National Apprenticeship Week – Simran Matharu, Apprentice Solicitor
This is an exciting National Apprenticeship Week for Fenchurch Law, as this year, we have our first apprentice on board. To mark NAW 2025, we asked legal apprentice Simran Matharu to share her experiences so far on the City Century apprenticeship scheme.
I’m excited to be Fenchurch Law’s first apprentice, choosing a degree apprenticeship was the perfect path for me, allowing me to gain real-world legal experience while working towards my qualification. Fenchurch Law’s specialist focus and supportive environment make it the ideal place to start my career, and I look forward to learning from experts in the field. Being part of the City Century apprenticeship scheme is empowering from my perspective. The programme not only creates valuable opportunities but also organises insightful events for current apprentices, featuring inspiring individuals from whom I gain invaluable knowledge.
I have always known that the traditional post-school route into university was not for me. However, I still wanted to pursue a higher education, and despite not wanting to follow a conventional route, I still wanted to embark on a conventional career. Having grown up in a family with many lawyers, I knew that a legal role was something I would do well in.
It has been really encouraging to see that saying no to university is no longer a limitation. In fact, saying no to university has helped me onto the job ladder quicker than a degree, and has offered me stability in the early stages of my career.
My day to day is very varied, and my first couple of years here will be mostly centered on integrating me into the office and learning about the industry we work in. In a week I spend four days working at Fenchurch Law as an apprentice and then one day studying at university.
This is my first job, so it has been helpful and enlightening to start in the operations team. I work with the operations team, performing tasks from billing, to answering calls, as well as saving and posting invoices. But I have also learnt about new software like Salesforce, Amiqus and Quill. I’m looking forward to moving onto Business Development in the coming year, as I’d love to learn more about how a successful boutique law firm grows and establishes its strong reputation.
At the end of my six years, I will have obtained both an LLB (Hons) in Legal Practice Skills and a SQE Qualification to become an England & Wales Solicitor, which will be great. But I think that a major benefit of this apprenticeship is that I will have gained a true understanding of working within the legal environment.
I have already learnt so much about myself, and have developed new skills that are only realised when you have participated in office life.
Having studied Philosophy, Politics, and Spanish in school, the insurance world was not something I knew a great deal about, like many my age. Instead I kept my options open, applying for as many legal apprenticeships as I could. Since joining Fenchurch Law, the team have been great at introducing me to the insurance market, and it is something I have now taken a real interest in.
I feel lucky to have already started working in such a specialised, niche area. I am extremely grateful for this opportunity and I am really excited to see what I can achieve in the next six years.
‘We are excited to be part of this initiative and it has been a privilege to have Simran join the team. She has already shown herself to be a real asset and we are looking forward to seeing her grow during her time with us and to being part of her journey to qualification.’ - Joanna Grant, Managing Partner at Fenchurch Law.
Clarendon v Zurich: Proposal Insolvency Questions Narrowly Construed
In a judgment handed down on 13 February 2025, the High Court upheld an application to strike out parts of an insurer’s Defence, in a coverage dispute arising from £8 million fire losses at a dental practice in Leeds. The decision is welcome news for policyholders and brokers, supporting a narrow approach to interpretation of insurer questions on insolvency of corporate entities related to the proposer, in statements of fact prior to inception of the policy.
Fenchurch Law act for the claimants, Clarendon Dental Spa LLP (the ‘LLP’) and Clarendon Dental Spa (Leeds) Limited (‘Clarendon’), in their action against Zurich and Aviva, following insurers’ refusal to indemnify property damage and business interruption losses arising from a catastrophic fire in June 2021. Following commencement of proceedings, settlement with Aviva was agreed on commercial terms, and trial of the claim against Zurich is listed for hearing in May 2025.
Duty of Fair Presentation
Zurich alleged that Clarendon had breached its duty of fair presentation in failing to disclose the insolvency of two companies (‘PDS’ and ‘JHP’) that shared a common director with Clarendon and the LLP. These entities were former partners of the LLP and resigned in 2014, before entering into creditors’ voluntary liquidation, following a business restructuring which led to the formation of Clarendon. The LLP continued to own the freehold of the premises. Prior to 2006, the freehold was owned by Back-to-back Investments Ltd (‘BTB’), a company in which the dentist owner of Clarendon was a director. BTB entered insolvent liquidation in December 2009.
