Fenchurch Law – Annual Coverage Review 2025

As the insurance market continues to navigate evolving risks, regulatory frameworks, and geopolitical developments, 2025 has delivered a series of judgments that set important precedents as well as reaffirming established coverage principles. This annual review highlights the key themes emerging from these decisions and their practical implications for those responsible for managing coverage and compliance.

The cases reported this year address critical issues such as the interpretation of policy terms, the scope of notification obligations, the application of fair presentation duties and the classification of policy terms under the Insurance Act 2015. They also explore the impact of third-party rights, insolvency considerations, and principles regarding multiple cover when ‘other insurance’ clauses are in play.

Collectively, these rulings clarify the boundaries of contractual and statutory duties, reinforce the importance of timely and accurate disclosures, and provide guidance on maintaining coverage integrity in complex scenarios.

This round-up aims to equip policyholders and brokers with a clear understanding of the legal trends shaping the insurance landscape, including salutary reminders and pitfalls to avoid.

Unless otherwise stated, the Insurance Act 2015 is referred to as the “2015 Act” and the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 as the “2010 Act”.

Insurance Act 2015

  1. Lonham Group Ltd v Scotbeef Ltd & DS Storage Ltd (in liquidation) (05 March 2025)

In this Judgment, the Court of Appeal issued seminal guidance on how the 2015 Act treats representations, warranties, and conditions precedent. The Court was asked to determine whether the requirements under a Duty of Assured clause were representations or conditions precedent and thus triggering different sections of the 2015 Act.

The policy contained a three‑limb “Duty of Assured Clause” requiring D&S to:

  1. Declare all current trading conditions at policy inception.
  2. Continuously trade under those conditions.
  3. Take all reasonable steps to ensure those conditions were incorporated into all contracts.

The Court was asked to consider whether all three limbs needed to be read collectively (i.e. they would all be classified as either representations or conditions/warranties) or separately (so that each limb was capable of a separate classification). Overturning the decision of the High Court, the Court found that limb 1 was a pre-contractual representation subject to the duty of fair presentation of the 2015 Act, but limbs 2 and 3 were warranties and conditions precedent. As such, in accordance with the 2015 Act, the Insurer had no liability after the date on which the warranty had been breached.

This classification was said to reflect the 2015 Act’s intent: representations allow for proportionate remedies if inaccurate; terms requiring future conduct held to be warranties and/or conditions, by contrast, enable insurers to reject coverage upon breach, provided the terms are clearly drafted.

This decision marked the first major Court of Appeal test of Part 3 of the 2015 Act, and confirms that Duty of Assured clauses can contain both historic representations that go to the Insured’s duty of fair presentation, and warranties as to future conduct, which can have particularly catastrophic consequences if breached. It serves as a reminder to Policyholders and Brokers to scrutinise policy terms and ensure compliance.

Read our full article here.

  1. Clarendon v Zurich [2025] EWHC 267 (Comm) – Commercial Court Judgment (13 February 2025)

Fenchurch Law acted for Clarendon Dental Spa LLP and Clarendon Dental Spa (Leeds) Ltd, who claimed under a Zurich property damage and business interruption policy after a major fire. Zurich sought to avoid liability, alleging breach of the duty of fair presentation under the 2015 Act for failing to disclose insolvency of related entities.

The Court examined Zurich’s proposal question, “Have you or any partners, directors or family members involved in the business… been declared bankrupt or insolvent…?,” and held that a reasonable policyholder would interpret it as referring only to current directors or partners, not former entities. Consistent with Ristorante Ltd v Zurich (2021), and applying contra proferentem, the Court confirmed that ambiguity in insurer questions is resolved in favour of the insured and that disclosure obligations are shaped by the questions asked at inception.

Overall, the Court concluded Clarendon’s answers were correct and, in any event, Zurich had waived any right to disclosure beyond the scope of its own questions.

Please see our full article here.

  1. Delos Shipholding v Allianz [2025] EWCA Civ 1019

The Court of Appeal upheld the earlier Commercial Court’s ruling, reinforcing policyholder rights under marine war risks insurance and clarifying the duty of fair presentation under the 2015 Act. The case concerned the bulk carrier WIN WIN, detained by Indonesian authorities for over a year after a minor anchoring infraction. Allianz denied cover, citing an exclusion for detentions under customs or quarantine regulations and alleging non-disclosure of criminal charges against a nominee director.

The Court confirmed the exclusion must be construed narrowly, only detentions genuinely akin to customs or quarantine regulations fall within its scope and the WIN WIN’s detention did not qualify. It also reaffirmed that fortuity remains where the insured’s actions were neither voluntary nor intended to cause the loss. On duty of fair presentation, the Court held the nominee director (who had no decision-making authority) was not part of “senior management” under the 2015 Act, so the Policyholder had no actual or constructive knowledge of criminal charges against him. Further, Allianz had failed to prove that the charges were material and would have induced Allianz to enter into the insurance contract.

Our article on the Court of Appeal Judgment can be found here. Our earlier article on the Judgment of first instance is also here.

  1. Mode Management Limited v Axa Insurance UK PLC [2025] EWHC 2025 (Comm)

Following a fire on 7 February 2018 at industrial units in Brentwood, Mode (the named insured) and its director (the property owner) sued AXA under a “Property Investor’s Protection Plan” seeking declaratory relief, specific performance (to reinstate/put them back to the pre‑loss position), and other remedies. AXA had avoided the policy ab initio in September 2018 for alleged misrepresentation/non‑disclosure (including questions over insurable interest and planning permission) and applied for summary judgment.

The Commercial Court (Lesley Anderson KC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge) granted AXA’s application. The judge held that the claims were statute‑barred under the Limitation Act 1980, and in any event had no real prospect of success, including the insured’s bid for specific performance of AXA’s alleged secondary liability to reinstate.

The director’s personal claim also failed because he was not a party insured under the policy. The Court emphasised that, on the pleaded facts and policy wording, specific performance was not an available remedy, and the case could be resolved without a trial.

The Judgment can be accessed here.

  1. Malhotra Leisure Ltd v Aviva [2025] EWHC

During the Covid-19 lockdown in July 2020, a cold-water storage tank burst at one of Malhotra’s hotels, causing significant damage. Aviva, the property damage and business interruption insurer, refused indemnity, alleging the escape of water was deliberately and dishonestly induced by the claimant and that there were associated breaches of the policy’s fraud condition.

The Commercial Court held that Aviva bore the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the incident was intentional. The Court found that available plumbing and expert evidence supported an accidental explanation, and Aviva’s own expert accepted the escape could have been fortuitous.

The Court also scrutinised Aviva’s allegations of dishonesty in the presentation of the claim, finding that the Fraud Condition must be interpreted in line with the common law, meaning it applies only to dishonest collateral lies that materially support the claim, consistent with The Aegeon and Versloot. Because there was no evidence of dishonesty, and the alleged inaccuracies were either immaterial or inadvertent, the fraud condition did not bite, and Malhotra Leisure was entitled to indemnity.

Please see our full article here.

In a separate costs hearing, the Commercial Court was asked to determine whether costs should be awarded on the standard or indemnity basis. The claimant’s approved costs budget was £546,730.50, but actual costs exceeded £1.2 million, making the distinction significant.

The Court noted that while there is no presumption in favour of indemnity costs where fraud allegations fail, such allegations are of the highest seriousness and, if unsuccessful, will often justify indemnity costs. The Judge found that Aviva’s allegations inflicted financial and reputational harm and were pursued to trial without settlement discussions. As a result, the Court ordered Aviva to pay the claimant’s costs on the indemnity basis, including an interim payment of £660,000, demonstrating the Court’s uncompromising approach towards unfounded fraud allegations.

Please see our full article here.

Effect of Third Parties Rights against Insurers Act 2010

  1. Makin v QBE [2025] EWHC 895 (KB), Archer v Riverstone [2025] EWHC 1342 (KB), and Ahmed & Ors v White & Co & Allianz [2025] EWHC 2399 (Comm)

This trio of cases highlights the strict approach taken to claims notification provisions in liability insurance policies alongside their impact under the 2010 Act and reaffirms that Claimants under the 2010 Act will have to suffer the consequences of a policyholders breach of conditions.

The Courts confirmed that third-party claimants inherit not only the insured’s rights but also its contractual obligations. Notification clauses were treated as conditions precedent, even where not expressly labelled as such, meaning a breach of these provisions entitled insurers to deny indemnity.

In Makin, Protec Security delayed notifying QBE for three years after an incident that ultimately led to catastrophic injury. The Court held that the obligation to notify arose once Protec reasonably appreciated potential liability which was well before formal proceedings. Ultimately, failure to comply barred recovery.

Similarly, in Archer, R’N’F Catering failed to notify Riverstone promptly and ignored repeated requests for information. The Court rejected arguments that the claimant’s later cooperation could cure the insured’s breach, confirming that rights lost by the insured cannot be revived under the 2010 Act.

Both judgments emphasise that the trigger for notification is not the incident itself but the point at which the insured knows a claim may arise. Excuses such as administrative errors (argument that relevant correspondence had been sent to a spam folder) or insolvency were given short shrift.

By contrast, Ahmed focused on whether notifications made by White & Co to Allianz were sufficiently clear to trigger coverage under a professional indemnity policy. Despite extensive correspondence, the Court found none of the notifications adequately identified the claims or potential liabilities intended to be covered. The judgment underscores that compliance is not just about timing but also clarity and substance, vague or incomplete notices may fail to engage the policy.

The case also illustrates how technical drafting, such as aggregation clauses and endorsements, can compound the consequences of inadequate notification, limiting recovery even where coverage might otherwise apply.

