Ristorante Limited t/a Bar Massimo v Zurich¬ [2021]: – Food for thought about the questions in insurance applications
This recent High Court decision considers the proper construction of questions put to an insured in insurance applications, and the circumstances in which they can amount to waiver.
Background
Ristorante Limited (“Ristorante”) was the leaseholder of a bar and restaurant in Glasgow (“the Property”). Ristorante took out an insurance policy with Zurich in 2015, which renewed in 2016 and 2017 (“the Policy”). Prior to inception of the Policy, and at each renewal, Ristorante confirmed that the following state of affairs was true:
“No owner, director, business partner or family member involved with the business:
i) ...
ii)...
iii) Has ever been the subject of a winding up order or company/individual voluntary arrangement with creditors, or been placed into administration, administrative receivership or liquidation
iv) ...
(“the Insolvency Question”)
On 3 January 2018, a significant fire broke out at the Property. After being notified of a claim, Zurich purported to avoid the Policy on the basis that Ristorante failed to make a fair presentation of the risk. In particular, it asserted that Ristorante misrepresented/failed to disclose that three of its directors had been directors of companies which previously entered liquidation (“the Other Insolvencies”), and that cover would not have been provided had they been disclosed.
Issues
There were two issues for the Court to determine at a trial of preliminary issues:
- Whether, on the true construction of the Insolvency Question, there was a misrepresentation/non-disclosure; and
- Whether, by asking the Insolvency Question in the way that it did, Zurich waived disclosure of the Other Insolvencies.
The Decision
The Judge, Mr Justice Snowden, found for Ristorante on both issues.
On the first issue, the Judge observed that the Insolvency Question limited its enquiry to any “owner, director, business partner or family member involved with the business”. There was no express enquiry in relation to any corporate bodies, and, accordingly, a person completing the Insolvency Question would not come to it “with any predisposition to think that the Defendant was interested in that information.”
The Judge also relied on cases such as R&R Developments v AXA [2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 527 (see our previous article on the case here) and Doheny v New India Assurance [2005] 1 All ER (Comm), both of which also addressed the proper construction of insolvency questions. The Judge found that a reasonable insurer in 2015 would be expected to know of those decisions, and to have understood the importance, if it wished to make enquiries of the insolvency of companies with which the insurer’s directors were involved, of using language which referred to those companies.
Zurich made a number of further arguments about the correct interpretation of the Insolvency Question, which included an argument that the words “has ever been the subject of” were sufficient, without more, to require disclosure of companies with which Ristorante’s directors were involved. Unsurprisingly, the Judge rejected that construction, noting that it made neither grammatical nor legal sense.
Zurich also said that, regardless of the precise wording used, a reasonable broker would have understood the Insolvency Question to mean that the Other Insolvencies were material facts which needed to be disclosed. However, absent any evidence on what a “hypothetical reasonable broker” would have done, the Judge rejected that argument.
On the second issue, the Judge, having regard to the authorities on the effect of asking a limited question, held that Zurich waived disclosure of the Other Insolvencies. Although Zurich contended that past insolvencies was a relevant moral hazard from the perspective of an insurer and “certainly information about which they would ordinarily expect to be told”, the Other Insolvencies related to a different set of persons identified in the Insolvency Question. Therefore, it was reasonable for Ristorante to infer that Zurich had no interest in them.
Summary
Ristorante v Zurich is another in a recent run of policyholder friendly decisions, and a timely reminder that Insurers’ attempts to re-write questions in insurance applications, when doing so would require a completely different meaning to be given to them, will be impermissible.
Alex Rosenfield is a Senior Associate at Fenchurch Law
The Good, the Bad & the Ugly: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. #11 (The Good). R&R Developments v AXA
Welcome to the latest in the series of blogs from Fenchurch Law: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. An opinionated and practical guide to the most important insurance decisions relating to the London / English insurance markets, all looked at from a pro-policyholder perspective.
Some cases are correctly decided and positive for policyholders. We celebrate those cases as The Good.
