A “WIN WIN” for Policyholders
Background
Delos Shipholding S.A. v Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty S.E. [2024] EWHC 719 (Comm) is one of several recent judgments to consider the scope of an insured’s duty of fair presentation under the English Insurance Act 2015 (the “Act”) and helpfully applies that duty in a manner likely to favour policyholders; also noteworthy are the Commercial Court’s observations on the concept of fortuity and on the duty to sue and labour. The Court additionally considered and rejected the insureds’ claim under section 13A of the Act for damages arising from late payment, which is not covered in this article.
Facts
The bulk carrier ‘WIN WIN’ (the “Vessel”) was insured under a policy (the “Policy”) incorporating an amended form of the American Institute Hull War Risks and Strikes clause.
In February 2019, the Master unknowingly anchored the Vessel in Indonesian territorial waters without permission. Some days later, the Indonesian Navy detained the Vessel for having done so illegally. The Master was prosecuted for contravening Indonesian shipping law, with the Vessel only being redelivered to the insureds in January 2020. The insureds alleged that the Vessel had become a constructive total loss and served several Notices of Abandonment on insurers, all of which were rejected. The insureds then commenced suit to claim for total loss of the Vessel under the Policy, as well as damages for late payment of their claim under section 13A of the Act.
At trial, insurers accepted that the conditions for a total loss had had been met, but alleged that (i) they were entitled to avoid the Policy for material non-disclosure, (ii) the detainment was not fortuitous, and (iii) the delay in release was materially caused by the insureds’ unreasonable conduct in breach of their duty to sue and labour. None of the defences succeeded and the Court allowed the insureds’ claim. The insureds’ claim for damages under section 13A of the Act was, however, dismissed.
Material non-disclosure
At the time the Policy was renewed on 29 June 2018, one Mr Bairactaris, who was the sole director of the first claimant (the shipowner), was being prosecuted by the Greek authorities on charges relating to a shipment of heroin (the “Charges”). Mr Bairactaris was also at all material times a nominee director of the first claimant. In other words, he exercised no independent judgment as director and instead acted on the instructions of other persons, who in this case where the second claimant (the Vessel’s commercial managers) and its owner.
Insurers sought to avoid the Policy on the basis that the insureds had breached their duty of fair presentation. Accordingly, Insurershad to establish that:
- the insureds had actual or constructive knowledge of the Charges;
- the Charges were a material circumstance that should have been (but was not) disclosed at the time of renewal; and
- the relevant underwriter had been induced by the non-disclosure of the Charges to write the risk.
(i) Knowledge
So far as actual knowledge was concerned, since Mr Bairactaris was the only individual within the claimants who knew of the Charges, the key issue was whether the first claimant had been fixed with knowledge of the Charges via section 4(3)(a) of the Act, which attributes to an insured “what is known to ... the insured’s senior management”. Section 4(8)(c) of the Act defines senior management as “those individuals who play significant roles in the making of decisions about how the insured’s activities are to be managed or organised”.
Notwithstanding his position as nominee director, the Court found that Mr Bairactaris was not part of senior management. It was the substance of the role played by him which was determinative, and since his responsibilities as sole nominee director were confined to executing administrative formalities (rather than the organisation of the first claimant’s activities), he could not be regarded as senior management.
This case thus demonstrates the key principles regarding the “knowledge” of a corporate policyholder and re-states the balance under English insurance law between the rights of the insurer to be provided with the material facts prior to inception of a policy against the practical challenges faced by those responsible for the insurance of corporate policyholders in ensuring they are in possession of the material facts in the first place.
As the Court also found that the insureds also did not have any constructive knowledge of the Charges, the defence of material non-disclosure failed at the first hurdle. The Court nevertheless continued to consider the remaining issues
(ii) Materiality
The parties agreed that the test for materiality was substantively unchanged by the Act, i.e. it was whether a prudent underwriter would have wanted to take the undisclosed circumstances (here, the Charges) into account.
The more controversial issue was whether the hypothetical prudent underwriter could also take into account exculpatory circumstances under the test for materiality. These consisted of information that the insureds would also have made known to insurers had the Charges been disclosed, including in this case:
- Mr Bairactaris’ firm belief that the charges were without foundation; and
- the fact that Mr Bairactaris was a nominee director fulfilling only an administrative function and had no role in the operation of the Vessel.