These decisions reinforce several key points for policyholders and claimants:

  1. Notification clauses, even if unlabelled, may operate as conditions precedent.
  2. Breaches by the insured cannot be remedied by third-party claimants under the 2010 Act.
  3. Both timing and clarity of notifications are critical; “can of worms” notifications must be explicit.
  4. Failure to comply can result in catastrophic loss of indemnity, regardless of claim severity.

Policyholders, with their Brokers' assistance, should adopt a proactive and precise approach to claims notification to avoid disputes and preserve coverage.

Please see our full article on Ahmed here.

The full Judgment on Ahmed is available here.

Aviation

  1. Russian Aircraft Lessor Policy Claims [2025] EWHC 1430 (Comm).

In a landmark Judgment handed down on 30 June 2025, the Commercial Court determined coverage disputes arising from the grounding and expropriation of hundreds of Western leased aircraft in Russia following the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of Russian Order 311 in March 2022. The claims, brought by a consortium of lessors including AerCap, DAE, Falcon, KDAC, Merx and Genesis, were the subject of a “mega trial” and resulted in the largest ever insurance award by the UK courts of over £809 million.

The Court held that Contingent Cover responded because the aircraft were not in the lessors’ physical possession and operator policy claims remained unpaid (interpreting, “not indemnified” as “not paid”). Applying a balance of probabilities standard, permanent deprivation was deemed to occur on 10 March 2022, with Russian Order 311 identified as the proximate cause amounting to an effective governmental restraint. This amounted to governmental “restraint” or “detention,” which fell within the Government Peril exclusion under the All-Risks section. Under the Wayne Tank principle, where there are concurrent causes, one covered and one excluded, the exclusion prevails, meaning All Risks could not respond. Consequently, the claims were covered under the War Risks section.

The biggest takeaway for Policyholders from this case, is the guidance that Mr Justice Butcher adopted from the Australian case of LCA Marrickville Pty Limited v Swiss Re International SE [2022] FCAFC 17, which held that:

“The ease with which an insured may establish matters relevant to its claim for indemnity may influence questions of construction … a construction which advances the purpose of the cover is to be preferred to one that hinders it as a factor in construing the policies.”

Please see our full article here.

Building Safety Act 1972

  1. URS Corporation Ltd (Appellant) v BDW Trading Ltd (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 21

In summary, BDW (being the relevant developer) sued URS (being the design engineers) in negligence for repair costs from structural defects in two development schemes. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether such voluntarily incurred cost was recoverable and whether section 135 of the Building Safety Act 2022 (“BSA”) extends limitation for such claims.

The Supreme Court unanimously found that once developer knows that defects are attributable to negligent design then remedial works – even on property no longer owned by it – are not ‘voluntary’ in the sense they fall within the ambit of the engineers’ duty. This fortifies the existing common law principles that loss incurred in reliance on professional duty is recoverable, even absent a direct proprietary interest.

The Court clarified that section 135 of the BSA merely extends time for Defective Premises Act 1972 claims and does not revive or extend limitation periods for tortious claims. Policyholders should note that professional indemnity insurers need not cover historic negligence where properly time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980, unless otherwise endorsed.

The Court also held that section 135 of the BSA does not permit developers to treat their negligent repair costs as falling within extended timeframes, preserving clear statutory boundaries between contract/statutory claims and tort claims.

Read our full article on the Supreme Court’s Judgment here.

CAR Policies

  1. Sky UK Limited & Mace Limited v Riverstone Managing Agency Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1567

Insurers sought permission to appeal the Court of Appeal’s December 2024 decision in Sky v Riverstone ([2024] EWCA Civ 1567), which confirmed that deterioration and development damage occurring after the policy period, but stemming from damage during it, was covered under the CAR policy, along with investigation costs and a single deductible per event.

On 30 April 2025, the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal, leaving the Court of Appeal’s ruling intact. This outcome reinforces that insurers cannot restrict recovery to damage physically present at the end of the policy period and affirms a practical approach to progressive damage under CAR policies.

Overall, the refusal cements the Court of Appeal’s interpretation, providing certainty for policyholders on coverage for post-expiry deterioration linked to insured-period damage.

Our article on the Court of Appeal ruling, now confirmed by the Supreme Court’s dismissal is found here.

Latent Defects

  1. National House Building Council v Peabody Trust [2025] EWCA Civ 932 (CA)

The Court of Appeal resolved a key limitation question over NHBC Buildmark insurance’s “Option 1 – Insolvency cover before practical completion.” Under this extension, insurance is triggered not by the contractor’s insolvency per se but when the employer (Peabody) “has to pay more” to complete the homes because of the insolvency.

The underlying development involved 175 dwellings, including 88 social housing units. The contractor became insolvent in June 2016, and Peabody arranged for completion thereafter, with practical completion in January 2021. The claim for additional completion costs was brought in July 2023. NHBC contended that the cause of action accrued in 2016, when the contractor became insolvent, and was now statute-barred; Peabody argued instead that it accrued when costs were actually incurred.

The Court unanimously agreed with Peabody, affirming the Technology & Construction Court’s view that the policy insured against additional payment triggered by insolvency, so the cause of action only accrued when extra costs became payable. The NHBC appeal was dismissed.

This decision emphasises the importance of carefully identifying the insured event as defined in policy terms and confirms that policies with “pay-when-loss-incurred” triggers should be interpreted on their true wording rather than conventional accrual rules.

The Judgment can be found here.

Other Insurance

  1. Watford Community Housing Trust v Arthur J Gallagher Insurance Brokers Ltd

This Judgment was a significant ruling clarifying principles concerning multiple cover and a policyholder’s rights following a cyber-related loss. It was a resounding win for policyholders: securing sequential access to multiple policies.

The Court held that Watford had the right to choose which policies to invoke, having the benefit of PI, Cyber and Combined policies, attracting limits of £5 million, £1 million, and £5 million, respectively. Timely notification was made under the Cyber policy, but late notification was successfully raised by the PI insurer to decline indemnity. The Combined insurer confirmed cover despite late notification.

The Court held that the “other insurance” clauses (limiting cover where overlapping insurance exists) effectively neutralised each other, allowing sequential claims rather than enforcing contribution across overlapping policies. This ruling supports the principle that a policyholder can access each policy in turn until the total loss is covered. Having recovered £6 million, Watford also sought recovery of the additional £5 million under the PI policy had timely notification been made. Consequently, Watford was entitled to a total of £11 million.

As to broker liability, the Court found that, but for the broker’s negligence, the PI policy would have been exhausted. Since it was not, the broker was held liable for the £5 million shortfall. The Judgment is a stark reminder that notification conditions should be identified and complied with. It also emphasises a broker’s duty to accurately advise on policy layers and limitations to ensure the policyholder is clearly instructed and that the advice given is documented.

Our full article can be found here.

Authors

Dan Robin, Managing Partner

Catrin Wyn Williams, Associate

Pawinder Manak, Trainee Solicitor


Claims Notifications and Policy Terms: A Taxing Duo

Ahmed & ors v White & Company (UK) Ltd & Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE [2025] EWHC 2399 (Comm)

BACKGROUND

This case concerned claims (“the Claims”) brought by 176 investors (“the Claimants”) against White & Company (UK) Ltd (“W&C”), a firm of chartered accountants, and its professional indemnity insurer, Allianz Insurance Company (“Allianz”). The Claimants alleged that they had been provided with negligent advice by W&C regarding a series of high-risk tax-mitigation investments. Following W&C’s insolvency, the Claimants sought recovery directly from Allianz under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 (“the TPRAI”).

The central question was whether Allianz was liable to indemnify W&C under its professional indemnity policy for the losses claimed.

THE POLICY

The policy contained the following terms:

The Notification Clause

"The Policyholder shall, as soon as reasonably practicable during the Policy Period, notify the Insurer at the address listed in the Claims Notifications clause below of any circumstance of which any Insured becomes aware during the Policy Period which is reasonably expected to give rise to a Claim. The notice must include at least the following:

(i) a statement that it is intended to serve as a notice of a circumstance of which an Insured has become aware which is reasonably expected to give rise to a Claim;

(ii) the reasons for anticipating that Claim (including full particulars as to the nature and date(s) of the potential Wrongful Act(s));

(iii) the identity of any potential claimant(s);

(iv) the identity of any Insured involved in such circumstance; and

(v) the date on and manner in which an Insured first became aware of such circumstance.

Provided that notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of this clause, any later Claim arising out of such notified circumstance (and any Related Claims) shall be deemed to be made at the date when the circumstance was first notified to the Insurer.”

          (“the Notification Clause”)

Related Claims Clause

“any Claims alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to the same facts or alleged facts, or circumstances or the same Wrongful Act, or a continuous repeated or related Wrongful Act…shall be deemed to be a single claim”.

(“the Related Claims Clause”)

Tax Mitigation Endorsement

claims arising from investments which were “pre-planned artificial transactions designed to achieve a specific tax outcome” were subject to a single limit of indemnity of £2 million.

(“the Tax Mitigation Endorsement”)

THE ISSUES:

The Court considered three key issues:

  1. Whether W&C had validly notified Allianz of the claims or circumstances that might give rise to claims pursuant to the Notification Clause.
  2. Whether the claims should be aggregated under the policy’s “Related Claims” clause; and
  3. Whether the Tax Mitigation Endorsement applied.

JUDGMENT

Notification

As part of determining whether the Claims had been validly notified, the Court was asked to consider whether the following three categories of communications constituted a valid notification of all Claims pursuant to the Notification Clause.