Some cases are, in our view, bad for policyholders, wrongly decided, and in need of being overturned. We highlight those decisions as The Bad.
Other cases are bad for policyholders but seem (even to our policyholder-tinted eyes) to be correctly decided. Those cases can trip up even the most honest policyholder with the most genuine claim. We put the hazard lights on those cases as The Ugly.
At Fenchurch Law we love the insurance market. But we love policyholders just a little bit more.
#11 (The Good)
R&R Developments Ltd v AXA Insurance UK Plc [2010] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 521
The case concerned a question in a proposal which asked if any of the insured’s directors had ever been declared bankrupt, either personally or in connection with any business with which they were involved. The Court held that the question did not extend to the insolvency of any company with which they may have been involved. The Court also held that, by asking a limited question, the insurer had waived disclosure of the insolvency of any party other than the insured and its directors.
Background
R&R Developments Limited (“R&R”) was insured by AXA Insurance UK plc (“AXA”). Prior to inception of the relevant policy, R&R completed a proposal, which asked:
“Have you or any Partners or Directors either personally or in connection with any business in which they have been involved … ever been declared bankrupt or are the subject of any bankruptcy proceedings or any voluntary or mandatory insolvency?”
R&R answered this question (“the Insolvency Question”) in the negative. AXA contended that this was a misrepresentation, since one of R&R’s directors had been a director of a company which had gone into administrative receivership. AXA also said that R&R should have disclosed that insolvency in any event, as it was material.
The Decision
The Judge, Nicholas Strauss QC, held that the Insolvency Question was clearly worded. As a matter of simple grammar and syntax, it did not relate to anybody other than R&R and its directors. So, since R&R was solvent and none of R&R’s directors had ever been made bankrupt, the Insolvency Question was answered correctly. Three further considerations supported that conclusion:
- AXA contended that the Insolvency Question referred, in effect, to “… you or any Partners or Directors or any business in which they had been involved”. Had this been its intention, it would have been very simple drafting to achieve that result.
- On AXA’s interpretation, the disclosure required from R&R would have been unreasonably wide. In particular, the meaning of “involved” could potentially have extended to any company of which one of the directors had been employed in a junior position.
- Looking at the proposal as a whole, and particularly the fact that a further question asked “Had any losses … or … any claims …. made against you (in this or any existing or previous business”), it was clear that the questions were targeted solely at R&R and its directors.
The Judge also rejected AXA’s secondary argument. Although AXA had in its mind the concept of other businesses with which R&R’s directors were involved, it chose not to ask about them. Therefore, by asking a limited question, R&R was entirely justified in thinking that AXA had waived its right to that information.
Comments
The decision is a helpful endorsement of the ‘natural and ordinary meaning’ rule of interpretation. AXA tried to argue, in effect, that words needed to be implied into the Insolvency Question which would significantly change its meaning, and that that should be done for its own benefit. Quite rightly, the Court gave short shrift to that argument.
Alex Rosenfield is a Senior Associate at Fenchurch Law.
Say hello, waive goodbye – waiver in insurance disputes
Waiver involves a party abandoning some or all of its rights under a contract. The concept is broad, and arguments about its application arise frequently in insurance disputes, in relation to both the creation and operation of a policy.
This article will outline situations where waiver arguments most commonly occur.
Waiver of disclosure
Under the Insurance Act 2015 (“the Act”), an insured must make a fair presentation of the risk. This requires disclosure of every material circumstances which the insured knows or ought to know, and in a manner which would be reasonably clear and accessible.
An insurer’s failure to ask questions has always risked being treated as a waiver of the insured’s duty of disclosure. That situation is now codified in s3(4)(b) of the Act, which confirms that it is only necessary for an insured to disclose “sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances.” The insurer therefore has a duty to make enquiries when it requires further information – it cannot simply sit on the disclosure provided and ask questions only once a claim is made.