The Court observed that, had it been necessary to decide, it would have held that that exculpatory circumstances could be taken into account; were it otherwise, an insurer “could … be as selective as it liked in how it defined the circumstances which it alleged could be disclosed”. On the facts, the Court observed that the Charges (considered with the said exculpatory circumstances) would have been material and would have led a prudent underwriter to consider imposing a condition, e.g. that Mr Bairactaris should be replaced as a nominee director.
(iii) Inducement & Remedy
The Court found that, had the Charges been disclosed, the actual underwriter would have imposed a condition requiring replacement of Mr Bairactaris as nominee director. The test for inducement under section 8(1)(b) of the Act would thus have been satisfied – the situation was one where, but for the non-disclosure of the Charges, insurers would only have entered into the Policy on different terms.
Insurers would thus have been entitled to treat the Policy as though it included the above condition (per paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of the Act). The more interesting issue was whether, in this case, it was equally open to the insured to then prove that it could and would have complied with the condition. The Court, accepting that “sauce for the goose [was] … equally sauce for the gander”, opined that insureds could, and that on the facts the insureds would, have complied with a condition requiring replacement of Mr Bairactaris in any event; as such, insurers would have been without a remedy even if they had successfully proved knowledge of the Charges.
Other issues
This wide-ranging judgment covered several other issues, two of which are dealt with below.
(i) Fortuity
Insurers relied on the proposition set out in The Wondrous [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 400, that the ordinary consequences of an assured’s deliberate and voluntary conduct are not fortuitous and do not fall within the cover provided by all risks policies. Insurers argued that, by anchoring in Indonesian waters, the Vessel had voluntarily exposed herself to the operation of local law. The consequent detention was simply an ordinary consequence of that voluntary conduct.
These arguments failed. The Court declined to read the proposition in The Wondrous so widely and instead clarified that the proposition had two aspects:
- First, there must be some choice by the insured. This implies awareness that a decision is being made between two or more options which are different in some relevant sense.
- Second, the consequences must be such as to flow in the ordinary course of events. This requires the consequence to be “inevitable in the sense that it is bound to eventuate in the ordinary course”.
Neither aspect was satisfied on the facts. Since the Master did not realise that the Vessel was in Indonesian waters to begin with, there was no conscious choice by the Master to anchor there. Further, since at the time of detention the Indonesian navy had only just begun to arrest vessels that had been anchored in Indonesian waters without permission (whereas previously there no reported cases of such detention), the detention was neither inevitable nor an ordinary consequence of the Vessel’s conduct.
(ii) Sue and Labour
Both the terms of the Policy and section 78(4) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 imposed on the insureds a duty to sue and labour. In simple terms, this duty is analogous to a contract party’s duty to mitigate its losses caused by a breach of contract and in the same way, the duty to Sue and Labour requires the insured to make every attempt to reduce the possible exposure to loss.
Insurers argued that, by being side-tracked into discussions with the Navy which involved considerations of a bribe or something similar (which the insureds were ultimately not prepared to do), the insureds had unreasonably protracted Indonesian Court proceedings against the Master and delayed the release of the Vessel.
The Court reiterated the well-established principle that an alleged breach of the duty to sue and labour would only afford insurers a defence where the breach breaks the chain of causation between the insured peril and the loss. This required the insured to act in a way in which no prudent uninsured would have acted; a mere error of judgment or negligence would not suffice. On the facts, there was no breach of the duty – given the uncertain circumstances faced by the insureds, there was no way of their knowing that engaging in discussions with the Navy would “slow things down”, so it could not be said that the insureds had acted in a way that no prudent uninsured would have acted.
Comment
The Court’s policyholder-friendly reading of both the elements of the duty of fair presentation, as well as of the meaning of the “ordinary consequences of an assured’s deliberate and voluntary conduct”, are welcome developments for policyholders. That said, many of the Court’s observations – particularly in relation to the issues of materiality and insurers’ remedies – were obiter, and it remains to be seen if future judgments will follow the lead established here.
Eugene Lee is a Senior Associate, and Toby Nabarro is a Director at Fenchurch Law.
Lithium Battery Fires – Not so Lit?
Introduction
Lithium batteries (also known as lithium-ion batteries) have become commonplace in devices such as mobile phones, cameras, laptops, e-cigarettes, tablets and e-bikes. They are popular because, unlike alkaline batteries, they are rechargeable and can be used multiple times, making them a comparatively sustainable energy source.
