Covid-19 Business Interruption Update – FCA challenges Orient Express v Generali
The FCA and insurers have now filed their skeleton arguments in the COVID-19 business interruption Test Case, drawing the battle lines and setting out in full the arguments in support of their pleaded cases.
Of particular interest, and with potentially significant wider implications, are the sections on causation, including the application of trends clauses. The general thrust of the FCA’s case on causation is that:
- for disease clauses, the presence of COVID-19 in each locality is an integral part of one single broad and/or indivisible cause, being the COVID-19 pandemic; and
- for public authority/prevention of access clauses, the various ingredients of the clause and the government’s actions in response to the pandemic amount to a single indivisible cause of loss, and the insurers' "salami slicing” of the insuring clause is legally flawed.
Most notably the FCA submits that, not only is Hamblen J’s decision in Orient Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni Generali Sp.A [1] to be distinguished on the facts, but that it was wrongly decided , ‘falls to be revisited’, and is ‘open to correction.’
Recap
Our commentary on the contentious Orient Express case can be found here, but in summary, the case concerned a claim brought by a hotel in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, which had damaged the insured property and devastated the city as a whole. The policyholder claimed for its business interruption losses caused by the damage, but the court found that the application of the trends clause prevented recovery of the losses due to the application of the ‘but for’ test of causation. ‘But for’ the damage to the insured property, the policyholder would still have suffered the same losses because of the damage to the wider area, meaning that there would have been no tourists able to stay in the hotel even if it had been undamaged.
Insurers’ reliance on the case
In relation to COVID-19 business interruption claims, insurers have cited the Orient Express case in support of their arguments that, even if coverage is triggered under Infectious Disease, Public Authority or Prevention of Access clauses, the application of trends clauses in the relevant policies means that adjustments must be made for the wider effects of the pandemic and/or other government actions such as social distancing and the general lockdown. The net result, insurers say, is that policyholders would have suffered the same losses regardless of whether the insured peril can be demonstrated to have been triggered.
The FCA’s case
The FCA attacks Orient Express from a number of angles. First, it notes that this was a first instance decision that was itself an appeal from an arbitration award, and as such was limited in scope to considering whether the arbitral tribunal had made an error of law. The court acknowledged that further arguments could have been made as to the disapplication of the ‘but for’ test in the interests of fairness, and indeed such arguments were raised by the policyholder in the case. But as the arguments had not been raised in the underlying arbitral proceedings, the court was unable to consider them. The court in Orient Express also granted permission to appeal, but the appeal was regrettably never heard as the case was settled.
Secondly the FCA points out, as many policyholders have done repeatedly to insurers, that the decision in Orient Express related to a dispute under a damage-linked BI cover, and that insurers had in fact paid out the available sublimits under the Denial of Access and Loss of Attraction covers in that case. The fact that they had was germane to the decision of the court, since the judge remarked:
“if Generali asserts that the loss has not been caused by the Damage to the Hotel because it would in any event have resulted from the damage to the vicinity or its consequences, it has to accept the causal effect of that damage for the POA or LOA, as indeed it has done. It cannot have it both ways. The ‘but for’ test does not therefore have the consequence that there is no cause and no recoverable loss, but rather a different (albeit, on the facts, more limited) recoverable loss.”
In the present case, insurers are indeed seeking to ‘have it both ways’, since they deny that coverage extends either under the main damage-linked insuring clause or the wider area non-damage extensions.
Thirdly, the FCA argues that the court in Orient Express applied the ‘but for’ test in a fundamentally incorrect way by treating the damage to the property and the underlying cause as distinct competing causes even though the property damage could not have occurred without the hurricane.
Finally, the FCA submits that the court failed to properly apply the superior court decision in The Silver Cloud [2], a case considering claims brought in relation to business interruption losses arising from the 9/11 attacks, in which the Court of Appeal found that the two causes of loss (terrorism and government warnings) were inextricably linked and so could be treated as a single cause. The case has obvious relevance to the present circumstances.