As part of the insurance renewal process, a statement of facts was provided to Zurich, including an ‘Insolvency Question’: “Have you or any partners, directors or family members involved in the business … Been declared bankrupt or insolvent, or been disqualified from being a company director?”. Clarendon answered ‘No’. A proposal form was given to Aviva, including a declaration that “Neither You or Your directors or partners involved with The Business or any other company or business have … in the last ten years been declared bankrupt or insolvent or been the subject of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings or been disqualified as a company director”.
Under section 3 of the Insurance Act 2015, an insured is required to make a fair presentation of the risk, including disclosure of every material circumstance that the insured knows or ought to know, ensuring that every material representation as to a matter of fact is substantially correct. Disclosure is not required of a circumstance as to which the insurer waives information (section 3(3)(c)).
Zurich’s Defence stated that Clarendon breached this duty by incorrectly answering the Insolvency Question and failing to disclose the liquidations. Clarendon argued that on its true construction, the subjects of the Insolvency Question were limited to Clarendon and its current directors only (and not other corporate entities that a partner/director of Clarendon had previously been involved with), so the answer provided was correct. The insurers advanced a broader interpretation covering any partner in any partnership, and any director of any company, that is or was involved in Clarendon’s business as a dental practice, including the LLP as owner of the freehold and the former operator of the dental practice prior to restructuring.
Contract Interpretation and Waiver
Applying the Supreme Court decision in Wood v Capita Insurance [2017], the Court held that a reasonable person would objectively understand the Insolvency Question as relating only to insolvencies of current partners or directors of the policyholder, and not former partners or members of the LLP.
A special rule applies where a question asked by an insurer is ambiguous. As explained by Snowden J in Ristorante v Zurich [2021]: when the court is interpreting questions posed by insurers, rather than a negotiated contract term, any genuine ambiguity is resolved in favour of the applicant. If there are two rival constructions, both of which are objectively reasonable, the insurer cannot impugn as misrepresentation an answer which a reasonable person would not consider to be false.
The questions were contained in standard form documents issued to policyholders, hence the reference to “partners, directors or family members”, used disjunctively to cover the various possibilities that a policyholder is a partnership, a company, or a sole trader. The wording should naturally be read as referring to current partners and directors, at the date of the question, not to former ones.
The Court also noted the practical difficulties that would be faced in answering the Insolvency Question, if it meant any entity ‘involved’ with the business, as alleged by Zurich. There would need to be an inquiry into the circumstances not only of the policyholder’s own former partners or directors, but also those of predecessor owners or operators of the business, and evaluation of whether any potentially relevant person was sufficiently involved to require investigation - placing an unrealistic and unnecessary burden on policyholders to determine those ‘materially involved’.
It was therefore held that Clarendon answered the questions correctly but even if they had not, they were at best ambiguous and that ambiguity would be interpreted in favour of the policyholders. Further, Zurich and Aviva waived any right to disclosure of the fact of the liquidations, by asking the insolvency questions in the terms presented. The Court therefore agreed to strike out parts of Zurich’s Defence, in relation to alleged material non-disclosures on insolvency.
Implications
The case serves as a timely reminder on the need for clarity in proposal form questions and answers, to avoid disputes. Insurers should ask carefully worded enquiries to sufficiently investigate at the outset, and any attempt to re-write or extend the scope of such questions at the claims stage should be refused.
Read the full judgment here.
Authors:
Daniel Robin, Deputy Managing Partner
Pawinder Manak, Trainee Solicitor
Fenchurch Law Appoints Abigail Smith as an Associate
Abigail Smith joined the London Fenchurch team earlier this year, on January 6th. With her she brings a wealth of experience, after working as an Associate in the Financial Services Disputes and Investigations team at Eversheds.
In her previous role, Abigail specialised in resolving high value and complex insurance disputes on behalf of policyholders, brokers and other large corporates. Abigail has experience in the global legal insurance market, working representing leading international brokers, firms, and banks.
Managing Partner at Fenchurch Law, Joanna Grant, commented: “We are very pleased to welcome Abigail to the team. Her legal expertise will be invaluable to Fenchurch Law as we look to deliver on our commitment to provide the highest quality insurance advice to both brokers and policy holders here in the UK, and across the globe.”
Abigail Smith added: “I was attracted to Fenchurch Law initially by the firm’s excellent reputation within the legal insurance market, and unwavering commitment to levelling the playing field for policyholders in coverage disputes. Upon joining the firm, I was delighted to find myself part of a collegiate team of genuine insurance specialists whose values and culture are as impressive as their level of expertise.”