This article will outline the key risks and coverage issues associated with lithium batteries for policyholders.
Why are Lithium Batteries so dangerous?
The London Fire Brigade has said that lithium battery fires are the fastest growing cause of fires in London in 2024. That is because of the phenomenon of ‘thermal runaway’, which occurs when flammable materials within lithium batteries break down. This is usually due to manufacturing defects or when the battery cells overcharge, which can lead to the release of a cloud of flammable gases which, in turn, can cause vapour cloud explosions. The vapour cloud explosions exacerbate the ignition of the battery and the speed at which a fire spreads.
Lithium battery fires can be unpredictable, and it is common for batteries to reignite days after the initial ignition. That is why they can cause such large fires, as seen at the Suez Recycling Centre in July 2024, where the most likely cause of the fire was thought to be the improper disposal of a lithium battery, which ignited in a pile of waste of around 100sqm (and it took 15 fire engines and 100 firefighters to quell the blaze). As a further example, a fire was allegedly caused at a home in Wales in September 2024, by a mobility scooter that was charging. Firefighters were present at the blaze for more than 12 hours.
The Wider Problem
The unpredictable nature of lithium battery fires may result in some building and property insurers declining and restricting cover for fires caused by them, or charging additional premium to cover this risk.
Further, it may be more difficult for companies whose businesses rely heavily on lithium batteries, such as those in the manufacture, supply and retail of products which utilise lithium batteries to obtain cover from their product liability insurers.
The legal climate around lithium batteries is changing, as we have seen with the introduction of the Lithium-ion Battery Safety Bill which aims to regulate the safe storage, use and disposal of lithium batteries in the UK. However, as we have seen with other emerging risks such as climate change, further discussion may be required between the relevant stakeholders to ensure that lithium battery risks do not become “uninsurable”.
The following section sets out some of the key coverage issues that may arise.
Coverage Issues for Policyholders
Breach of the duty of fair presentation
Policyholders are required to make a fair presentation of the risk under the Insurance Act 2015 (“the Act”). To make a fair presentation, a policyholder must disclose all “material circumstances” to the insurer that the policyholder knows or ought to know. Failing that, an insured can satisfy the duty by giving the insurer sufficient information to put it on notice that it needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances (section 3(4)(b) of the Act). A circumstance or representation is ‘material’ if it would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms. The duty is not limited to answering questions asked by the insurer in a proposal form.
So, for example, say a policyholder deliberately discloses to an insurer that it has a sophisticated strategy in place for mitigating the risk of fire due to the high number of products containing lithium batteries at its premises when, in fact, the position is otherwise. In that situation, an insurer would probably be entitled to refuse to indemnify the policyholder for a claim on the basis that, had the true position been disclosed, it would have provided insurance on different terms, if at all.
A more difficult position may arise when an insurer does not ask any specific questions about the extent to which lithium batteries are used in an insured’s business, and an insured inadvertently fails to disclose the true position on inception or renewal. Is the use or storage of products which contain lithium batteries itself a material circumstance? If so, will disclosure of the type of products supplied or stored be sufficient to put the insurer on notice and discharge the duty owed under section 3(4)(b), or will an insured have to spell out that the products contain lithium batteries?
It should be borne in mind that not all lithium batteries necessarily pose a fire risk. In that regard, the Fire Protection Association has provided guidance that each fire protection and mitigation strategy should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. That will include a consideration of the battery type, the Battery Energy Storage System (“BESS”) and layout.
Breach of Condition Precedent to Liability
Insurance policies frequently contain terms known as ‘conditions precedent to liability’. Subject to certain provisions in the Act, such terms must be complied with strictly, otherwise there is no cover for the claim.
In Wheeldon Brothers Waste Limited v Millennium Insurance Company Limited [2018] EWHC 834 (TCC), the policy contained a condition precedent that combustible waste had to be stored at least 6m from any fixed plant. On the evidence, the court found there was no breach of the condition precedent, and that “storage” meant a degree of permanence and a deliberate decision to designate an area to place and keep material.
Guidance from the Fire Protection Association states that the BESS should be (a) located in non-combustible containers or enclosures, (b) placed at least 3 metres from other equipment, buildings, structures and storage, and (c) the distance should only be reduced when there is a suitable-fire barrier, where exposed surfaces and fire-resisting, or where BESS enclosures have fire-resisting walls and roofs. If insurers impose conditions relating to storage in compliance with this guidance, the decision in Wheeldon is potentially relevant as to what “storage” means.