What are the possible outcomes?
Broadly speaking there are three different landings the court may reach on this issue (although inevitably the court may find some more nuanced combination or alternative):
- The Court rules in the FCA’s favour – Orient Express was wrongly decided, and the ‘but for’ test should consider a counterfactual in which the broader underlying cause of loss is removed. This outcome is very unlikely at first instance: although not technically bound by the High Court decision in Orient Express, the decision will be viewed as highly persuasive authority, and the court in this case is unlikely to depart from it, since this would result in two conflicting lower court decisions. It is possible however that the court may simply find that it is bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in The Silver Cloud rather than the lower court decision in Orient Express. Any such decision would almost certainly be appealed by insurers.
- The Court rules in insurers’ favour – the application of Orient Express means no (or limited) recovery even if coverage is triggered. In this case it is quite possible, that the court may in its judgment indicate that whilst it finds itself bound to follow Orient Express, it disagrees with the decision in whole or in part. Either way, by arguing that Orient Express ‘falls to be reconsidered’, the FCA must presumably be contemplating appealing on this issue to seek the overturning of the decision by the higher courts. As the Framework Agreement expressly contemplates a leapfrog appeal, it is therefore possible that this issue could fall for determination by the Supreme Court in the near future.
- Alternatively, the Court may take the somewhat easier path of distinguishing Orient Express on the basis that it only applies to property damage losses, which has also been argued by the FCA. This would leave the legal principle intact, but would narrow the scope of its application so that it does not act to limit claims brought under non-damage BI extensions, which is surely right, since these extensions are themselves effectively intended to respond to ‘wide area’ perils. Such a ruling would still have significant implications for insurers and may well still be appealed.
It is clear that the FCA’s Test Case has far-reaching implications beyond the scope of COVID-19 business interruption coverage for which it has been brought, and whilst these issues will be fiercely contested by insurers, the end result will hopefully be a greater degree of judicial clarity and certainty, which in the long term can only be in the best interests of both policyholders and insurers.
[1] Orient Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni Generali Sp.A [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm), [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 531
[2] IFP&C Insurance Ltd (Publ) v Silversea Cruises Ltd, the Silver Cloud [2004] EWCA Civ 76, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep 696 CA
The Good, the Bad & the Ugly: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. #6 (The Bad). Orient-Express Hotels v Generali
Welcome to the latest in the series of blogs from Fenchurch Law: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. An opinionated and practical guide to the most important insurance decisions relating to the London / English insurance markets, all looked at from a pro-policyholder perspective.
Some cases are correctly decided and positive for policyholders. We celebrate those cases as The Good.
Some cases are, in our view, bad for policyholders, wrongly decided, and in need of being overturned. We highlight those decisions as The Bad.
Other cases are bad for policyholders but seem (even to our policyholder-tinted eyes) to be correctly decided. Those cases can trip up even the most honest policyholder with the most genuine claim. We put the hazard lights on those cases as The Ugly.
At Fenchurch Law we love the insurance market. But we love policyholders just a little bit more.
#6 (The Bad)
Orient-Express Hotels v Generali
Business interruption (BI) policies in the UK ordinarily provide for recovery of loss caused by physical damage to property at the insured premises, subject to adjustment to reflect other factors that would have affected the business in any event.
In Orient Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni Generali SPA t/a Generali Global Risk [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that the ‘but for’ causation test applies under standard BI policy wordings where there are two concurrent independent causes of loss, and there could be no indemnity for financial loss concurrently caused by: (1) damage to the insured premises - a luxury hotel in New Orleans, and (2) evacuation of the city as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Orient Express Hotels Ltd (OEH) was owner of the Windsor Court Hotel (the Hotel), which suffered significant hurricane damage in August and September 2005 leading to its closure for a period of two months. The surrounding area was also devastated by the storms, with the entire city shut down for several weeks following the declaration of a state of emergency, and the imposition of a curfew and mandatory evacuation order.