Absent enquiry by the insurer, the Act provides that an insured does not need to disclose a circumstance if, amongst other things, it is something about which the insurer waives information. This can happen expressly, or impliedly.
Express waiver
Numerous forms of agreement can be reached between an insurer and an insured whereby the latter’s duty of fair presentation is restricted. This may be by way of agreement which restricts materiality to knowledge held by specific individuals. Alternatively, they may agree that specific types of information need not be disclosed.
Implied waiver – asking limited questions in a proposal
An insurer may, in some circumstances, be taken to have waived the scope of disclosure by asking a limited question in a proposal. By way of example; suppose an insurer asks a proposer, “have you been made insolvent during the last 5 years?” which the proposer correctly answers “no”. Then, following the making of a claim, the insurer refuses to pay on the basis that the insured failed to disclose that it entered into administration 8 years ago. On those facts, there is an unanswerable argument of waiver. The insurer could easily have asked the proposer about insolvencies occurring more than 5 years prior, and by not doing so indicated that it had no interest in those insolvencies. These types of argument are fact-sensitive, and will depend on the proper construction of the proposal as a whole. The question to be asked, as MacGillivray says, is:
“Would a reasonable man reading the proposal form be justified in thinking that the insurer had restricted his right to receive all material information, and consented to the omission of the particular information in issue?”
If the answer to that question is “yes”, an insurer cannot subsequently use that non-disclosure as a reason to avoid paying a claim.
Waiver of the insurer’s remedy for breach of the duty of fair presentation
This type of waiver is known as waiver by election. In short, where an insurer discovers that there has been a non-disclosure entitling it to avoid the policy, it has a choice between two inconsistent rights: it can either affirm the policy (i.e. treat it as continuing), or it can avoid it. If the insurer, having knowledge of those inconsistent rights, makes an unequivocal representation that it will affirm the policy, the right to avoid will be lost.
For example; suppose an insurer, during the course of its investigations following a claim, discovers that the insured had failed to disclose that it has an unsatisfied CCJ. If the insurer expressly affirm cover, it cannot go back on that choice.
That example can be contrasted with implied affirmation i.e. where the insurer’s conduct amounts to an unequivocal communication that it has chosen to affirm the policy. Such conduct might include the actual payment of a claim under a policy, or accepting future premiums.
Waiver of the insurer’s remedy for breach of condition
Where an insured breaches a policy condition, the only form of waiver available is waiver by estoppel (Kosmar Villa Holdings PLC v Trustees Syndicate 1243 [2008] EWCA Civ 147).
As with waiver by election, waiver by estoppel rests on an unequivocal representation that a party will not rely on its rights; however, the insured must also show detrimental reliance i.e. that it has relied on the insurer’s representation, such that the insurer’s withdrawal of that representation would be unjust.
As an example; say there is a fire at an insured’s premises, and the insurer then discovers that the insured had breached a condition precedent regarding the storage of combustible materials. Ordinarily, no liability would attach to the insurer for the claim, as the condition precedent was breached. However, in this case the insurer chooses to act in a manner only consistent with it having waived the insured’s breach, by asking the insured to provide information about the repair costs. If the insured can show that it relied on the insurer’s representation to its detriment (e.g. by starting to repair the premises), the insurer will be estopped from relying on the breach.
Estoppel by silence?
Recent case law has raised the potential for the court to find, in some circumstances, that an insurer’s silence or acquiescence may give rise to an estoppel.
The case in question, Ted Baker v AXA Insurance UK plc [2017] EWCA Civ 4097, concerned a claim by the clothing retail company, Ted Baker, following a theft. AXA refused to pay the claim because, amongst other reasons, Ted Baker had breached a condition precedent in the policy requiring it to produce certain information.
Ted Baker argued that AXA was estopped from relying on its breach, because AXA had known that Ted Baker believed, albeit mistakenly, that the obligation to produce the information had been “parked”. Although Ted Baker’s claim failed on other grounds, the Court of Appeal agreed that Ted Baker was entitled to expect AXA, acting honestly and responsibly, to speak up if it regarded the information as outstanding, and if it realised that Ted Baker had wrongly believed otherwise.