It is open to a policyholder to rely on section 11 of the Act and show that the breach could not have increased the risk of loss which occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred. For example, if there was a fire at a policyholder’s premises, and it had breached a condition requiring it to store lithium batteries in a particular way, to escape the consequences of breach, the policyholder would need to prove, in effect, that compliance would not have impacted the general risk of fire.
Concluding Thoughts
There is no UK specific guidance or legislation to govern lithium battery use, storage or disposal. Policyholders should therefore consult reliable guidance to ensure that fire risk strategies are sufficient on a case-by-case basis, and compliant with the terms of the policy.
If in doubt, policyholders should consult with their brokers on inception and renewal to ensure that they have complied with their disclosure obligations and are able to satisfy the applicable policy terms to maximise the chance of policy coverage in the event of a lithium battery fire.
Ayo Babatunde is an Associate at Fenchurch Law.
The Good, the Bad & the Ugly: #24 The (mostly) Ugly: Tynefield Care Ltd (and others) v the New India Assurance Company Ltd
Welcome to the latest in the series of blogs from Fenchurch Law: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. An opinionated and practical guide to the most important insurance decisions relating to the London / English insurance markets, all looked at from a pro-policyholder perspective.
Some cases are correctly decided and positive for policyholders. We celebrate those cases as The Good.
In our view, some cases are bad for policyholders, wrongly decided and in need of being overturned. We highlight those decisions as The Bad.
Other cases are bad for policyholders but seem (even to our policyholder-tinted eyes) to be correctly decided. Those cases can trip up even the most honest policyholder with the most genuine claim. We put the hazard lights on those cases as The Ugly.
#24 The (mostly) Ugly: Tynefield Care Ltd (and others) v the New India Assurance Company Ltd
Background
A substantial fire broke out at a care home which was owned and operated by the insured Claimants. At the time of the fire, the Claimants had a policy of insurance with New India Assurance co Ltd (“New India”), under which New India agreed to indemnify them against various losses.
Following the fire, the Claimants claimed from New India the cost incurred of having to move residents out of the care home for four weeks in order to carry out remedial work, as well as the cost of the remedial work itself.
New India refused to indemnify the Claimants on the basis that they misrepresented and failed to disclose that their Mr Khosla, a de facto director (a director who performs the duties and functions of a director, but without being legally appointed as such), was a de jure director (a legally appointed director) of a company that previously went into administration (“the Khosla Insolvency”).
The Claimants accepted that Mr Khosla was a de facto director at all relevant times, but denied making a misrepresentation or failing to disclose the Khosla Insolvency.
Although the Claimants had been taken out policies with New India from 2013 onwards, this article will address the parts of the Judgment that deal with the post-Insurance Act 2015 (“the IA 2015”) position.
The Good – was there a misrepresentation?
The relevant question in the Proposal asked: “Have you or any director or partner been declared bankrupt, been a director of a company which went into liquidation, administration or receivership. If so give details” (“the Insolvency Question”).
The Claimants answered the Insolvency Question in the negative. New India asserted that their answer was a misrepresentation, because any person who had the status of a director, if not the title, was nevertheless a director for the purposes of the Companies Act. It also argued that any reasonable person completing the Proposal would have realised that “what was being asked related to the reality of the position”.
The Claimants disagreed. They said that the word ‘director’ should be restricted to its plain meaning, i.e., a legally appointed director, and that to hold otherwise would create uncertainty and confusion because a policyholder needs to understand precisely what is being asked of it.
The Judge, Judge Rawlings, agreed with the Claimants: the Claimants were not taken to be qualified lawyers who understood the concepts of de facto and shadow director (and he accepted their evidence that they didn’t even know what those terms meant). The Judge also held that while one could determine if a person had been appointed as a de jure director with certainty, that was not the case with de facto directors, which would turn on a number of factors, including that individual’s role and responsibilities and how they were perceived by others in the organisation.
So far, so Good. But that was not the end of the story.
The Ugly – Was there a failure to disclose a material circumstance under s. 3 of the IA 2015
The duty of fair presentation requires an insured to disclose to an insurer every material fact which it knows or ought to know, in a manner which would be reasonably clear and accessible. A circumstance will be material if it would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms.