  1. The “Akbar Letters”

These were letters written by the Claimants’ solicitors to W&C, outlining details of specific investments and the alleged negligent advice provided by W&C in relation to those investments.

The Claimants argued that forwarding these letters to Allianz constituted a broad notification, sometimes referred to as a “hornets’ nest” notification, which should be interpreted as alerting Allianz to the possibility of further claims from other clients who had received similar advice, not just the 14 named entities. Allianz, on the other hand, argued that the notification was limited strictly to the 14 specific entities mentioned in the letters and did not extend to any other potential claimants.

Considering all the evidence presented, the Court found in favour of Allianz that the language did not signal a “hornet’s nest” scenario, indicating an influx of future claims. In coming to this decision, the Court stressed that any notification must be clear and specific. In contrast, the Akbar Letters did not provide sufficient information to put Allianz on notice of a broader class of claims.

  1. The “Block Notification”

These communications between W&C and Allianz contained information regarding HMRC inquiries into premature EIS relief, along with a spreadsheet. An EIS (Enterprise Investment Scheme) is a UK government initiative that encourages investment in small, high-risk companies by offering tax reliefs to investors. The relevance in this case was that the investments in question were structured to take advantage of EIS tax reliefs, and HMRC inquiries suggested that the reliefs may have been claimed prematurely or improperly.

The Claimants argued that the Block Notification, which included details of the HMRC inquiries and a spreadsheet of affected clients, should have been interpreted as a notification of circumstances that might give rise to multiple claims against W&C. Allianz, however, interpreted this notification as relating solely to another entity MKP, which W&C had acquired and not W&C itself, and argued that it did not provide sufficient detail or context to constitute a valid notification of claims or circumstances under the policy.

In the Court’s judgement, a reasonable insurer in Allianz’s position would have perceived the Block Notification as limited, and not indicative of wider claims against W&C, as it did not clearly identify W&C as the subject of the potential claims, nor provide enough information to alert Allianz to the risk of multiple claims. The Court noted that while W&C may have had the subjective awareness of the broader matters, that awareness was not communicated to Allianz and therefore was not within the scope of the notification.

  1. The “Kennedy Documents

These were emails between defence counsel, their clients, W&C, Allianz, and the claimants’ lawyer. The documents included correspondence and information that might have disclosed sufficient facts to support a broader notification of circumstances. The Claimants argued that these communications, by virtue of being shared with Allianz, should be treated as a valid notification under the policy. However, Allianz contended that the policy required notifications to be made “by the insured,” and that communications from solicitors or third parties did not satisfy this requirement, unless there was express contractual authority for them to notify on W&C’s behalf.

In his judgment, Judge Pearce noted that such documents might have disclosed sufficient facts to support a broader notification. However, as W&C itself did not communicate them and, absent express contractual authority for W&C’s solicitors to notify on its behalf, Allianz’s receipt did not satisfy the policy’s requirement that any notifications come “by the insured”.

Overall, the Court determined that no communication effectively notified Allianz of broader circumstances or triggered wider policy cover. Only narrow notifications of specific claims, by reference to specific investments, were valid. Hence, policyholders should note the importance of strict compliance with policy notification requirements and the need for clarity and specificity in any notification to insurers.

Aggregation and Endorsement

Judge Pearce then addressed the alternative arguments on aggregation and policy limits if the matters had been validly notified.

Tax Mitigation Endorsement:

This endorsement applied to tax-mitigation schemes such as pre-planned, artificial transactions aimed at achieving specific tax outcomes (including EIS). The Claimants contended that the endorsement should not apply to all the investments in question, or that its application should be limited. Allianz argued that the endorsement was triggered by the nature of the investments, which were designed to achieve specific tax outcomes through artificial means, and that the £2 million limit therefore applied to all claims.

The Court agreed with Allianz, finding that the endorsement applied and that the Claimants’ demand for £50 million was subject to the £2 million limit.

Related Claims Clause

The policy defined related claims as those arising from the same facts, circumstances, wrongful act, or a related wrongful act. The Claimants argued that each investor’s claim should be treated separately, potentially allowing for multiple limits of indemnity to apply. Allianz, conversely, argued that all claims arose from the same or related acts, namely, W&C’s advice on tax mitigation schemes, and should therefore be aggregated as a single claim under the policy.

Supporting Allianz, the Judge found that each of the investor claims relating to EIS stemmed from the same alleged misconduct by W&C, namely, negligent advice on tax‑mitigation schemes and therefore were sufficiently “related” to aggregate as one claim. However, the non-EIS claims were not sufficiently related.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Overall, this decision is a reminder of the strict approach towards claim notifications and the application of policy terms. Policyholders must ensure notifications are clear, complete and timely, as ambiguous or narrow notifications risk leaving policyholders without cover. Equally, it is critical for policyholders to understand the wording of their insurance policy and be alive to terms that limit cover via aggregation clauses, to ensure policy coverage aligns with risk exposure.

Chloe Franklin is an Associate and Pawinder Manak is a Trainee Solicitor at Fenchurch Law


When can an insurer join the party? Managed Legal Solutions v Mr Darren Hanison (trading as Fortitude Law) and HDI Global Specialty SE [2025]

This recent High Court judgment sheds light on the circumstances under which an insurer may be joined as a party to underlying liability proceedings. The case explores the nuanced question of when, and in what situations, an insurer is deemed to have “an interest” in a liability dispute, and carries significant implications for claims brought under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 (“the TPRAI”).

Background

Managed Legal Solutions Limited (“MLS”), a litigation funder, commenced proceedings against Darren Hanison trading t/a Fortitude Law (“Mr Haninson”) in 2021 seeking damages (“the Liability Proceedings”).

Although Mr Hanison initially defended the Liability Proceedings in their entirety, including an allegation that he owed MLS an independent tortious duty (“the Tortious Duty”), he was debarred from defending them from 1 November 2024, having failed to comply with an Unless Order.

Separately, HDI Global Specialty SE (“HDI”), which provided Mr Hanison with professional indemnity insurance with a limit of £2m, initiated confidential arbitration proceedings against Mr Hanison in relation to coverage (“the Arbitration”).

As the Arbitration was unresolved at the time of the current application, HDI had an interest in the outcome of the Liability Proceedings. That interest was particularly acute given the risk that Mr Hanison could become bankrupt if he lost the Liability Proceedings, thus triggering an automatic transfer of his rights under the insurance policy to MLS under the TP(RAI) 2010. Accordingly, HDI applied under CPR 19.2 to be added as a second defendant to the Liability Proceedings.

The central argument advanced by HDI was a conflict-of-interest point. While it was in Mr Hanison interest for the Tortious Duty to be established, since that would enable him to pursue an indemnity from HDI – HDI had a clear interest in demonstrating that no such duty existed, as that would absolve them of any obligation to indemnity Mr Hanison. In light of this inherent conflict, HDI argued that its joinder to the Liability Proceedings was necessary to safeguard its interests.

The application

Did CPR 19.2 apply?

MLS opposed the application, contending that the relevant rule was, in fact, CPR 19.6. That provision addresses the substitution or addition of parties after the limitation period has expired, which, according to MLS, was the case here because the limitation period for the alleged Tortious Duty claim had already lapsed.

HDI, however, argued that the relevant claim was only a potential future claim by MLS against it under the TP(RAI) 2010, because that claim was contingent on Mr Hanison becoming bankrupt. On that basis, the limitation period had not expired (and strictly speaking had not even commenced).

The Court agreed with HDI. It concluded that the claim in the Liability Proceedings was not time-barred and that HDI’s joinder did not amount to a “change of parties”. Rather, it would simply permit it to make submissions in relation to the Liability Proceedings. Accordingly, the only question for the Court to decide was whether the requirements of CPR 19.2 were satisfied.

CPR 19.2

CPR 19.2 provides that a Court may permit the addition of a new party where either: (a) it is desirable to do so to enable the Court to resolve all matters in dispute within the proceedings; or (b) there exists an issue involving the new party and an existing party connected to the matters in dispute, such that it is desirable to add the new party to resolve that issue.

The Court accepted that there was “an issue” involving HDI and relied on several authorities, notably Wood v Perfection Travel [1996], which established that it may be appropriate, in certain cases, to add an insurer to liability proceedings and allow them to make submissions.

The Court was also satisfied that the ‘desirability’ threshold was made out. Given that Mr Hanison had been debarred from defending the Liability Proceedings, the Tortious Duty claim was effectively uncontested. The Court therefore found it ‘desirable’ for HDI to be added, unless there were compelling factors to the contrary.

In the Court’s view, no such factors existed. Although MLS argued that the application was delayed, pointing out that the Tortious Duty issue had been ‘in play’ since October 2023 (HDI’s application, by contrast, was made in June 2025), the Court found that the decisive trigger was Mr Hanison being debarred from defending the Liability Proceedings. Until that point, Mr Hanison had maintained his defence. As it was no longer possible for him to do so, it was necessary for HDI to be joined to the Liability Proceedings to protect its interests.

MLS further contended that joining HDI would place it in a more advantageous position than its insured, since Mr Hanison had already been debarred from defending the claim. The Court, however, was not persuaded by that argument. It recognised that HDI had its own distinct interest in the Tortious Duty claim and, if it were not permitted to participate, it would be exposed to the risk of providing an indemnity for an uncontested liability.

Comment

This case raises several noteworthy issues, particularly in relation to the TP(RAI) 2010. While HDI’s application was not itself a TP(RAI) 2010 claim, it was clearly made with the prospect of such a claim in mind.

