyholders in the claimant group who owned or operated only one venue, and those who owned or operated multiple venues.  In those circumstances, interpreting the policy limit as applying separately to each policyholder rather than to each premises would be “somewhat capricious”.

This is an important finding for policyholders with more than one premises in circumstances where insurers are frequently seeking to limit losses to a single limit across multiple premises. Close attention should be paid to the specifics of the wording, as the nuance of the drafted wording and the policy as a whole will dictate whether a per premises argument can be sustained.

Correction

The insurer’s attempt to introduce an aggregate limit were unsuccessful in the absence of a clear mistake (or at least a mistake with a clear answer).

The insurer’s had attempted to rework the wording of the extension referring to “any one claim in the aggregate” to provide an annual aggregate limit by inserting the word “any one claim and in the aggregate”. The Court of Appeal found that while it was reasonably clear that something had gone wrong in the language, it was nonetheless far from obvious what solution the parties had intended. It was as likely that the insurer had intended for the limit to apply in the aggregate as it was that the limit was intended to apply to any one claim. The correction proposed by the insurer would result in the words “any one claim” being deprived of any meaning. Accordingly, the judge was correct to have rejected the insurer’s case of construction by correction at first instance.

This decision again confirms the principles in East v Pantiles (Plant Hire) Ltd and Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd, which were considered recently in another appellate Covid-19 decision, Bellini N/E Ltd v Brit UW Ltd. It serves as a stark reminder that the courts will usually be reluctant to correct mistakes, and the circumstances in which they might do so are limited to those where there is an obvious definitive answer.

Parting Comments

Despite a disappointing result on the meaning of “policing authority”, this decision has produced renewed hope for policyholders with similar issues in dispute, and it is far from the last word on the various NDDA wordings still out there. Further appeals arising from the Gatwick Investment Ltd v Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe SE group of cases are listed for hearing early next year, in addition to other matters proceeding to trial in the commercial court.

Watch this space.

Authors

Joanna Grant, Managing Partner

Anthony McGeough, Senior Associate


A “WIN WIN” for Policyholders

Background

Delos Shipholding S.A. v Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty S.E. [2024] EWHC 719 (Comm) is one of several recent judgments to consider the scope of an insured’s duty of fair presentation under the English Insurance Act 2015 (the “Act”) and helpfully applies that duty in a manner likely to favour policyholders; also noteworthy are the Commercial Court’s observations on the concept of fortuity and on the duty to sue and labour. The Court additionally considered and rejected the insureds’ claim under section 13A of the Act for damages arising from late payment, which is not covered in this article.

Facts

The bulk carrier ‘WIN WIN’ (the “Vessel”) was insured under a policy (the “Policy”) incorporating an amended form of the American Institute Hull War Risks and Strikes clause.

In February 2019, the Master unknowingly anchored the Vessel in Indonesian territorial waters without permission. Some days later, the Indonesian Navy detained the Vessel for having done so illegally. The Master was prosecuted for contravening Indonesian shipping law, with the Vessel only being redelivered to the insureds in January 2020. The insureds alleged that the Vessel had become a constructive total loss and served several Notices of Abandonment on insurers, all of which were rejected. The insureds then commenced suit to claim for total loss of the Vessel under the Policy, as well as damages for late payment of their claim under section 13A of the Act.

At trial, insurers accepted that the conditions for a total loss had had been met, but alleged that (i) they were entitled to avoid the Policy for material non-disclosure, (ii) the detainment was not fortuitous, and (iii) the delay in release was materially caused by the insureds’ unreasonable conduct in breach of their duty to sue and labour. None of the defences succeeded and the Court allowed the insureds’ claim. The insureds’ claim for damages under section 13A of the Act was, however, dismissed.

Material non-disclosure

At the time the Policy was renewed on 29 June 2018, one Mr Bairactaris, who was the sole director of the first claimant (the shipowner), was being prosecuted by the Greek authorities on charges relating to a shipment of heroin (the “Charges”). Mr Bairactaris was also at all material times a nominee director of the first claimant. In other words, he exercised no independent judgment as director and instead acted on the instructions of other persons, who in this case where the second claimant (the Vessel’s commercial managers) and its owner.