Therefore, quite apart from the Insolvency Question – which the Judge found did not embrace the Khosla Insolvency – the question was whether the Khosla Insolvency was material, and therefore disclosable, in any event.
Applying the summary of the law provided by Lionel Percy QC in Berkshire Assets (West London) Ltd v AXA Insurance UK PLC (see our article on that decision here), and particularly the principle that facts which raise doubt as to the risk, without more, are sufficient to be material, the Judge found that the Khosla Insolvency was a material fact. Specifically, the Judge held:
“Whist I cannot say whether a prudent underwriter would, if asked to provide insurance for the first time, refuse to provide that insurance, or only agree to do so on more stringent terms than would otherwise be the case, because of those concerns, it seems to me clear that a prudent underwriter would, at least be influenced or affected by those concerns and would.”
The Judge also considered – but had no hesitation in rejecting – the Claimants’ further argument that New India waived disclosure of the Khosla Insolvency because the Insolvency Question only used the term “director”. That argument was wrong, the Judge found, because a reasonable person would have appreciated that New India had not waived the requirement to disclose that Mr Khosla controlled the management of the Claimants, and was their director in all but name. Accordingly, the case was distinguished from cases such as Ristorante v Zurich (see our article on that decision here), because the insolvency question in that case enquired only about “owners, directors, business partners or family members of the business” i.e., unlike in this case, it did not extend to other business with which those individuals were involved.
Having found that the Claimants failed to disclose a material circumstance, and thus breached their duty of fair presentation, the next issue to be decided was whether that failure was deliberate, reckless, or innocent. The judge held it was the latter. In particular, he accepted the Claimants’ evidence that they did not, at the relevant time, understand what “de facto director” and “shadow director” meant, and therefore would not have understood the Insolvency Question to be referring to Mr Khosla. The Judge also accepted Mr Khosla’s evidence that he had not read the proposal forms, and was unlikely to have read the Statement of Facts, either. While the Judge was satisfied that those failings were negligent, we can see how a different Judge could just as easily have found it to have been reckless (i.e., where a claimant “does not care” whether or not it was in breach of the duty).
The final issue to be decided was the remedy to which New India was entitled. New India’s evidence, which the Judge accepted, was that it had a strict policy of refusing to incept policies if it was disclosed to it that a director (which included Mr Khosla) had been a director of a company which had gone into liquidation. Accordingly, pursuant to the IA 2015, New India was entitled to refuse the Claimants’ claim, but had to refund the premiums.
Conclusion
We think Tynefield is a paradigm example of an ugly decision. In particular, while we sympathise with the Claimants given the wording of the Insolvency Question, the position in this case was that Mr Khosla was essentially “running the show”, such that his insolvency history was disclosable.
The decision is a salutary reminder that there is a critical difference between a misrepresentation and a non-disclosure, and that even an honest and correct answer to a question in a Proposal will not avail an insured of its duty under the IA 2015 to disclose material facts.
Alex Rosenfield is an Associate Partner at Fenchurch Law
(Not) the new LEG clauses.
Let me start by making something clear. The clauses referred to below are NOT the new LEG clauses.
Whilst I have made no secret of my view that the LEG committee does need to amend LEG3 (and, perhaps, should have done so before now), and that the decisions in SCB and Archer have provided a golden opportunity to overhaul not just the LEG clauses, but the DE clauses too, I have no involvement in the decision about whether the LEG committee will, in fact, produce new versions of the LEG clauses or, if they do decide to do so, in determining what those clauses will look like. As a result, what is set out below represents nothing more than my own suggestions about how the existing LEG clauses could be amended in order to preserve what I believe to be the general market understanding of their meaning, whilst being expressed in clear language that would be easily understood not only by those who specialise in CAR / Builder’s Risk, but also by those who have no involvement in this particularly fascinating area of insurance.
I have been asked, not unreasonably, whether it is misleading of me even to refer to my own draft clauses by reference to the official LEG clauses. However, after careful consideration I have maintained the view that I originally took instinctively, that it is appropriate for me to do so, for two reasons.
The first is that my proposed clauses are not intended to alter the meaning of the existing clauses but, rather, to express what I regard as the meaning of the existing clauses in a clear way. Whilst I am happy to be challenged about my understanding of the meaning of the existing clauses, it would make no sense for me not to explicitly link my drafts to the current clauses, because my re-drafts of each clause only make sense when considered in the context of the original. I don’t consider it to be my place, as a lawyer, to be suggesting that the intention of the existing clauses should be changed in order to provide more (or less) cover. That is for underwriters and brokers to decide.