In this context, it could be argued that permitting an insurer to find itself in a more advantageous position than its insured is out of step with the TP(RAI) 2010 given that, conversely, recent decisions under the TP(RAI) 2010 make it clear that a claimant’s rights are no better than those of an insolvent insured in whose shoes they stand. See, in particular, Makin v QBE and Archer v Riverstone.

That said, it is perhaps unsurprising that HDI was so determined to safeguard its interests. Without the opportunity to participate in the Liability Proceedings, HDI faced the prospect of an uncontested claim against its insured, and a subsequent judgment, which, following Makin v QBE, it would likely be unable to challenge.

This case also brings into focus a vexed issue facing insureds who are required to defend liability claims on one hand, while pursuing claims for indemnity from their insurers on the other. Notably, an insured will usually seek to deny liability in proceedings brought against them, yet, paradoxically, must establish that liability in order to secure an indemnity from their insurer.

MLS has been granted permission to appeal, so its opposition to HDI’s joinder will now be considered by the Court of Appeal. Watch this space.

Alex Rosenfield is a Partner at Fenchurch Law


Understanding Common Construction Exclusions: Lessons for brokers and policyholders

At our recent London Symposium, Daniel Robin, Deputy Managing Partner at Fenchurch Law hosted a session on the principles and importance of interpreting policy exclusions, both within construction, and across the insurance industry.

The session focused on four key areas: contractual liability exclusions, cladding and fire safety exclusions, exclusions relating to liquidated damages, and finally whether Section 11 Insurance Act can apply to Exclusions. It is often said that a policy is only as good as its exclusions, and a good proportion of coverage disputes turn on the correct interpretation of its exclusions. An understanding of these exclusions is essential for brokers to help their clients navigate and mitigate these risks to avoid being left uncovered.

  1. Contractual liability exclusions managing assumed risks

Contractual liability exclusions are one of the most common exclusions in liability insurance. These clauses prevent insurers from covering risks that arise because the policyholder has assumed ‘obligations by contract’ through indemnities, guarantees, or warranties given to third parties.

Daniel clarified: “Insurers don’t generally want to be on the hook for liabilities that wouldn’t exist under common law or statute, or for promises that go beyond what’s legally required.”

When an insured professional takes on a larger liability than legally required, like guaranteeing an outcome, which is a larger promise than simply the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care, that liability may fall outside insurance cover.

Often claimants will go down the path of least resistance and pursue strict liability contractual breaches, which will leave policyholders having to prove that they would still have been liable under common law, usually for a breach of reasonable skill and care. However, building regulations or planning requirements can be amended retrospectively, sometimes making previous designs non-compliant, which could fall foul of a strict liability contractual provision, but not a breach of a reasonable skill and care.

To protect clients, brokers should scrutinise client contracts for any indemnities, guarantees, or warranties that extend liability beyond common law, and ensure the policy either aligns with those obligations, or that clients understand the potential uninsured exposures, or that the appropriate extensions to cover are purchased.

  1. Cladding and fire safety exclusions

Cladding and fire safety exclusions are potentially the most topical and complex exclusions facing construction professionals. “One exclusion that is very common; insurers limit their liability for anything arising out of or connected to combustibility or fire protection.”

Fire safety exclusions are standard in many professional indemnity and construction all-risk policies, and they often appear deceptively simple. However, their breadth can leave significant coverage gaps.

Ultimately, interpretation can hinge on small wording distinctions. In an example, Daniel suggested that the exclusion might not apply where the issue concerned a lack of design detail rather than the choice of combustible material. The key was whether the clause referred to the form of materials used or the design or omission itself.

Daniel cautioned: “It’s a fine line, but the burden will always be on the insurer to prove that an exclusion applies. Still, brokers and insureds must be alert to the fact that even design omissions may fall foul of broadly drafted fire safety exclusions.”

Other types of cladding provisions, that limit the scope of cover but do not outright exclude it, can also raise challenges; where exclusions limit indemnity to the “cost of rectifying defective work,” policyholders may find that consequential losses or replacement costs are uninsured.

Brokers must therefore review policy wordings in line with regulatory developments to make clients aware of any gaps in coverage due to evolving building standards or retrospective safety amendments, and ensure that their policyholders are aware of what cover is in place.

  1. Exclusions relating to damages: liquidated and consequential losses

Furthermore, insurance does not automatically follow the contract, particularly when contracts allocate risk through liquidated damages.

Liquidated damages clauses are a common feature of construction contracts, predefining the amount payable in the event of delay or breach, reflecting an agreed estimate of loss. However, insurers typically exclude these liabilities, viewing them as ‘punitive’ or ‘beyond the scope’ of compensatory loss.

“Insurers exclude them because they don’t allow for an assessment of actual loss and can operate more like penalties even though in reality they can limit the policyholders exposure that they would have in any event under other contractual provisions.”

Exclusion clauses still remain even when liquidated damages are a genuine pre-estimate of loss, meaning that policy coverage generally extends only to direct, compensatory loss, not to sums agreed pre contract.

The knowledge that delay or contractual penalty exposures are unlikely to be insured, even if they seem commercially reasonable, is essential to clients, and brokers should therefore always draft limitation of liability clauses that cover liquidated damage risks too.

  1. Section 11 Insurance Act and exclusions

Daniel finally discussed an increasingly important area of insurance law: how S.11 Insurance Act 2015 interacts with policy exclusions and warranties.

Section 11 of the Act clarifies that an insurer cannot rely on a breach of warranty or condition precedent if the breach did not actually increase the risk of the loss that occurred. It is not yet tested in Court if this principle could also apply to exclusions, as it may “catch other types of contractual provisions such as conditions precedent or similar rules.” However, the wording of the Act, and the guidance notes suggest that it can apply to exclusions that impose an obligation on the policyholder as a pre-requisite to cover.

Brokers should therefore challenge insurers who decline claims by considering section 11; if the decline is purely technical and unrelated to the loss event, policyholders may still be entitled to claim cover.

Key lessons for brokers

Exclusion clauses are more than technicalities, they define the boundaries of insurance protection. For brokers, several practical lessons emerged: primarily, brokers must scrutinise contractual obligations and identify warranties, indemnities, or guarantees that extend liability beyond ‘duty of care’. It is also important to monitor regulatory shifts, and educate clients on the difference between compensatory damages (insurable) and liquidated or penalty-based damages (typically excluded).

Good communication is essential, not just with your client, but with experts from every industry involved. Effective dialogue between legal, technical, and insurance teams while forming a contract is one of the easiest ways to ensure risk cover is coherent and insurable. The interpretation of an exclusion depends not only on precise wording but also on how contracts are drafted, executed, and aligned with the policyholder’s duties.

Mastering these subtleties and leaning on the expertise of other teams is central to a broker’s role as an adviser. A proactive, detail-oriented approach, combining legal awareness with practical foresight, enables brokers to anticipate exclusions, bridge gaps, and ultimately keep their clients covered.

Daniel Robin is the Deputy Managing Partner at Fenchurch Law.


The Fenchurch team reflects on a year in the insurance legal sector

This year, we were pleased to contribute to Insurance Post’s Claims and Legal Review 2025, with Senior Partner, David Pryce, Managing Partner, Joanna Grant and Deputy Managing Partner, Daniel Robin sharing their perspectives on the year.

David shared that this year was one for international expansion. We built on our 2024 launches in Singapore and Copenhagen, and formed a partnership with US policyholder firm Saxe Doernberger & Vita, alongside the opening of an office in Istanbul to serve the wider Turkic region. ‘These milestones put us ahead of schedule on our objective to have a presence in every region by 2030.’

For Joanna, her major disappointment was the continued failure of many insurers to pay valid claims, ‘insurers are still not stepping up to be part of the solution as often as we would like.’

However, she did see some positive developments in the legal landscape, welcoming the courts’ reaffirmation of a policyholder-friendly approach to insurance interpretation. ‘This is a real boost for both the claims and legal sectors, ensuring insurance works as intended.’

Looking back on the year, Joanna also noted that the sharp rise in cyberattacks served as a reminder of the importance of proactive risk management. ‘Armed with the knowledge that cyber-attacks have tripled this year, I would go back and ensure that every policyholder, from the largest, most sophisticated corporates to SMEs, received robust advice on cyber coverage.’

Daniel Robin turned his focus to the year ahead, observing that after the disruptive impacts of COVID-19 and Grenfell, ‘we’re seeing the market begin to soften, which we hope will lead to insurers taking a more holistic and pragmatic approach to coverage, particularly for complex or grey-area claims.’ He also anticipated a final surge in Covid-19 claims activity as limitation periods expire, alongside increased adoption of AI to drive efficiency and support faster, fairer outcomes for policyholders.

Finally, David concluded with one key ambition for the future: ‘My wish for 2026, would be for all policyholders to be treated fairly by their insurers.’

Find the full Insurance Post article here (subscription required): https://www.postonline.co.uk/claims/7959390/claims-legal-review-of-the-year-2025?check_logged_in=1&ref=search 


Fenchurch Law strengthens coverage dispute team with Wilkes appointment

Fenchurch Law, the leading international law firm for insurance policyholders and brokers, has appointed renowned insurance lawyer, Chris Wilkes, as a new Partner in their London office.

Wilkes joins the Fenchurch team from his previous role as a leading insurer side lawyer at DAC Beachcroft. With over 47 years of experience in insurance and reinsurance disputes, the seasoned litigator brings a wealth of expertise to the firm. He is recommended by Chambers and Partners as a leading lawyer in insurance, with a particular focus on product liability, property damage, construction and professional indemnity; all key practice areas at Fenchurch Law. In recent years he has been involved in many of the Covid-19 BI claims for his insurer-clients: usually on the other side from Fenchurch Law!