A dispute arose concerning the interpretation of OEH’s BI policy (subject to English law and an arbitration provision), which provided cover for BI loss “directly arising from Damage”, defined as “direct physical loss destruction or damage to the Hotel”. The trends clause provided for variations or special circumstances that would have affected the business had the Damage not occurred to be taken into account, “so that the figures thus adjusted shall represent as nearly as may be reasonably practicable the results which but for the Damage would have been obtained during [the indemnity period]”.
The arbitral Tribunal held that OEH could only recover in respect of loss which would not have arisen had the damage to the Hotel not occurred, and this meant that OEH was to be put in the position of an owner of an undamaged hotel in an otherwise damaged city. Since New Orleans itself was effectively closed for several weeks due to widespread flooding, with no-one able to visit the area or stay at the Hotel even if it had (theoretically) been undamaged, OEH could not recover under the primary insuring provisions for BI loss suffered during this period. A limited award of damages was made under separate Loss of Attraction and Prevention of Access extensions to the policy.
OEH appealed to the Commercial Court, arguing that the Tribunal’s approach was inappropriate given the wide area damage to the Hotel and the vicinity caused by the same hurricanes. OEH sought to rely upon principles established in: Miss Jay Jay [1987] and IF P&C Insurance v Silversea Cruises [2004], that, where there are two proximate causes of a loss, the insured can recover if one of the causes is insured, provided the other cause is not excluded; and Kuwait Airways Corpn. v Iraqi Airways Co. [2002], that, where a loss has been caused by two or more tortfeasors and the claimant is unable to prove which caused the loss, the Courts will occasionally relax the ‘but for’ test and conclude that both tortfeasors caused the damage, to avoid an over-exclusionary approach.
Mr Justice Hamblen dismissed the appeal, concluding that no error of law had been established in relation to the Tribunal’s application of a ‘but for’ causation test under the policy on the facts as found at the arbitration hearing, whilst recognising “as a matter of principle there is considerable force in much of OEH’s argument”. The insurance authorities mentioned above were distinguished as involving interdependent concurrent causes, in which case the ‘but for’ test would be satisfied. The Court did appear to accept that there may be insurance cases where principles of fairness and reasonableness meant that the ‘but for’ causation test is not applicable, but OEH was unable to establish an error of law by the Tribunal where this argument had not been raised at the arbitration hearing. Given these evidential constraints on an appeal limited to questions of law, OEH was unsuccessful in the Commercial Court.
Permission to appeal was granted, indicating that the Court considered OEH’s grounds for further challenge had a real prospect of success. Settlement on commercial terms was agreed between the parties prior to the Court of Appeal hearing.
The decision in this case has been criticised by commentators as unfair, giving rise to the surprising result that the more widespread the impact of a natural peril, the less cover is afforded under the policy. Leading textbooks (including Riley on Business Interruption Insurance and Hickmott’s Interruption Insurance: Proximate Loss Issues) express concern at this unsatisfactory outcome, noting that the ‘windfall loss’ applied by Generali under the trends clause during the period when OEH itself was affected by its own damage did not reflect the approach adopted by insurers following, for example, the earlier London bombings, or severe flooding in Cumbria in 2009. We consider that that the true intention of the London market was that, in the event of wide area damage, claims would be met up to the level that would have applied had the damage been restricted solely to the insured’s own property at the premises.
In our view, the approach taken by the Tribunal and upheld by the Commercial Court in this case is wrong in principle. It is hoped that an opportunity will arise for the English Courts to revisit this issue and adopt a fairer approach to indemnity under standard UK wordings, to remedy the potential injustice for policyholders. In the meantime, those taking out BI policies should seek amendment of the trends clause to provide for the policyholder to be put in the position they would have been “but for the event(s) causing the damage” (instead of “but for the damage to insured premises”), and to agree sufficient limits of indemnity under extensions for Loss of Attraction and Prevention of Access.