Fenchurch Law - Annual Coverage Review
A panoply of coverage disputes reached the English courts in 2024 across diverse industry sectors, highlighting the London market’s sophisticated role in managing risk and boosting commercial resilience through geopolitically turbulent times.
Several judgments from the Court of Appeal reflect the trend for literal policy interpretation and a reluctance to interfere with unambiguous wording, including in marine cargo, offshore construction and W&I claims. The first reported decision on section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 (‘IA 2015’) provides insight on the requisite causal connection. And guidance was provided on the scope of recovery for loss sustained over extended periods of time, in relation to construction projects and Covid BI losses.
The Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a deluge of claims in the Commercial Court for losses arising from aircraft stranded in Russia, and damage to or expropriation of strategic assets including energy, mining and manufacturing interests. Several aircraft leasing companies are pursuing claims under contingent & possessed policies, case managed alongside parallel proceedings against various reinsurers, with related trials taking place in Ireland and the US.
Collectively these cases demonstrate the importance of precise language throughout insurance policies, with particular attention on key provisions around the description of insured parties, triggers for non-damage perils, aggregation, dispute resolution and any opt-out from statutory protections. Recent claims experience helps to inform best practice on pitfalls to avoid for policyholders and brokers, to secure coverage as broad as market conditions might realistically allow and minimise the prospect of disputes.
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
Various Eateries v Allianz [2024] EWCA Civ 10
The latest decision on coverage under the Marsh Resilience wording considered various issues concerning the scope of prevention of access clauses, and aggregation of loss. Following settlement of related cases in Stonegate and Greggs, important questions on the treatment of furlough payments and additional increased costs of working were not included in continuing points of appeal and these matters are due to be revisited by the Court of Appeal in January 2025.
The remaining grounds of appeal from the first instance decision in Various Eateries were dismissed. The position remains that policyholders are entitled to claim for multiple sub-limits by reference to particular government actions, such as the nationwide lockdowns and regulations imposing restrictions on operation of different industry sectors; and those with ‘composite’ policies i.e. a number of separate contracts recorded in a single document, can recover individual sub-limits per company or per premises, depending on the insuring clauses and aggregation wording.
Gatwick Investment v Liberty [2024] EWHC 124 (Comm)
This case considered a number of preliminary issues in relation to coverage under prevention of access (‘POA’) or non-damage denial of access (‘NDDA’) clauses for policyholders operating in leisure, hospitality and retail industries.
The Commercial Court held that: (i) the Supreme Cout ruling on concurrent causation applies to POA / NDDA clauses in the same way as disease clauses, (ii) government action was that of a ‘statutory authority’, (iii) there was cover in respect of regulations imposed in response to a nationwide pandemic, (iv) furlough payments fell to be deducted from any sums otherwise due to policyholders, and (v) policy limits apply separately to multiple insured entities under a composite policy.
Bellini v Brit UW [2024] EWCA Civ 435
The claimant sought indemnity for Covid losses under a policy extension providing cover for: “interruption of or interference with the business caused by damage … arising from … any human infectious or human contagious disease … manifested by any person whilst in the premises or within a 25 mile radius …”
The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision, that there was no cover under this extension in the absence of physical damage. The claimant’s argument that something had gone wrong with the language, so that it was necessary to correct the error through contractual construction (applying Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes [2009]) was rejected. ‘Clumsy drafting’ resulting in limited cover did not mean that the provision was absurd, nor justify rewriting the contract. Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the courts must apply it, following the Supreme Court decision in Rainy Sky [2011].
London International Exhibition Centre v Allianz [2024] EWCA Civ 1026
The Court of Appeal considered coverage under insuring clauses triggered by disease ‘at the premises’ and held that the Supreme Court’s approach to causation applied to radius clauses in the FCA Test Case [2021] was equally applicable. The nature of the insured peril informs the causation test agreed between the parties and it must have been contemplated that an outbreak of disease could spread rapidly and widely. The appropriate causation test did not involve a ‘but for’ analysis and each individual case of illness resulting from Covid may constitute a separate and equally effective cause. Unfortunately, the judgment did not discuss in any detail the evidential requirements for policyholders to prove the presence of Covid at their premises and this remains contentious, given the limited availability of testing services in the early stages of the pandemic.