The appointment comes at a time of expansion for Fenchurch Law, as it grows its offering both in London and internationally, most recently with the opening of its Istanbul office on 1st October.

Managing Partner, Joanna Grant, commented: “We have always regarded Chris as one of the leading insurer-side representatives in the market. We couldn’t be more delighted to welcome him and the wealth of experience and legal acumen he brings to our firm.”

Chris Wilkes, Partner, added: “I am excited to join the Fenchurch Law team. I have worked opposite many of their lawyers predominantly in disputes, and they have an outstanding reputation within the legal insurance market. Having worked for insurers, I am interested in their unwavering commitment to levelling the playing field for policyholders in resolving coverage disputes.”


PFAS – Out of the Frying Pan into the Court Room?

Fenchurch Law considers the impact of PFAS on the UK insurance sector, following the rise of litigation progressing through the US courts.

What Are PFAs?

PFAS, or Polyfluoroalkyl Substances, also known as Forever Chemicals, are a group of over 10,000 chemicals that do not readily degrade.

These synthetic chemicals have been utilised in products such as non-stick cookware,  waterproof clothing and cosmetics since the 1950s for their non-stick, water- and heat-resistant properties. A concerning aspect of PFAS is that they can accumulate indefinitely in the environment and in living organisms. Their highly durable nature has led scientists to investigate the long-term effects of these chemicals on the body and the environment, with alarming results.

Currently, PFAS are linked to several health issues, including immunosuppression and certain types of cancer. Consequently, and unsurprisingly, regulators are now aiming to tighten the regulation of PFAS chemicals to limit ongoing risks.

Regulatory Landscape in the UK

PFAS are currently regulated under the UK REACH regime (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals). However, only a limited number of specific PFAS are restricted for use in the UK. For example, PFOA (Perfluorooctanoic acid) and PFOS (perfluorooctane sulfonate) are types of chemicals within the PFAS category and have been listed as Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), making it illegal (with limited exceptions) to manufacture or use them in the UK and requiring their removal from products and waste streams.

The emerging risks associated with PFAS use are being closely monitored, with the HSE initiating a six-month consultation earlier this year on the use of PFAS in firefighting foam. UK regulation lags behind other countries; for example, the US has already declared PFAS a critical contamination crisis.

Although the UK regulatory framework for PFAS is still in its early stages, the Environmental Agency has begun assessing the risks. It has identified over 10,000 “high risk” sites believed to contain elevated PFAS levels. Some of the highest-risk sites include firefighting foam manufacturing plants, RAF bases, and airports.

Emerging Risks for the Insurance Sector

PFAS present a complex challenge for insurers. They pose potential long-tail liabilities, similar to claims arising from asbestos or environmental pollution, arising from historic use. Moreover, the increased focus of regulators and claimants on PFAS means insurers must navigate a rapidly changing risk that spans numerous lines of insurance – including general liability, product liability, environmental impairment, directors & officers, as well as property and speciality lines.

Insurers' response to this uncertain risk exposure has been to introduce specific exclusions, often based on existing pollution exclusion clauses. For instance, insurers may add a clause excluding any claims “arising out of, resulting from or relating to PFAS of any kind”.  Of course, such exclusions will not be relevant to the extent cover attaches to expired policies.

Lloyd’s has also issued standard PFAS exclusion wordings, LMA5595A and LMA5596A[1].

Types of Claims
  1. Nuisance Claims: arising from contamination of public drinking water and environmental cleanup.
  2. Personal injury Claims: resulting from exposure to PFAS in everyday products.
  3. Property Damage/Diminution of Value Claims: caused by PFAS seeping into the ground from industrial manufacturers.
  4. False Advertising & Product Labelling: Due to products failing to identify the dangers of PFAS.
The New Asbestos?

The insurance market has been questioning whether PFAS will become the “next asbestos”, as both are similar in that they were once widespread, marketed as safe, and only later revealed to be potentially dangerous.

However, a key difference between PFAS and asbestos is that exposure to many different types of PFAS is unavoidable in the modern world, whereas asbestos exposure can usually be traced back to a specific place and time to establish a cause. This causal link is likely to be far more difficult to establish in the context of PFAS exposure.

Currently, unlike in asbestos claims, no disease has been solely linked to PFAS exposure. This complicates the process of directly attributing the development of diseases such as cancer to PFAS, requiring substantial expert evidence to support the claim that the claimant would not have developed the disease without specific PFAS exposure.

UK PFAS Litigation

Although PFAS litigation is advancing through US courts with multimillion-dollar settlements already reached, UK litigation remains in the early stages. So far, there have been no PFAS cases litigated in UK courts, but two British law firms have announced investigations into PFAS contamination cases. While formal proceedings may take time, we might soon see the first UK group action application for PFAS.

Similarly, to date, there have been no regulatory actions; however, the UK Environment Agency or local authorities could designate contaminated sites for remediation in the future. Companies might then face clean-up costs and seek insurance coverage for those expenses.

Furthermore, the lack of UK personal injury claims may stem from the difficulty in proving a causal link between exposure and injury. While legal systems in countries like the US are more claimant-friendly in this regard, the UK requires evidence that a defendant’s actions caused the harm. The widespread presence of PFAS compounds further complicates this issue. There is no precedent in the UK for relaxing causation standards for PFAS, unlike asbestos, where English law permits more lenient rules for mesothelioma causation.

If and when PFAS claims arise, several key coverage questions will need to be answered, including whether PFAS claims constitute “pollution” and whether the contamination was sudden or gradual. When did an “occurrence” of contamination or injury happen (continuous trigger or not)? Can a claimant’s blood PFAS levels amount to an “injury” within the policy period?

Conclusion

PFAS present an increasing challenge across various sectors due to their persistence, health hazards, and complex liability concerns. Their extensive use, environmental durability, and potential health effects have led to heightened scrutiny and regulatory measures. However, the UK’s response via regulators and the Courts is still in its early phases compared to other jurisdictions.

As UK regulation and litigation evolve, proactive risk management and continuous vigilance will be essential to navigate the uncertainties associated with these “forever chemicals.”

[1] https://lmalloyds.imiscloud.com/LMA_Bulletins/LMA23-035-TC.aspx

Chloe Franklin is an Assoicate at Fenchurch Law


The Cost of Alleging Fraud: Costs Judgment Handed Down in Malhotra Leisure Ltd v Aviva [2025]

Introduction

This article examines the Commercial Court’s recent costs judgment in Malhotra Leisure Ltd v Aviva [2025], a case with significant implications for policyholders facing fraud allegations from their insurers. The decision underscores the risks insurers face when making serious allegations without sufficient evidence, and the potential for substantial costs consequences if those allegations fail.

Background

Earlier this year, we reported on the Commercial Court’s decision in Malhotra Leisure Ltd v Aviva [2025] EWHC 1090 (Comm).

To recap, during the Covid-19 lockdown in July 2020, water had escaped from a cold-water storage tank at one of the Claimant’s hotels causing significant damage.

Aviva, the Claimant’s insurer under a property damage and business interruption policy, refused to indemnify the Claimant on the basis that:

  • the escape of water was deliberately and dishonestly induced by the Claimant; and
  • there were associated breaches by the Claimant of a fraud condition in the policy.

However, considering that there was no evidence that (a) the escape of water had been induced by the Claimant, or (b) there was any financial motive for it to have been, the Commercial Court held that Aviva’s fraud allegations failed.

The judgment read as a cautionary tale, reminding insurers that allegations of dishonesty cannot be pleaded lightly and that reasonably credible evidence must exist to establish a prima facie case of fraud.

You can read our article on the underlying judgment here - Court pours cold water on insurer’s fraud claims: Malhotra Leisure Ltd v Aviva - Fenchurch Law UK.

The Costs Judgment

This month, the Commercial Court handed down judgment on a number of consequential matters. Crucially; whether Aviva should pay the Claimant's costs of the proceedings on an indemnity or standard basis.

An award of costs on the indemnity basis is considerably more favourable than an award on the standard basis because it:

  • places the onus of showing that costs are unreasonable on the paying party;
  • disapplies the requirement for proportionality; and
  • renders the parties’ approved budgets irrelevant for the purposes of assessment.

In this case, the Claimant had budgeted costs of £546,730.50 but incurred costs of £1,202,957.09. The difference—over £650,000—depended on whether indemnity costs were awarded.

The starting point in all cases is that costs should be assessed on the standard basis and the burden of proving that costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis lies with the receiving party (in this case, the Claimant). Whilst there is no presumption in favour of indemnity costs where a defendant makes unsuccessful allegations of fraud, it will frequently attract indemnity costs in practice.

In Clutterbuck v HSBC Plc [2016] 1 Costs LR 13, David Richards J, as he then was, stated that “the seriousness of allegations of fraud are [sic] such that where they fail they should be marked with an order for indemnity costs because, in effect, the defendant has no choice but to come to court to defend his position”.

In other words, failed allegations of fraud should be a significant factor in persuading a court that indemnity costs should be awarded.

The Claimant referred the Court to the test set out in Suez Fortune Investments Ltd v. Talbot Underwriting Ltd [2019] Costs LR 2019. Namely whether, when one looks at the circumstances of the case as a whole, they are “out of the norm” in such a way as to make it just to order costs on the indemnity basis.

The Parties’ Arguments

The Claimant argued that, because Aviva’s allegations were so serious, they had inflicted financial and reputational damage and, because those allegations had turned out to be misconceived, justice demanded that costs should be recovered on an indemnity basis. An order for indemnity costs would allow it to recover a higher percentage of the costs that it had been forced to incur in order to defend and vindicate itself. It is no answer to an application for indemnity costs to say, as Aviva did, that the allegations were reasonably made or advanced by experienced and responsible counsel (Farol Holdings v Clydesdale Bank [2024] EWHC 1044 (Ch)).