The second reason is that, although the LEG clauses are officially maintained by the London Engineering Group (i.e. “LEG”), the existing clauses have become, in my view, public property as a result of their popularity, and by their wide usage across the world. For better or for worse, the scope of cover provided by Builder’s Risk policies in every insurance market needs to be considered in the context of the defects exclusions produced by the LEG committee, whether an official LEG clause is used, or whether a different form of defects exclusion is used (whether from the DE suite, or bespoke clauses).
That being the case, it seems to me that anyone with a serious interest in the health of the Builder’s Risk market has the right to contribute to the debate about what the market-leading suite of defects exclusions (which is what the LEG clauses are) should look like in the next generation of Builder’s Risk policies. I don’t claim to have any unique insight into that debate, or to be writing the last word on the subject, but I do hope that what I say can be a useful contribution to what should be a market-wide conversation about these important clauses.
What would be worse even than the unsatisfactory position that we are in today (where SCB and Archer have raised considerable uncertainty about the meaning of the clauses, and arguably called into question whether their meaning can reliably be ascertained at all), would be for insurers to fragment and begin to provide a multiplicity of their own defects exclusions. These clauses have layers of meaning, and there is beauty in their individual and collective complexity. But if we move away from standard defects exclusions, then beautiful complexity may give rise to unfathomable chaos in which brokers, policyholders and, if we’re honest, even the Builder’s Risk underwriters themselves, will have little chance of achieving a clear common understanding of the cover that their policies are providing. In that situation it would only be the lawyers who would be the only winners, and no-one wants that.
So, what is the problem with the existing clauses?
Firstly, they are overly long and convoluted. There are numerous phrases (most notably, but not only, the words in brackets in the 2006 version of LEG3) which I understand to have been introduced “for the avoidance of doubt”, but which have had precisely the opposite effect. Rather than bringing clarity to the meaning of the clauses, these superfluous phrases have instead obscured that meaning.
Secondly, the word “defect” is used to describe two quite different things in different contexts. Sometimes the word defect is intended to describe the condition of the insured property. At other times it appears to be intended to refer to a mistake (whether a mistake concerning design, or workmanship, etc).
Thirdly, the clauses have encouraged some users to take the view that they treat “damage” on the one hand, and a “defect” on the other, as binary concepts, so that one should be concerned with the question of whether insured property is damaged OR defective. However, that is plainly not right. As I remember being explained to me when I began to work with Builder’s Risk policies, when you refer to “damage” you are concerned with a happening, whereas when you refer to a “defect” you are concerned with a condition.
Knowing that insured property is in a condition that the owner would preferred it not to be in, today (so that it can therefore be described as being defective, today), tells you nothing at all about whether the insured property underwent an adverse change in physical condition which impaired the value or usefulness of the property. If it did undergo that change (i.e. it suffered damage in order to reach its defective state or, to put it another way, it become “damaged”), then that would trigger the insuring clause of a Builder’s Risk policy. If, on the other hand, the insured property was simply built badly, it should never trigger the insuring clause of a Builder’s Risk policy.
So, what am I intending to achieve in my proposed re-drafts of the clauses? As set out above I am not intending to suggest any alteration of the cover which I believe is intended by the existing clauses. Rather, my only intention is to express, in as clear language as possible, my understanding of the meaning of the existing clauses.
With that in mind, my re-drafts have largely retained the existing language of the current LEG clauses, and primarily removed the words which in my view serve to obscure the meaning of the existing clauses. The exception to that approach is in my proposed amendment to LEG1, where in order to avoid using the word “defect” to refer to a mistake, I have instead introduced that word into the clause even though it doesn’t appear anywhere in the existing suite of exclusions. However, in my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “mistake” accurately reflects the meaning of the (in my view) misleading word that it replaces in the original clause.
A final point in relation to the clauses. As I explained in my article on the SCB decision, the urgent need to amend LEG3 (and, by extension, the other LEG clauses) presents an opportunity to move away from the current unhelpful position where we have two separate suites of defects exclusions (LEG, and DE).