Summary
Waiver arguments arise in a number of different guises in insurance disputes, and are likely to be hotly contested. Although the availability of any waiver argument will be fact-specific, relevant considerations include the conduct and knowledge of the insurer, and whether the insurer had reserved its rights.
If an insured is able to establish that the insurer has waived its rights, the law will hold the insurer to its choice, and any alternative choice will be lost.
Government to fund replacement of non-ACM cladding systems on residential buildings
On 11 March, the government announced that it would provide up to £1 billion in 2020/21 to fund the removal and replacement of unsafe non-ACM cladding systems on high-rise residential buildings.
Attitudes towards building safety have undergone a paradigm shift since the tragic events at Grenfell Tower. Since then, the government has introduced a wide-ranging package of measures to ensure that buildings, particularly those with Aluminum Composite (ACM) cladding, are made safe. Notably, the government last year introduced a fund of £600m for the replacement of unsafe ACM cladding from residential buildings, similar to the type that was in place on Grenfell Tower.
Although ACM cladding remains the government’s priority, it has now announced proposals to extend funding for the removal and replacement of non-ACM cladding, such as High Pressure Laminate panels (‘HPL’). The announcement follows the guidance issued by the government earlier in the year in its “Consolidated Advice Note on Building Safety”, and in particular, the views of its Expert Panel that HPL systems with a ‘C’ or ‘D’ (i.e. those with a medium or high contribution to fire) would not meet the requirements of the Building Regulations, and that owners of such buildings should replace those materials as soon as possible.
Funding will be available to both the social and private sectors. In the private sector, the fund will be for the benefit of leaseholders to ensure that their buildings are made safe; and in the social sector, where remediation costs would otherwise be too prohibitive.
What are the eligibility criteria?
As with the ACM fund last year, funding will be available for buildings that are 18m or above.
The government has also said that building owners will be required to pursue warranty claims and take “appropriate action against those responsible for putting unsafe cladding on these buildings, with any damages recovered paid to Government once recouped.”
What are warranty claims?
Warranty claims refer to claims made under latent defect insurance policies. Those policies provide cover for newly built properties in the event of an inherent defect that was not capable of being discovered through inspection before completion.
Typically, latent defect policies are triggered in the event of (a) a non-compliance with the relevant Building Regulations that applied at the time of construction/conversion; and (b) which causes a present or imminent danger.
Given the above, unsafe non-ACM cladding that has been installed in high-rise residential blocks is likely to meet those requirements.
What other claims might be available against those responsible for putting unsafe cladding on buildings?
Those involved with the original cladding installations may include Main Contractors, Architects, and specialist cladding subcontractors. The type of claims that can be brought against them will differ in each case, and will depend upon the nature of the relationships between the parties, and the specific work that was undertaken.
One route to making a recovery against those involved with the original cladding installation is under the Defective Premises Act 1972.
The Defective Premises Act imposes a duty on builders and any other professionals who take on work in connection with the provision of a dwelling. It requires the work to be done in a professional or workmanlike manner, with proper materials, and that the dwelling is for habitation when completed. The duty is owed to every person who acquires a legal or equitable interest in the dwelling.
Summary
The announcement of funding for the remediation of non-ACM buildings underlines the government’s ever-increasing commitment to building safety.
It is also likely to come as a blow to latent defect insurers, who may face a surge in the number of claims made under their policies. The potential for claims will be increased if, as expected, local authorities and Fire and Rescue Services are granted enforcement powers where building owners refuse to apply for funding, or otherwise refuse to remediate their buildings.
Alex Rosenfield is a Senior associate at Fenchurch Law
Endurance Corporate Capital Limited v Sartex Quilts & Textiles Limited [2020] EWCA Civ 308 – Indemnity on the Reinstatement basis
In its decision earlier this year, the Court of Appeal confirmed that, absent a contractual provision to the contrary, an insured does not need to show a genuine, fixed and settled intention to reinstate in order to recover on the reinstatement basis under a property policy.