Insurers sought to avoid the Policy on the basis that the insureds had breached their duty of fair presentation. Accordingly, Insurershad to establish that:

  • the insureds had actual or constructive knowledge of the Charges;
  • the Charges were a material circumstance that should have been (but was not) disclosed at the time of renewal; and
  • the relevant underwriter had been induced by the non-disclosure of the Charges to write the risk.

(i) Knowledge

So far as actual knowledge was concerned, since Mr Bairactaris was the only individual within the claimants who knew of the Charges, the key issue was whether the first claimant had been fixed with knowledge of the Charges via section 4(3)(a) of the Act, which attributes to an insured “what is known to ... the insured’s senior management”. Section 4(8)(c) of the Act defines senior management as “those individuals who play significant roles in the making of decisions about how the insured’s activities are to be managed or organised”.

Notwithstanding his position as nominee director, the Court found that Mr Bairactaris was not part of senior management. It was the substance of the role played by him which was determinative, and since his responsibilities as sole nominee director were confined to executing administrative formalities (rather than the organisation of the first claimant’s activities), he could not be regarded as senior management.

This case thus demonstrates the key principles regarding the “knowledge” of a corporate policyholder and re-states the balance under English insurance law between the rights of the insurer to be provided with the material facts prior to inception of a policy against the practical challenges faced by those responsible for the insurance of corporate policyholders in ensuring they are in possession of the material facts in the first place.

As the Court also found that the insureds also did not have any constructive knowledge of the Charges, the defence of material non-disclosure failed at the first hurdle. The Court nevertheless continued to consider the remaining issues

 (ii) Materiality

The parties agreed that the test for materiality was substantively unchanged by the Act, i.e. it was whether a prudent underwriter would have wanted to take the undisclosed circumstances (here, the Charges) into account.

The more controversial issue was whether the hypothetical prudent underwriter could also take into account exculpatory circumstances under the test for materiality. These consisted of information that the insureds would also have made known to insurers had the Charges been disclosed, including in this case:

  • Mr Bairactaris’ firm belief that the charges were without foundation; and
  • the fact that Mr Bairactaris was a nominee director fulfilling only an administrative function and had no role in the operation of the Vessel.

The Court observed that, had it been necessary to decide, it would have held that that exculpatory circumstances could be taken into account; were it otherwise, an insurer “could … be as selective as it liked in how it defined the circumstances which it alleged could be disclosed”. On the facts, the Court observed that the Charges (considered with the said exculpatory circumstances) would have been material and would have led a prudent underwriter to consider imposing a condition, e.g. that Mr Bairactaris should be replaced as a nominee director.

(iii) Inducement & Remedy

The Court found that, had the Charges been disclosed, the actual underwriter would have imposed a condition requiring replacement of Mr Bairactaris as nominee director. The test for inducement under section 8(1)(b) of the Act would thus have been satisfied – the situation was one where, but for the non-disclosure of the Charges, insurers would only have entered into the Policy on different terms.

Insurers would thus have been entitled to treat the Policy as though it included the above condition (per paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of the Act). The more interesting issue was whether, in this case, it was equally open to the insured to then prove that it could and would have complied with the condition. The Court, accepting that “sauce for the goose [was] … equally sauce for the gander”, opined that insureds could, and that on the facts the insureds would, have complied with a condition requiring replacement of Mr Bairactaris in any event; as such, insurers would have been without a remedy even if they had successfully proved knowledge of the Charges.

Other issues

This wide-ranging judgment covered several other issues, two of which are dealt with below.

(i) Fortuity

Insurers relied on the proposition set out in The Wondrous [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 400, that the ordinary consequences of an assured’s deliberate and voluntary conduct are not fortuitous and do not fall within the cover provided by all risks policies. Insurers argued that, by anchoring in Indonesian waters, the Vessel had voluntarily exposed herself to the operation of local law. The consequent detention was simply an ordinary consequence of that voluntary conduct.