In support of its argument that it’s conduct did not warrant such an outcome, Aviva submitted that what is required for an order of indemnity costs is conduct that is unreasonable to a high degree, and that a fraud defence supported by credible, lay and expert evidence is not deemed to be speculative, weak, opportunistic or thin simply because it ultimately proves unsuccessful at trial.

It pointed out that the insurance industry is plagued with fraudulent claims and the financial pressures facing businesses both during and following the Covid-19 lockdowns only exacerbated the problem. It submitted that insurers have a duty to challenge insurance claims which appear disingenuous (in whole or in part) otherwise fraudulent claims go unchallenged, premiums across the industry increase and all policyholders suffer. Legally, it pointed out that the Court must be careful not to use hindsight when assessing the strength of an unsuccessful party's case pursuant to Governors and Company of the Bank of Ireland & Anr v Watts Group Plc [2017] EWHC 2472 (TCC).

The Decision

Despite Aviva’s plea, in a judgment handed down on 6 November 2025, Nigel Cooper KC ordered it to pay the Claimants' costs on an indemnity basis, for the following reasons:

  1. The allegations of dishonesty made by Aviva (that individuals at the Claimant had devised a fraudulent scheme to damage the Claimant’s own property in order to defraud, and had subsequently lied to the court in respect of this) were of the highest level of seriousness.
  2. Both the Claimant and individuals at the Claimant had suffered financial and reputational harm as a result of Aviva’s allegations.
  3. Aviva had pursued the allegations through to the end of trial without entertaining settlement discussions with the Claimant.
  4. The risks associated with making the allegations were reasonably apparent from when they were first raised, given that there was no evidence that the flood had been induced by the Claimant.
  5. Aviva’s case evolved at trial without any attempt to amend its pleadings.

Implications for Policyholders and Insurers

This case serves as a salient reminder that fraud cannot be pleaded lightly. Aviva’s argument that it has a duty to challenge insurance claims that appear disingenuous is perhaps telling of what is at the heart of an increasing issue in the insurance industry; insurers being too willing to pursue fraud allegations. While there is no suggestion that insurers should not be able to allege fraud in circumstances where there are bona fide reasons to do so, those allegations must be balanced against the damage and harm they cause to policyholders if they prove to be incorrect. The starting point should a holistic assessment, considering all factors before such allegations are pursued, rather than the presumption that any suspicion of dishonesty should lead to a fraud allegation.

For policyholders, the case demonstrates that robustly defending unfounded fraud allegations can lead not only to vindication but also to recovery of costs on the indemnity basis.

An insurer must assess the risk, consider engaging in settlement discussions and ensure that all allegations are appropriately pleaded. Otherwise, it may well pay a significant price.

Authors

Daniel Robin, Deputy Managing Partner

Abigail Smith, Associate 


The unattractive reality of the King Trader Decision - a botched appeal

The Court of Appeal has handed down its judgment in MS Amlin v King Trader.

The case stems from the 2019 grounding of MV Solomon Trader. After Bintan Mining Corporation (“BMC”), the charterer insured by MS Amlin, became insolvent, the vessel’s owner (King Trader Ltd) and its P&I Club sought to enforce a US$47 million arbitration award against MS Amlin under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010. The policy included a “pay-first” clause, requiring the insured to pay the liability before receiving an indemnity. Anticipating BMC’s inability to pay due to insolvency, MS Amlin sought a declaration that it owed no indemnity due to the pay-first clause. In July 2024, the High Court (Foxton J) granted the declaration. King Trader and the P&I Club appealed on three grounds.

Issues forming the appeal

Three issues below were considered by the Court of Appeal:

  1. Incorporation: Were the policy’s general conditions (including the pay-first clause) part of the insurance contract?
  2. Inconsistency: If incorporated, did the pay-first clause conflict with the primary insuring terms (and thus not apply)?
  3. “Red Hand” Notice (Onerous Term): Was the pay-first clause so onerous or unusual that it should not bind the insured (or its assignees) since it wasn’t sufficiently brought to their attention?

On 5 November 2025, the Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, Singh LJ, Males LJ) dismissed the appeal on all grounds, confirming that the pay-first clause defeated the owners’ and Club’s claim.

Court of Appeal Decision

Incorporation

The Court of Appeal agreed with the first instance judge that the pay-first clause was indeed part of the policy, was enforceable, and had been properly incorporated into the contract. The policy’s Certificate of Insurance expressly incorporated a policy booklet containing the general conditions, and no reasonable reader would assume that only the Certificate contained all terms. The Court saw no merit in the suggestion that the pay-first clause “was not part of the contract”.

Inconsistency

The court also found no inconsistency between the pay-first clause and the policy’s insuring clause. The charterers’ liability insuring agreement promised to indemnify the insured against liabilities (such as the arbitration award) that were established by final judgment or award. The pay-first clause qualified that promise by making actual payment of the liability a precondition to indemnity. The owners argued this “emasculated” the cover, but the Court held it merely “qualifies and supplements” the indemnity; it does not negate it. The Court found no actual conflict, so the pay-first condition remained effective alongside the main insuring terms.

“Red Hand” Notice

On the “red hand” argument (a reference to Lord Denning’s dictum that especially onerous clauses must be printed with a red hand pointing to them), the Court of Appeal gave a definitive response. Vos MR preferred the term “onerous clause doctrine” for this principle. He emphasised the high threshold for declaring a contract term unenforceable due to lack of notice in a commercial setting. The pay-first clause, though harsh in outcome, was not unusual in marine insurance, and such clauses are common and well understood in that market. Moreover, BMC had a professional insurance broker, who is presumed to know the significance of standard terms and explained this significance to the insured. The Court held the pay-first provision was neither onerous nor unusual enough to require special notice beyond what was given. Therefore, the owners and Club could not avoid it on that basis. The Judgment clarifies that the onerous clause doctrine has little application between sophisticated parties of equal bargaining power in commercial insurance.

Policyholder Perspective – Key Takeaways:

This decision confirms that English law will uphold clear “pay first” or “pay-to-be-paid” provisions in marine insurance contracts, even where this leaves an insolvent policyholder’s creditors without recourse. This outcome is harsh, as pay-first clauses reduce the efficacy of insurance protection just when it’s most needed. However, the Court of Appeal’s confirmation that there is little room to escape these clauses puts further emphasis on the need for insureds to carefully consider whether a “pay-first” requirement is acceptable to them, or if they (and their brokers) should really negotiate these clauses out of policies before inception.

From a policyholder’s standpoint, the case is the latest stark reminder to scrutinise policy wordings for onerous conditions, such as pay-first clauses. Such terms can fundamentally restrict coverage in scenarios of insolvency, and also will have a broader impact on the cash flow of an insured.

It’s worth noting that the 2010 Act does, however, invalidate pay-first requirements for certain kinds of claims (notably personal injury or death in marine policies), but aside from those exceptions, the clause will bite.

In King Trader, the inability of the insured to pay meant the loss ultimately stays where it fell – on the insolvent insured and the third parties – rather than shifting to the insurer.

Our colleague, Anthony McGeough, concluded that the underlying Judgment was an ugly decision for policyholders, (bad for policyholders, but correctly decided). The resounding failure of the appeal suggests that the Court of Appeal has made this case uglier still.

For our commentary on the underlying Judgment, click here.

Authors

Toby Nabarro, Partner

Dru Corfield, Associate


Anatomy of an Insurance Dispute

In early 2025, we participated in a panel discussion about the similarities and differences in the process of resolving a disputed insurance claim. We were both so taken by the striking differences in the process and had such a good time learning about each other’s process that we decided to prepare this joint article to share with a wider audience.

Comparatively examining the anatomy of an insurance dispute in the US and the UK is an exercise in contrasts. In many ways, the two are strikingly opposite. Here, we examine, from start to finish, how the process differs in the two jurisdictions and how those differences may contribute to different outcomes, and discuss what lessons perhaps can be gleaned from each other’s experience.

Pre-litigation process

The US Perspective

What stands out about the insurance dispute process in the US as a point of comparison, is the vastness of the arena you are working in. In stark contrast to the UK (as will be discussed below), the US insurance market is sprawling. Hartford, Connecticut might claim to be the insurance capital of the US, while Des Moines, Iowa would claim to be the insurance capital of the Midwest, yet, while there might be more significant insurance companies formally based in either of those two cities than in other US cities, there are many multiples of that more sprawled out across the full country. On top of that, US insureds regularly access the excess and surplus lines market to place insurance through London-based insurers.

This makes the industry, for the average insured, rather impersonal. From the coverage lawyer’s perspective, dealing with a claim under a specialty line of insurance issued by a large insurer, even in the same jurisdiction or region, may result in experiencing the same combination of insurer counsel and assigned claim adjuster. However, more often than not, each dispute reveals an entirely new set of individuals to try to resolve your claim with.

Brokers placing multiple significant programs with larger insurers can sometimes create a more direct line to a personal relationship that can help influence the direction of the claim before it becomes too adversarial. Still, this seems to pale in comparison to the degree that relationships play a role in the UK process.

On top of the geographical scope of the arena, there are a vast number of playing fields within the arena in the US. The federal government does not regulate insurance, leaving insurance law entirely to the states. This means that each state resolves legal issues involving insurance differently and, in many cases, in ways that are directly contrary to each other. The first step in an insurance dispute in the US is not to determine how the issues are properly resolved, but to determine which US states’ law might govern the issue. Once you know which states’ law could apply, then there are often multiple states where the dispute could be filed, each of which will have a different set of rules to determine which of the states’ law should apply.