Background
Sartex Quilts & Textiles Limited (“Sartex”) was the owner of a factory at Crossfield Works, Rochdale (‘the Property’), from which it had manufactured textiles.
A serious fire occurred at the Property in 2011 destroying it and the plant and machinery it contained. Sartex was insured by Endurance Corporate Capital Limited (“Endurance”).
Endurance accepted liability for Sartex’s claim, but the parties disagreed as to the basis on which Sartex was entitled to indemnity. Specifically, Sartex claimed that it was entitled to the cost of reinstating the Property to the condition that it was in immediately before the fire, whereas Endurance argued that Sartex was only entitled to (significantly lower) sums representing the diminution in market value of the Property as a result of the fire.
The matter originally came before David Railton QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in May 2019. He concluded that Sartex had a genuine intention to reinstate the Property, and that accordingly, reinstatement was the appropriate measure of indemnity. The Deputy Judge also rejected Endurance’s argument that there should be a discount for betterment.
The Appeal
Endurance appealed the decision on the basis that the Deputy Judge was wrong to assess damages on the reinstatement basis, when Sartex had not demonstrated a genuine intention to reinstate. In this regard, it asserted that Sartex’s ongoing failure to achieve reinstatement, 8 years after the fire, showed that it had no such intention.
Further, if Endurance failed on its primary case, it argued that the Deputy Judge was wrong not to make a deduction for betterment.
The Court’s decision
The measure of indemnity
Leggatt LJ observed that in indemnity insurance, damages were intended to put the insured in the same position it would have been in had the loss not occurred. What an insured actually intended to do with the damages was generally irrelevant.
There were two bases on which the court could award damages: (a) the cost of repair; or (b) the reduction in the market value of the property. Endurance argued that the latter applied, and relied on the decision in Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) SE v Western Trading [2016] EWCA Civ 1003, in which a listed building was destroyed by a fire. Unusually in that case, the value of the property increased following the fire because its listed status was revoked, thereby improving its development potential. In Great Lakes, Clarke LJ commented that the basis of indemnity was “materially affected by the insured’s intentions in relation to the property”. He went on to say that “the insured’s intention need to be not only genuine, but also fixed and settled. And that what he intends must be at least something which there is a reasonable prospect of him bringing about (at any rate if the insurance money is paid)”.
The Court of Appeal in Sartex said that these comments did not assist Endurance. It was only in rare cases such as Great Lakes, where the property had gone up in value, that there was a need to demonstrate a fixed and settled intention to reinstate. No such issue arose in this case. Therefore, to put Sartex in an equivalent position as if the fire had not occurred, it was necessary to award it the cost of repairing the buildings and buying replacement plant and machinery.
Betterment
Endurance asserted that a percentage deduction should be applied to any award of damages, representing the alleged betterment arising from the replacement of the original building with modern materials. The Court of Appeal agreed that a deduction could, in principle, be made for savings if the building or the new machinery would have generated lower running costs; however, it was incumbent upon the insurer to identify and justify those savings. In this case, Endurance had made no attempt to do so, and simply advanced notional deductions for betterment that were unsupported by evidence. Therefore, absent any evidence, the Deputy Judge had been right to reject Endurance’s argument.
Implications of the decision
The decision in Sartex is good news for property owners, who, subject to any alternative provision in a policy, will not be required to show an intention to reinstate in order to recover on the reinstatement basis. The insured’s intentions will only be relevant in exceptional circumstances, which did not apply on the facts.
As to betterment, although property owners may, in some instances, be required to give credit for savings made as a result of reinstatement, the “blanket percentage” approach will be impermissible. A deduction will only be allowed where insurers can prove and quantify the lower running costs of the new building or the greater efficiency of the new plant and machinery.