UnipolSai Assicurazioni v Covea Insurance [2024] EWCA Civ 1110
Covea provided cover for many children’s nurseries forced to close between March and July 2020. The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision that Covea, having paid out substantial sums in respect of BI losses, were entitled to indemnity under property catastrophe excess of loss policies with reinsurers. The pandemic did constitute a ‘catastrophe’ giving rise to the insured losses, and there was no requirement in the policy for ‘suddenness’ or occurrence of a time-limited ‘event’.
On the issue of aggregation, pursuant to the Hours Clause in the reinsurance policy, the Court affirmed that, when the covered peril is the loss of an ability to use the premises, the individual loss occurs at the same time, regardless of how long the financial loss continues. Provided the individual loss occurs within the indemnity period, the totality of that loss is covered and all of its financial consequences (consistent with the approach taken by Mr Justice Butcher in Stonegate and Various Eateries). An apportionment of financial loss would be impractical and was deemed to be incorrect.
International Entertainment Holdings v Allianz [2024] EWCA Civ 1281
The Court of Appeal decided that restrictions brought in by the UK government, preventing or hindering access to the claimants’ theatres around the country, were not actions of a ‘policing authority’ and there was no indemnity available under policies imposing this requirement within the insuring clauses. Further, it was held that Covid can qualify as an ‘incident’ and coverage may be available on a per premises basis, in the absence of clear wording to the contrary.
CONSTRUCTION ALL RISKS
Technip Saudi Arabia v MedGulf Insurance [2024] EWCA Civ 481
Technip was the principal contractor for an energy project in the Persian Gulf. A vessel chartered by Technip collided with a platform within the project site, leading to a damages settlement of $25 million agreed with the platform owner, KJO.
Technip claimed under the liability section of its offshore construction policy, written on the WELCAR wording, which named both Technip and KJO as ‘Principal Insureds’ (the words Insured and Assured were used interchangeably in the policy). The insurer refused indemnity on grounds that the Existing Property Endorsement excluded cover for damage to existing property owned by any of the ‘Principal Assureds’, including the platform owner KJO, and this was upheld by the High Court.
Technip appealed, arguing that the policy was composite, and the exclusion only applied to property owned by the particular insured claiming the indemnity. The Court of Appeal refused, based on the natural meaning of the wording and how this would be understood by a reasonable person. Each insured under the policy was deemed to have separate insurance cover, but the term ‘Principal Assureds’ had the same meaning in each case.
Sky UK & Mace v Riverstone [2024] EWCA Civ 1567
The timber roof of Sky’s headquarters in West London suffered extensive water ingress, due to a design defect in failing to incorporate temporary waterproofing during installation. The building was constructed by Mace as main contractor and insured under a CAR policy. The damage occurred prior to practical completion in April 2016, but continued to develop thereafter, including subsequent to expiry of the period of insurance in July 2017.
The Court of Appeal affirmed that ‘damage’ means an adverse change which impairs the relevant property’s use or value. The roof was damaged as soon as it suffered water ingress. Insurers were held liable to indemnify both Sky and Mace for all damage that occurred during the period of insurance but deteriorated or developed thereafter, overturning the trial judge’s decision that the claimants were only entitled to recover for the cost of repairing damage in existence at the end of the insured period. Investigation costs reasonably incurred to determine how to remediate damage were also covered, whether or not damage was revealed.
The roof was made up of 472 modular ‘cassettes’ covering an area of 16,000 square metres. The policy deductible of £150,000 applied per any one event and the Court of Appeal held that the relevant event was the decision to build to a design that did not include temporary waterproofing, so that only one deductible applied.
Mace had pleaded and proved damage at practical completion and was entitled to a monetary judgment in addition to and distinct from Sky. Matters have been remitted to the trial judge, for determination of the sums due to each claimant under the policy.
INSURANCE ACT 2015
Scotbeef v D&S Storage [2024] EWHC 341 (TCC)
Scotbeef pursued a claim against D&S Storage in relation to the supply of defective meat. After D&S Storage became insolvent, its liability insurer was added to the proceedings pursuant to the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (‘TPRIA 2010’).
The insurance policy contained a ‘Duty of Assured’ clause, described as a condition precedent to liability, requiring Scotbeef to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Food Storage & Distribution Federation’s standard terms were incorporated into commercial contracts. The terms were not incorporated to the agreement with D&S Storage, and the insurer applied to strike out the insurance claim, based on Scotbeef’s non-compliance with the policy term. The High Court considered: (a) whether the construction of a condition precedent affects its enforceability; and (b) when terms which depart from the IA 2015 are enforceable.