On top of all of that, there are federal courts sitting in each state, which have different jurisdiction over parties than the state courts do, and which apply substantive state law to decide the coverage issues, but federal law to govern the procedural process. A Florida federal court might conduct a different choice-of-law analysis than a Florida state court, resulting in a different state’s substantive law applying to a case depending on whether it is in the state’s own courts or the federal court sitting there.

In a claim where a company based in New York does work in California, but uses a broker in Texas to place its insurance through an insurance company based in Florida, an insured would be assessing (1) which state(s) would allow the insured to file litigation over the claim, (2) what state’s law each state the insured could file in would choose if conducting a choice of law analysis, and, finally, (3) which state’s substantive insurance law would be most favorable. Of course, the insurer is likely to contend that a less favorable set of state law will apply to the claim than the insured, who will argue for a more favorable set of state law. In other words, the parties may not even agree on the rules by which they are to have their dispute or on which “playing field” they should have it on.

On top of the differences in the states’ approaches to the substantive rules of insurance law, each state varies significantly in its approach to the concept of bad faith claims – referring to a situation where the insurer is deemed to have violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which some US jurisdictions impose as a part of all contracts. Just as the different states take different approaches to the substantive issues, the insured may contend the appropriate body of law is that of a state that allows a bad faith claim, while the insurer contends a different state’s law applies, yielding the opposite result. A classic example of this friction is California, which allows bad faith, and New York, which effectively does not. Where the controlling state law is not settled in the pre-litigation claims process, this can make it very difficult to resolve a disputed claim, as the two jurisdictions have very different substantive law and also very different potential remedies, given the bad faith differences.

Finally, barring a few contrary specific rules in specific jurisdictions, parties to litigation in the US pay their own attorneys’ fees. This seems to have the effect of encouraging commercial litigation of insurance claims, while unfortunately dissuading personal litigation of insurance claims, usually except among wealthy individuals. The economics of the situation make this inevitable. For a corporation, if the insurance claim is large enough, it will almost certainly make sense to litigate a claim that has not resolved through the normal claim process, as even a partial recovery will easily cover the cost of the fees to bring the lawsuit and then some. The company can predict, based on its own attorney’s budget, what its costs will be for the lawsuit, without the unknown of a potential fee award to the other side if the company is not successful. On the other hand, for an individual, many insurance claims are simply cost-prohibitive, unless the lawyer is willing to work for discounted rates, pro bono, or on an alternative fee arrangement, such as a contingency.

Each of these factors influencing the pre-litigation claims process contribute to a claims environment where litigation often feels inevitable.

The UK Perspective

While sharing certain common characteristics, there are some key differences in how insurance disputes are resolved in the US and the UK.

The most central is that, unlike in the US, there is a single body of law applicable in England and Wales. Also, there is no concept of bad faith.

Further, compared with the US, the insurance market in the UK is geographically more defined – being centred around the Lloyds Building in what is known as the insurance district in the City of London.  All of the major players in the London market, including insurers, brokers, and law firms, are situated within the same square mile.

While we would agree that, as in the US, aside from the largest industry participants, relationships with insurers are typically short-term, managed by the broker, and not significantly customized, equally it is a much smaller marketplace, and for those who have made their life’s work a career in insurance, those main players work cheek by jowl.

It would be fair to say that, traditionally, both insurance law and its application by the English courts were perceived to be, and indeed were, pro-insurer.   That fact, combined with the “loser pays” cost regime in the UK, has led to a conservative approach to litigation: the stakes are high.

Notably, until recently, insurers were able to decline claims on the basis of a failure by the insured to disclose every circumstance they knew or ought to have known which would influence an insurer in underwriting the risk, and many policies contained ‘basis’ clauses which effectively meant that any and all representations made were warranties, the breach of which discharged an insurer from liability.

The introduction of the Insurance Act 2015 sought to level the playing field for policyholders by bringing in a duty of fair presentation, breach of which would not necessarily lead to a voidance of the policy but a more proportionate remedy based on the terms on which the insurer would have entered into the policy had the breach not occurred.  The Act also banned ‘basis’ clauses, and brought in provisions whereby if non-compliance with a warranty did not increase the risk of the loss in the circumstances in which it occurred, insurers could not rely on that breach to avoid liability under the policy.

In terms of the pre-action process, this differs depending on the court in which the claim is brought.  For complex high-value commercial disputes, including insurance coverage disputes, brought in the Commercial Court, which is a division of the High Court, the court expects the parties to have exchanged sufficient information to understand each other’s position and to try to settle the proceedings without proceedings, including considering ADR.  This process will include sending a Letter of Claim and allowing the defendant time to respond, from 14 days to 3 months, depending on the complexity of the matter. For certain types of claims, there are more specific Pre-action Protocols.

Of particular relevance is the Pre-Action Protocol for Construction and Engineering Disputes brought before the Technology and Construction Court, which has a more prescribed process that includes deadlines that must be adhered to, exchanges of information, and a pre-action meeting.  Costs sanctions can be applied for non-compliance with the Protocol.  Compliance is taken seriously by the parties and the courts, such that it can be an effective tool for exploring whether pre-action resolution is possible, or if not, at least narrowing the issues in advance of the issue of formal proceedings.

Substantive Framework for contract/policy interpretation

The US Perspective

While the US states each have their own approach to insurance issues, there are certain fundamental rules where they tend to come together in near unanimity. At the most fundamental level, nearly every jurisdiction considering an insurance dispute is going to start with the question of whether the court can interpret the meaning of the policy provisions applicable to the claim solely from the policy’s plain language, without considering anything else. If the court decides that it can do this, that is the end of the analysis. If there is clear policy language, that will control. Further, there is extensive caselaw interpreting many common policy provisions, so there is a large body of guidance as to whether a particular term is or is not likely to be deemed clear from the plain language.

It is only if the court decides that the language at issue is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, yielding different results (i.e., is ambiguous), that the court potentially looks beyond the policy language. However, even then, this is not guaranteed. Some jurisdictions simply interpret ambiguous policy language in favor of coverage, giving the benefit of the doubt automatically to the policyholder. Others will look to extrinsic evidence (i.e., the underwriting file) or the reasonable expectations of the insured to try to determine what the most appropriate interpretation is.

The UK Perspective

English law takes an objective approach to policy interpretation, asking what a reasonable person, with all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties when they entered into the contract, would have understood the language of the contract to mean.  The subjective intention or understanding of the parties as to what the policy wording means or is intended to achieve is not relevant to the exercise.  However, market practice or understanding, if it can be established that there was one, can form part of the background knowledge that would reasonably have been available to the parties.

Commercial common sense is not permitted to be invoked retrospectively to rewrite a clause in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalize an astute party: where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court will apply it. In recent years, the courts have taken an increasingly strict approach in this regard, making it clear that it is not their job to rescue a commercial party from a bad bargain.  If the wording is clear, the court will give effect to it.

However, where there is ambiguity and there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other.   In an insurance context, the doctrine of contra proferentem applies so that where there is ambiguity, the clause is interpreted against the party responsible for drafting the wording – usually the insurer – and is, therefore, helfpul for the policyholder.  Also helpful for policyholders is a recent ruling that held that “a construction which advances the purpose of the cover is to be preferred to one that hinders it.” (LCA Marrickville Pty Limited v Swiss Re International SE [2022] FCAFC 17, in the Federal Court of Australia, per Derrington and Colvin JJ at [15])

In the context of the recent Covid-19 business interruption litigation, the courts have identified what has been termed a ‘pick and mix’ approach to drafting insurance policies, with clauses adapted from other contracts such that the policy does not necessarily hang together as an internally consistent whole. That is a factor that may influence interpretation in that reference to the same or similar language elsewhere in the policy may carry little weight.

Litigation Process – Initial Stages and Discovery

The US Perspective

In most jurisdictions, there is essentially no procedural barrier to entry to begin litigating an insured’s disputed claim. An insured who has submitted a claim can file a lawsuit the next day, even if the claim has not yet been denied. Declaratory judgment actions, which ask the court to declare the parties’ respective rights and obligations under the policy, can be procedurally appropriate even without a denial.

There are few procedural opportunities to put a binding end to that lawsuit prior to trial. There is an opportunity for the defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint at the outset, but the standard to prevail on that is exceedingly difficult. There is an opportunity to seek judgment based on the complaint and answer together but, again, the standard is challenging to meet. Finally, there is an opportunity to have the case decided prior to trial, through a motion for summary judgment, but only if the issues to be decided are exclusively legal ones. A single disputed issue of fact material to the outcome of the case will be cause for the case to be sent to trial.

This forces the parties through the fact-finding phase of the case, known as discovery. Discovery in US litigation can be extremely expensive and time-consuming, and there typically is not any limitation imposed on discovery in a case based on the nature or size of the case. Thus, an individual with a claim against an insurer may have the same right to take the deposition of a senior person at the insurance company as a Fortune 500 company would. The individual would be equally entitled to all potentially relevant documents and to ask the same number of interrogatory written questions in the process. Many high-profile individuals – i.e., Donald Trump, Mark Zuckerberg – have been deposed in US litigation. This is a high-stakes process, as there are few limitations on what can be sought and asked from the other party in discovery, provided it is credibly connected to the insurance dispute.