These arguments failed. The Court declined to read the proposition in The Wondrous so widely and instead clarified that the proposition had two aspects:

  • First, there must be some choice by the insured. This implies awareness that a decision is being made between two or more options which are different in some relevant sense.
  • Second, the consequences must be such as to flow in the ordinary course of events. This requires the consequence to be “inevitable in the sense that it is bound to eventuate in the ordinary course”.

Neither aspect was satisfied on the facts. Since the Master did not realise that the Vessel was in Indonesian waters to begin with, there was no conscious choice by the Master to anchor there. Further, since at the time of detention the Indonesian navy had only just begun to arrest vessels that had been anchored in Indonesian waters without permission (whereas previously there no reported cases of such detention), the detention was neither inevitable nor an ordinary consequence of the Vessel’s conduct.

(ii) Sue and Labour

Both the terms of the Policy and section 78(4) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 imposed on the insureds a duty to sue and labour. In simple terms, this duty is analogous to a contract party’s duty to mitigate its losses caused by a breach of contract and in the same way, the duty to Sue and Labour requires the insured to make every attempt to reduce the possible exposure to loss.

Insurers argued that, by being side-tracked into discussions with the Navy which involved considerations of a bribe or something similar (which the insureds were ultimately not prepared to do), the insureds had unreasonably protracted Indonesian Court proceedings against the Master and delayed the release of the Vessel.

The Court reiterated the well-established principle that an alleged breach of the duty to sue and labour would only afford insurers a defence where the breach breaks the chain of causation between the insured peril and the loss. This required the insured to act in a way in which no prudent uninsured would have acted; a mere error of judgment or negligence would not suffice. On the facts, there was no breach of the duty – given the uncertain circumstances faced by the insureds, there was no way of their knowing that engaging in discussions with the Navy would “slow things down”, so it could not be said that the insureds had acted in a way that no prudent uninsured would have acted.

Comment

The Court’s policyholder-friendly reading of both the elements of the duty of fair presentation, as well as of the meaning of the “ordinary consequences of an assured’s deliberate and voluntary conduct”, are welcome developments for policyholders. That said, many of the Court’s observations – particularly in relation to the issues of materiality and insurers’ remedies – were obiter, and it remains to be seen if future judgments will follow the lead established here.

Authors

Eugene Lee

Toby Nabarro


Lithium Battery Fires – Not so Lit?

Introduction

Lithium batteries (also known as lithium-ion batteries) have become commonplace in devices such as mobile phones, cameras, laptops, e-cigarettes, tablets and e-bikes. They are popular because, unlike alkaline batteries, they are rechargeable and can be used multiple times, making them a comparatively sustainable energy source.

This article will outline the key risks and coverage issues associated with lithium batteries for policyholders.

Why are Lithium Batteries so dangerous?

The London Fire Brigade has said that lithium battery fires are the fastest growing cause of fires in London in 2024. That is because of the phenomenon of ‘thermal runaway’, which occurs when flammable materials within lithium batteries break down. This is usually due to manufacturing defects or when the battery cells overcharge, which can lead to the release of a cloud of flammable gases which, in turn, can cause vapour cloud explosions. The vapour cloud explosions exacerbate the ignition of the battery and the speed at which a fire spreads.

Lithium battery fires can be unpredictable, and it is common for batteries to reignite days after the initial ignition. That is why they can cause such large fires, as seen at the Suez Recycling Centre in July 2024, where the most likely cause of the fire was thought to be the improper disposal of a lithium battery, which ignited in a pile of waste of around 100sqm (and it took 15 fire engines and 100 firefighters to quell the blaze). As a further example, a fire was allegedly caused at a home in Wales in September 2024, by a mobility scooter that was charging. Firefighters were present at the blaze for more than 12 hours.

The Wider Problem

The unpredictable nature of lithium battery fires may result in some building and property insurers declining and restricting cover for fires caused by them, or charging additional premium to cover this risk.