Each suite can be broken down in three categories: clauses that are concerned with causation (LEG1 and DE1); clauses that are concerned with improvements (LEG3 and DE5); and clauses that are concerned with the condition of the insured property before damage occurred (DE2-4, and LEG2). Of those three categories, the clauses relating to two of them are materially the same in each suite, despite differences in drafting (i.e. LEG1 and DE1 do the same thing, as do LEG3 and DE5 - there may be technical arguments that they operate slightly differently, but those technical arguments should not, in my view, be taken seriously).
The only difference between the two suites is in the intermediate clauses which are concerned with the condition of the property before the damage occurred. In that regard LEG2 operates materially differently from DE2-4. That is due to the different origin of the two suites: the DE clauses were intended to be general Builder’s Risk clauses, whereas the LEG clauses were introduced specifically to cater for engineering risks (i.e. EAR as opposed to CAR). Unfortunately, the DE clauses have not been as successfully exported as the LEG clauses (perhaps because there are more of the DE clauses and so they are perceived as being more difficult to understand), with the result that in some important markets, including the US, the LEG clauses are used as standard for civils projects, whereas the DE clauses would be more appropriate for projects of that type.
So, rather than simply amending the LEG clauses, it seems to me to be much more sensible to introduce a single suite of clauses which are based on the existing LEG clauses, but which re-brand LEG2 in the way it was intended (i.e. as applying to EAR) and amending DE3 as a civils alternative to LEG2.
And with that rather long introduction, and with thanks for the patience of anyone who has taken the time to read this far rather than jumping straight to the draft clauses themselves, here are my suggestions for a new single suite of defects exclusions, modelled on the current LEG clauses, but with an amended version of DE3 introduced as an alternative to LEG2 (and branded LEG2 (CAR)).
| Original clauses | My draft clauses |
| LEG1
“The Insurer(s) shall not be liable for Loss or Damage due to defects of material workmanship design plan or specification.” |
LEG1
The Insurer shall not be liable for the cost of fixing any damage caused by mistakes of any kind. |
| LEG2
“The Insurer(s) shall not be liable in respect of: All costs rendered necessary by defects of material workmanship design plan or specification and should damage occur to any portion of the Insured Property containing any of the said defects the cost of replacement or rectification which is hereby excluded is that cost which would have been incurred if replacement or rectification of the said portion of the Insured Property had been put in hand immediately prior to the said damage. For the purpose of this policy and not merely this exclusion it is understood and agreed that any portion of the Insured Property … shall not be regarded as damaged solely by virtue of the existence of any defect or material workmanship design plan of specification”. |
LEG2 (EAR)
Should damage occur to any portion of the Insured Property which was in a defective condition before the damage occurred the Insurer shall not be liable for the cost that would have been incurred to fix the defects in that portion of the Insured Property immediately before the damage occurred.
|
| DE3
“This policy excludes loss of or damage to and the cost necessary to replace repair or rectify: i. Property insured which is in a defective condition due to a defect in design plan specification materials or workmanship of such property insured or any part thereof; ii. Property insured lost or damaged to enable the replacement repair or rectification of Property insured excluded by (i) above. Exclusion (i) above shall not apply to other Property insured which is free of the defective condition but is damaged in consequence thereof.” |
LEG2 (CAR)
The Insurer shall not be liable for the cost incurred to fix any portion of the Insured Property which was in a defective condition immediately before the damage occurred.
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| LEG 3/06
“The Insurer(s) shall not be liable in respect of: All costs rendered necessary by defects of material workmanship design plan or specification and should damage (which for the purposes of this exclusion shall include any patent detrimental change in the physical condition of the Insured Property) occur to any portion of the Insured Property containing any of the said defects the cost of replacement or rectification which is hereby excluded is that cost incurred to improve the original material workmanship design plan or specification. For the purpose of the policy and not merely this exclusion it is understood and agreed that any portion of the Insured Property shall not be regarded as damaged solely by virtue of the existence of any defect of material workmanship design plan or specification.” |
LEG 3
The insurer shall not be liable for the cost incurred to improve the original material workmanship design plan or specification.
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I would love to hear from anyone who either agrees or disagrees with what I’ve set out above. The market would benefit from a debate on this important issue, and we have an opportunity to create a better situation than the one in which we find ourselves today. Please feel free to email me either at david.pryce@fenchurchlaw.co.uk, or at david.pryce@fenchurchlaw.com.sg.
David Pryce is a Senior Partner at Fenchurch Law.