Alex Rosenfield is a Senior Associate at Fenchurch Law
Unoccupied Buildings conditions – a trap for the unwary
Properties become unoccupied in a number of different scenarios. In a residential context, this might be because the home is not the policyholder’s main residence, or because the policyholder is going on an extended holiday. Similarly, for buy-to-let landlords, a property may become unoccupied for lengthy periods between tenancies.
This short article will explore the requirements that insurers impose where a property is left unoccupied, and how those requirements have been interpreted by the courts.
Home insurance
Standard home insurance policies exclude claims where properties are left unoccupied for extended periods. The rationale is simple: an unoccupied home represents a greater risk as it is more likely to attract thieves, vandals or squatters. Equally, there is a greater chance of structural damage in an unoccupied home because no one is available to deal with, say, a burst pipe or a fire. For those reasons, home insurance policies usually require policyholders to tell their insurers if the property is/becomes unoccupied.
“Unoccupied” is typically defined as: “not being lived in.” The case law suggests that this means actual use as a dwelling. So, in Simmonds v Cockell [1920] 1K.B. 843, a warranty requiring a property to always be occupied did not mean that there would always be someone present, but rather that it would be used as a dwelling house.
Most policies say that the cover will cease if the property is not being lived in “for more than [30] consecutive days” (although the precise number of days will vary from policy to policy). As long as the property is regularly being occupied, temporary unoccupancy will not invalidate the cover. Therefore, in the case of Winicofsky v Army & Navy General Assurance [1919], a condition requiring premises to remain “occupied” was not breached where the policyholder sought temporary refuge in a shelter during an air raid.
Once an insurer is told that a property is unoccupied, it will, if the change is accepted, be entitled to vary the premium and terms, and may raise a small administration charge for the variation. If the change is not accepted, the policyholder will need to arrange specialist unoccupied property insurance.
Commercial insurance
In commercial insurance, unoccupied buildings conditions take on a different character. Commercial policies usually impose a number of obligations, some of which may be quite onerous, which must be complied with if cover is to remain in force despite the property becoming unoccupied.
For example, landlords may be required to ensure that an unoccupied property, or a part of it, is inspected once a week (often with a requirement that a record of the inspection is kept), secured against illegal entry, kept free of combustible material, and disconnected from any mains services. The consequence of a failure to comply with the condition depends on whether it is expressed as a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability. If it is, the condition must be complied with absolutely, and any breach will entitle the insurer to deny liability for the claim. If it is not, the position will turn on whether the insurer has suffered prejudice.
A common scenario is that a property becomes unoccupied without the policyholder’s knowledge. This might occur in a landlord’s policy, where, say, a tenant vacates the property without giving notice. Commercial policies usually cater to that scenario by including “non-invalidation clauses”. These are terms which provide that cover will not be invalidated in the event of any act, omission or alteration which is either unknown to the policyholder or beyond its control. To gain the benefit of those clauses, the policyholder will be required to notify its insurer immediately of the act, omission or alteration.
Application of Section 11 of the Insurance Act
Section 11 of the Insurance Act is intended to prevent an insurer from disputing a claim for non-compliance with a term which is unconnected to the actual loss. The Law Commission has said that a causation test is not required; rather, the test is simply whether there is a possibility that the non-compliance could have increased the risk of loss.
Since Section 11 is capable of applying to Unoccupied Buildings conditions, how might it apply in this context?
Let us suppose that a landlord owns a property which has two floors, and the upper floor is unoccupied. A fire then starts on the ground floor, which spreads to the upper floor. Insurers then discover that the landlord breached the Unoccupied Buildings condition by failing to keep the building free of combustible materials, and refuse to pay the claim. There are not yet any authorities on the meaning and application of Section 11.
On an orthodox interpretation of section 11, it would not be open to the policyholder to argue the upper floor would have caught fire in any event, even if the condition had been complied with. However, on a non-orthodox interpretation, section 11 should arguably come to the policyholder’s rescue: the fire started on the ground floor, which was occupied, and compliance with the condition would not have made a difference to the loss.