The cost and discomfort of this process force many claims to settle. The process of reviewing sometimes tens of thousands of documents to ensure only relevant non-privileged documents are produced is extremely time-consuming and expensive. Similarly, the process of having to go through the intensive full-day questioning of the deposition process can be a daunting prospect for decision-makers on both sides. The parties also gain a significantly more acute understanding of their cases during this time, given the amount of document scrutiny and preparation involved. Many, if not most, insurance disputes settle during the discovery phase of litigation.

The UK Perspective

Litigation in the UK begins with a sequential exchange of pleadings: the claim form and particulars of claim, the defense, and the reply.

Notably, and unlike in the US, in the UK, we have a split profession with the court advocacy being carried out by barristers who also draft the pleadings. Issuing proceedings, therefore entails instructing a barrister in addition to the existing solicitor firm that will have been initially instructed and had day-to-day conduct of the matter through the pre-action stages.

There are another three key reasons why litigation is not something one embarks upon lightly: although relatively modest, the £10,000 court fee for issue of claims above a certain value is sufficient to deter many a vexatious litigant; the potential liability for adverse costs triggered by commencing litigation coupled with the fact that once underway the litigation may take on a life of its own; and finally the level of specificity needed to plead the claim to the satisfaction of the court and/or the defendant.  A poorly pleaded claim may lead to rounds of requests for further and better particulars or applications for strike out or summary judgment.

While not as onerous as in the US, disclosure – our equivalent of discovery – is nevertheless in many cases disproportionately time-consuming and expensive.  The volume of electronic documents that are likely to have been generated in any dispute will typically require the parties to engage an e-disclosure provider and agree to search terms and a review process in an attempt to unearth the “smoking gun” that will unlock the dispute.  The policyholder bears the brunt in that, since having suffered the insured event, they will hold the majority of the documents and have the burden of proving their case. Attempts by the courts in recent years to overhaul the process and make the exercise more manageable have, as often as not, only served to frontload the cost and add additional layers of procedure. Insurance cases often settle after the disclosure stage once insurers are satisfied that the claim is genuine and that any adverse documents that might provide justification for declining the claim have been shared.

There is no equivalent of the US deposition process.  Written witness evidence is prepared by each party’s own legal team and exchanged.  There is no opportunity to interrogate that evidence until the witness is cross-examined at trial.  Few insurance cases ever make it that far.

The key to unlocking an insurance claim, particularly in the construction sector, can often be strong technical expert evidence.  Although written expert evidence is not exchanged until relatively late in the process (after disclosure and witness statements), it can be helpful to share expert evidence at an earlier juncture – even pre-action – to demonstrate the robust basis for the claim.

Litigation Process – ADR

The US Perspective

Although a large percentage of insurance litigation settles during discovery, it rarely happens without assistance from a third party. The courts in the US know this well. Accordingly, it is almost uniformly true now that courts require the parties, from the outset, to participate in some form of official alternative dispute resolution process during the course of the litigation.

While private mediation is the most common in our experience, this can take other forms as well, depending on the jurisdiction. Many jurisdictions have judges in the same court, other than your assigned judge, conduct settlement conferences or early neutral evaluations, which are often similar in format to mediation, but have some additional formality around them due to the presence in the courthouse and the neutral being a judge.

Judges also have significant discretion in how they set the case calendar. It has become increasingly common, in our experience, for judges in insurance disputes to not set a date for trial until after motions for summary judgment have been resolved. A federal judge recently expressly told the SDV author of this article that she would not set a trial date until after summary judgment motions because, in her experience, most of her insurance disputes settle at or around that time. Sure enough, the case settled at the end of discovery, just before those motions would have been filed. This is a significant departure from the typical procedure for other forms of litigation in the US.

The UK Perspective

While ADR and, specifically, mediation has been a very common way of resolving insurance disputes, in recent years, a number of issues that have had wide-ranging implications for the entire insurance sector, with billions of pounds at stake, have meant an unprecedentedly high volume of insurance disputes going not just to trial, but to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  This wave of litigation has included the Covid-19 business interruption litigation, the Russian aviation litigation, and the construction litigation relating to the cost of remedying fire-safety issues affecting buildings throughout the country following the Grenfell tragedy and introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022. In the context of disputes relating to those issues, insurers have often been reluctant to enter into commercial settlements through ADR pending clarity from the courts on the extent of their liability. Further, settling one claim would have repercussions for claims being brought by other policyholders on similar wordings.

More generally, the court’s approach had traditionally been to encourage – but not require – the parties to a dispute to engage in ADR. However, following the introduction of new procedural rules in 2024, courts now have the power to order parties to engage in ADR and can impose costs sanctions on a party for failing unreasonably to engage in ADR. The extent to which the courts elect to exercise that discretion remains to be seen, and certainly it remains open to the parties to argue that, in the particular circumstances of their case, ADR would not be appropriate at any particular juncture.

Litigation Process – Trial and Judgment

The US Perspective

At the end of all of the pre-litigation, pleading, discovery, and motion practice phases of the insurance dispute, if the parties have not yet settled, there is still the prospect of a trial. Provided there is a disputed factual issue involved in the dispute, the insured is typically entitled to have the dispute heard by a jury.

Insurance companies have traditionally not benefited from positive news coverage in the US. Juries are composed of local individuals within the geographic jurisdiction of the court and include people from all social classes and bands of life. All residents in the geographic jurisdiction are subject to being called into the court for jury duty. These individuals are also regularly exposed to negative news coverage about insurance companies pulling out of insurance markets, denying claims, and charging ever-increasing rates for reduced coverage. Accordingly, there is a negative perception of the industry from average US citizens. Aside from specific situations where the policyholder carries a similar negative public perception, policyholders typically feel more confident bringing a disputed fact issue to trial than insurers do. This also contributes to driving settlement.

Relatively few insurance disputes in the US are resolved through arbitration, usually only occurring in select situations where the insurer included a mandatory arbitration provision in the policy. For those disputes that do go through arbitration, the process is similar, but with more limited discovery and less predictability in the procedural rules, as the arbitrator is typically not bound by state or federal procedural rules in how they administer the proceeding. Policyholders find that the perceived advantage in perception typically lacks in arbitration, due to the absence of a jury.

Another reason for the policyholder’s aversion to arbitration is the inability to appeal. Insurance issues are often extremely complex. Appeal of a trial court decision is typically a matter of right for the policyholder, at least to the intermediate state or federal appellate court. Insurance issues are typically not heard by the US Supreme Court, but state supreme courts may also agree to hear a further appeal following the intermediate court of appeals’ decision. This gives policyholders a reasonable degree of assurance that the correct result will ultimately be reached. If an arbitrator applies the law wrong, on the other hand, the case is typically over.

The UK Perspective

Civil trials in England and Wales are heard by a single judge at first instance, and without a jury.  Juries are reserved solely for criminal trials. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, there is a panel of three judges, and should the matter come before the Supreme Court, the panel will typically consist of five, but potentially seven or even nine, of the twelve appointed judges – or justices, as they are called, of the Supreme Court.

From issue of proceedings to trial typically takes a period of 18 months to 2 years, and the process involves exchange of written statements of case (particulars of claim; defence and reply); a procedural hearing known as a case management conference to agree the directions to trial; usually followed by disclosure of documents (akin to discovery); sequential exchange of factual and expert witness statements; and trial. There may be interlocutory hearings, for example, for summary judgment.

The successful party at trial is awarded their legal costs.  That is, the losing side bears not only their own costs but also adverse costs, being those of their winning adversary.  The reasonableness of those costs is assessed, but typically around 65% - 70% can be recovered.  The court also has a discretion to award indemnity costs, which results in a higher recovery.  That potential exposure can be a bar to issuing proceedings – although it is possible (at a price) to obtain After The Event insurance (ATE) to cover the risk of being liable for adverse costs.

In the UK, the courts do not have the power to award punitive damages.  Recent legislation has brought in the ability to claim damages for the late payment of insurance claims, but the threshold is high, and as a remedy, this has yet to gain significant traction.

The courts of England and Wales will not necessarily have jurisdiction over insurance disputes: many insurance policies contain arbitration clauses whereby any disputes, or disputes over quantum, are referable to arbitration.  The advantages of arbitration for insurers are that their confidential nature means that decisions on certain contested clauses are not made public; conversely, the fact of litigation proceedings being heard in open court can provide policyholders with commercial leverage to the extent that not paying claims may open an insurer to negative reputational consequences.  There is also a perception that many experienced insurance arbitrators hail from a long career on the insurer-side of the market, meaning that the outcome might be an insurer-friendly foregone conclusion – which as, in the US – is unlikely to be appealable.

Conclusion

Will: Most likely not to anyone’s surprise, there are some significant distinctions in the US and UK systems. Some of these distinctions – the ease of instituting litigation, impersonal nature of the insurance industry, and entitlement to highly probing discovery processes – perhaps help to explain the US’s reputation for litigiousness. The US system provides many opportunities for strategic gamesmanship, given the many forums to file in and the differences in state substantive law. I am left thinking that these considerations create an environment more favorable to corporate policyholders, who can take advantage of these processes as long as they are able to fund the process along the way.

Joanna: Drawing the threads together, and notwithstanding the fascinating and clear differences that we have explored between the two systems, some common themes do emerge, such as the relatively similar approaches to policy interpretation and propensity for claims to settle before trial.  Despite the greater risks that litigating in the UK may pose to policyholders, similarly, those corporate policyholders that can fund the process are able to take advantage of a more favorable landscape post the Insurance Act 2015 and in light of the number of recent policyholder-friendly rulings. The challenge for us on both sides of the pond is how we bring about our shared goal of leveling the playing field for all policyholders.

Authors

Joanna Grant, Managing Partner, Fenchurch Law

Will S. Bennett, Partner, SDV Law