Further, it may be more difficult for companies whose businesses rely heavily on lithium batteries, such as those in the manufacture, supply and retail of products which utilise lithium batteries to obtain cover from their product liability insurers.

The legal climate around lithium batteries is changing, as we have seen with the introduction of the Lithium-ion Battery Safety Bill which aims to regulate the safe storage, use and disposal of lithium batteries in the UK. However, as we have seen with other emerging risks such as climate change, further discussion may be required between the relevant stakeholders to ensure that lithium battery risks do not become “uninsurable”.

The following section sets out some of the key coverage issues that may arise.

Coverage Issues for Policyholders 

Breach of the duty of fair presentation

Policyholders are required to make a fair presentation of the risk under the Insurance Act 2015 (“the Act”). To make a fair presentation, a policyholder must disclose all “material circumstances” to the insurer that the policyholder knows or ought to know. Failing that, an insured can satisfy the duty by giving the insurer sufficient information to put it on notice that it needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances (section 3(4)(b) of the Act). A circumstance or representation is ‘material’ if it would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms. The duty is not limited to answering questions asked by the insurer in a proposal form.

So, for example, say a policyholder deliberately discloses to an insurer that it has a sophisticated strategy in place for mitigating the risk of fire due to the high number of products containing lithium batteries at its premises when, in fact, the position is otherwise. In that situation, an insurer would probably be entitled to refuse to indemnify the policyholder for a claim on the basis that, had the true position been disclosed, it would have provided insurance on different terms, if at all.

A more difficult position may arise when an insurer does not ask any specific questions about the extent to which lithium batteries are used in an insured’s business, and an insured inadvertently fails to disclose the true position on inception or renewal. Is the use or storage of products which contain lithium batteries itself a material circumstance? If so, will disclosure of the type of products supplied or stored be sufficient to put the insurer on notice and discharge the duty owed under section 3(4)(b), or will an insured have to spell out that the products contain lithium batteries?

It should be borne in mind that not all lithium batteries necessarily pose a fire risk. In that regard, the Fire Protection Association has provided guidance that each fire protection and mitigation strategy should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. That will include a consideration of the battery type, the Battery Energy Storage System (“BESS”) and layout.

Breach of Condition Precedent to Liability

Insurance policies frequently contain terms known as ‘conditions precedent to liability’. Subject to certain provisions in the Act, such terms must be complied with strictly, otherwise there is no cover for the claim.

In Wheeldon Brothers Waste Limited v Millennium Insurance Company Limited [2018] EWHC 834 (TCC), the policy contained a condition precedent that combustible waste had to be stored at least 6m from any fixed plant. On the evidence, the court found there was no breach of the condition precedent, and that “storage” meant a degree of permanence and a deliberate decision to designate an area to place and keep material.

Guidance from the Fire Protection Association states that the BESS should be (a) located in non-combustible containers or enclosures, (b) placed at least 3 metres from other equipment, buildings, structures and storage, and (c) the distance should only be reduced when there is a suitable-fire barrier, where exposed surfaces and fire-resisting, or where BESS enclosures have fire-resisting walls and roofs. If insurers impose conditions relating to storage in compliance with this guidance, the decision in Wheeldon is potentially relevant as to what “storage” means.

It is open to a policyholder to rely on section 11 of the Act and show that the breach could not have increased the risk of loss which occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred.  For example, if there was a fire at a policyholder’s premises, and it had breached a condition requiring it to store lithium batteries in a particular way, to escape the consequences of breach, the policyholder would need to prove, in effect, that compliance would not have impacted the general risk of fire.

Concluding Thoughts

There is no UK specific guidance or legislation to govern lithium battery use, storage or disposal. Policyholders should therefore consult reliable guidance to ensure that fire risk strategies are sufficient on a case-by-case basis, and compliant with the terms of the policy.

If in doubt, policyholders should consult with their brokers on inception and renewal to ensure that they have complied with their disclosure obligations and are able to satisfy the applicable policy terms to maximise the chance of policy coverage in the event of a lithium battery fire.

Ayo Babatunde is an Associate at Fenchurch Law.