Conclusion
Almost all property owners, whether acting as private homeowners or in a commercial context, will need to consider the implications of unoccupied buildings conditions at some point.
We would recommend that policyholders check the fine print of their policies in order to understand (a) when they need to notify their insurers if a property becomes unoccupied; and (b) the steps which need to be taken in order to comply with Unoccupied Buildings conditions. A failure to do so may be the difference between an insurer paying, or refusing to pay, a claim.
Alex Rosenfield is a Senior Associate at Fenchurch Law
Government to fund replacement of Grenfell-style cladding
Almost 2 years after the Grenfell Tower tragedy, the government has stepped in to speed up the removal and replacement of unsafe aluminium composite material cladding (“ACM cladding”) on privately owned, high-rise buildings. What are the implications for building owners?
On 9 May, the government announced its intention to make around £200m available to remove and replace ACM cladding from approximately 170 privately owned, high-rise buildings. The decision was driven by the slow pace by building owners to replace ACM cladding on their buildings, and the government’s view that ACM cladding represents an unparalleled fire risk.
Guidance on the Fund was published on 18 July. There are three eligibility criteria:
1. The Fund is available for the benefit of leaseholders in residential buildings over 18m in height;
2. Applicants will need to confirm that they are replacing cladding with materials of limited combustibility.
3. The government expects owners to actively pursue “all reasonable claims” against those involved in the original cladding installations, and to pursue warranty claims “where possible”.
Applications to the Fund can only be made by the “responsible entity”. This will usually be the building owner, head leaseholder, or Management Company with responsibility for the repair of the property. If a responsible entity does not apply or refuses to apply to the Fund, the Guidance states that local authorities and fire and rescue services are likely to take enforcement action under the Housing Act 2004.
What is a warranty claim?
Warranty claims refer to claims made under latent defect insurance policies. Those policies provide cover for newly built properties in the event of an inherent defect which was not capable of being discovered through inspection before completion.
Typically, latent defect policies are triggered in the event of (a) a non-compliance with the relevant Building Regulations which applied at the time of construction/conversion; and (b) which causes a present or imminent danger.
Unsafe ACM cladding which has been installed in high-rise residential blocks will meet those requirements.
What other claims might be available against those involved with the original cladding installations?
Those involved with the original cladding installations are likely to include Main Contractors, Architects, and specialist cladding subcontractors. The type of claims that can be brought against them will differ in each case, and will depend upon the nature of the relationships between the parties, and the specific work which was undertaken.
One route to making a recovery against those involved with the original cladding installation is under the Defective Premises Act 1972.
The Defective Premises Act imposes a duty on builders and any other professionals who take on work in connection with the provision of a dwelling. It requires the work to be done in a professional or workmanlike manner, with proper materials, and that the dwelling is for habitation when completed. The duty is owed to every person who acquires a legal or equitable interest in the dwelling.
Summary
The message from the government is clear. Responsible entities that are eligible to apply to the Fund must do so at the earliest possible juncture, and must pursue claims available under latent defect insurance policies as a pre-requisite to any funding.
The Guidance does not explain what a “reasonable claim” against those involved with a building’s original construction/conversion would look like, and this is likely to be assessed on a case by case basis.
Our recommendation is that building owners investigate the roles played by those parties, and the availability of any claims against them. Even where a party is no longer in business, there may be insurance cover that would still respond.
Alex Rosenfield is an associate at Fenchurch law
Young v Royal and Sun Alliance PLC
The Court of Session found that an insurer had not waived disclosure under the Insurance Act 2015 (“the Act”). The case is the first to be decided under the Act.
Background
A fire occurred at Mr Young’s property (“the Property”) causing extensive damage. Mr Young then claimed an indemnity from his insurers, Royal and Sun Alliance PLC (“RSA”).
RSA declined Mr Young’s claim on the basis that he had failed to disclose material information pursuant to section 3(1) of the Act. Mr Young denied making a material non-disclosure, and, in any event, argued that RSA had waived disclosure of that information, pursuant to section 3(5)(e) of the Act.
The Market Presentation
Mr Young’s insurance was arranged by his broker by way of a 20-page Market Presentation (“the Presentation”). The Presentation was completed using the broker’s software, and identified the insured as Mr Young and Kaim Park Investments Ltd (“Kaim”).
The “Details” section of the Presentation contained the following passage, which the judge referred to as the “Moral Hazard Declaration”:
“Select any of the following that apply to any proposer, director or partner of the Trade or Business or its Subsidiary Companies if they have ever, either personally or in any business capacity:”
The Moral Hazard Declaration required the proposer to select from seven options in a drop-down menu. The answer selected was “None”.
RSA emailed the broker on 24 April 2017 in response to the Presentation (“the Email”). The Email contained a heading titled “Subjectivity”, and stated as follows:
“Insured has never
Been declared bankrupt or insolvent
Had a liquidator appointed
…”
The Parties’ positions
RSA asserted that Mr Young failed to disclose that he had been a director of four insolvent companies (“the Insolvency Information”), and, had he done so, it would not have entered into the insurance “on any terms”.
Mr Young, in response, argued that the Presentation contained no misrepresentation, as neither he, Kaim, nor any director of Kaim had ever been insolvent. Further, by referring to “the insured” in the Email, Mr Young said that RSA had waived any entitlement to disclosure of prior insolvencies or bankruptcies experienced by anyone other than the insured themselves.
RSA denied that it had waived disclosure of the Insolvency Information, as the Email did not set out any questions for Mr Young to respond to. As a result, Mr Young’s failure to disclose the Insolvency Information was unconnected to the Email. Further, RSA said that it had no knowledge of Mr Young’s prior breach of the duty of fair presentation, and, since there must be knowledge of the right before it can be waived, there had been no waiver here.
The decision – was there a waiver?
The Judge firstly referred to the pre-Act case law, which established that an assured seeking to establish waiver would need to show a “clear case” (Doheny v New India Assurance Co Ltd [2005] Lloyd’s Rep I.R. 251). This could be done in one of two ways: (1) where an insured submitted information which contained something which would prompt a reasonably careful insurer to make further enquiries, but the insurer fails to do so; and (2) where an insurer asks a “limited” question such that a reasonable person would be justified in thinking that the insurer had no interest in knowing information falling outside the scope of the question. This case concerned the latter.
In considering the issue, the Judge noted that the term “any business capacity” was capable of including other entities with which the insured was involved. The difficulty for RSA, however, was that the Moral Hazard Declaration was incomplete; although RSA had seen the answer of “None”, it did not know what the “None” referred to.
The Judge held that the Email was aimed at clarifying Mr Young’s answer to the Moral Hazard Declaration, which it achieved by stipulating the specific moral hazards that needed to be addressed. Further, the judge held that the reference to “the insured” in the Email was not limited to Mr Young and Kaim, but also covered the longer formulation contained in the Moral Hazard Declaration. So, read in this context, the judge was satisfied that no reasonable reader would have understood the Email as waiving the part of the Moral Hazard Declaration relating to “any business capacity” in which Mr Young might have acted. Accordingly, the judge held that there was no waiver.
Comments
A number of themes arise in the judgment which are of relevance to policyholders and brokers.
Firstly, the judgment illustrates the potential drawbacks of using bespoke software to place insurance. Here, it was to Mr Young’s detriment that RSA were not using the same software as the broker, the result being that RSA were unable to determine the full extent of what was being disclosed, absent further information being provided.
The judgment also demonstrates that formulations such as “any business capacity”, may, in some circumstances, be broad enough to extend to any company with which an individual insured was involved. However, it is unclear whether that same analysis would apply where insurance is taken out by a business only.
Finally, although the judgment sheds light on what is required to establish waiver, it did not consider issues of materiality or inducement, and so the question of whether RSA can make good their assertion that it would not have written the risk “on any terms” remains to be decided.
Alex Rosenfield is a senior associate at Fenchurch Law.