On the first issue, it was held that construction of the entire clause must be evaluated in the context of the whole policy, to determine whether the provision would operate as a condition precedent, regardless of any label applied. In this case, the disputed term included a write-back for cover, where the policyholder acted reasonably in seeking to incorporate the standard terms, and the consequences of breach were detailed in a later section of the policy. This meant the provisions were difficult to reconcile and ambiguous in effect, so that the purported condition precedent was unenforceable.
On the second issue the Court held that, while it is possible to depart from the IA 2015, any such terms must be clearly brought to the policyholder’s attention prior to inception of the policy. The insurer had not done so and therefore could not rely on the purported opt-out term to deny indemnity.
Delos Shipholding v Allianz (“the WIN WIN”) [2024] EWHC 719 (Comm)
The claim arose from the ‘illegal parking’ of a bulk carrier just inside Indonesian territorial waters off Singapore. This minor infraction led to the vessel being detained by the Indonesian authorities for over a year, while the Master was prosecuted under local shipping laws. The claimants claimed under a war risks policy, which provided that the vessel became a constructive total loss after 6 months’ detainment.
The Insurers denied liability on grounds that (i) the loss was not fortuitous, as resulting from voluntary conduct to anchor in that location, (ii) an exclusion applied, for arrest restraint or detainment ‘under customs or quarantine regulations’, and/or (iii) the claimants had breached the duty of fair presentation, by failing to disclose that the sole director of the registered owner of the vessel was the subject of criminal charges in Greece.
The Commercial Court held that the exclusion did not apply, and the loss was fortuitous, since the crew did not realise the vessel had strayed into Indonesian territory or consciously chosen to do so. On alleged material non-disclosure, the Court held that the claimants did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the criminal charges, because the director was not ‘senior management’ for the purposes of section 4(3) of the IA 2015, instead being merely a nominee director with no decision-making powers. In any event, the defendants were held not to have been induced by the alleged non-disclosure.
The claimants’ separate claim for damages for late payment, pursuant to section 13A IA 2015 was dismissed. Based on the expert evidence, the Court was not satisfied that another similar vessel would have been available for the claimants to purchase, as alleged, and the claim for loss of trading profit, as a result of late payment of the insurance claim, was not made out.
MOK Petro Energy v Argo [2024] EWHC 1935 (Comm)
A cargo of gasoline loaded onto a tanker in Oman was insured under an all risks marine open cover on the ICC (A) wording. The gasoline was blended with methanol and the sale contract between MOK (the buyer) and PetroChina (the seller) required the cargo to have a phase separation temperature (‘PST’) below a stated level. On arrival at the discharge port, the cargo was found to significantly exceed the agreed limit. This meant that the octane rating was negatively affected, although the blend did not actually undergo phase separation, and the cargo was rejected by the end purchaser.
Insurers declined indemnity, on grounds that (a) no damage had occurred, and (b) a warranty in the policy, requiring inspection and certification of the cargo at the load port, had not been complied with. The cargo had been inspected, but there was no contemporaneous evidence of certification. MOK sought to rely on section 11, IA 2015, which provides that insurers cannot rely on breach of terms (such as warranties or conditions precedent) intended to reduce the risk of loss, if the insured can show that the breach “could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred”. MOK argued that its failure to comply with the certification element was irrelevant and would not have reduced the risk, since inspection of the cargo had taken place.
The Commercial Court held that no damage, i.e. adverse physical change, had occurred simply by mixing the blend in proportions which resulted in a defective product with propensity for a higher PST than contractually stipulated, applying Bacardi v Thomas Hardy [2002]. The comments on breach of warranty were therefore ‘obiter’, i.e. unnecessary to the decision and not binding in subsequent cases. The Judge agreed with the insurer that section 11 “is directed at the effect of compliance with the entire term and not with the consequences of the specific breach”. It was not disputed that compliance with the warranty as a whole was capable of minimising the risk of water contamination, so that the breach of warranty was made out.
This is the first judicial guidance on the operation of section 11, since the enactment of the IA 2015. There has been much debate as to whether this provision introduced a strict causation test, allowing policyholders to argue that the specific breach would have made no difference in the particular circumstances, even if compliance with the term would generally decrease the risk of that type of loss occurring. The decision in this case suggests a more onerous test for policyholders, and it will be interesting to see how the arguments are developed in subsequent cases.
JURISDICTION
Zephyrus Capital Aviation v Fidelis Underwriting [2024] EWHC 734 (Comm)
The defendant reinsurers applied to stay claims against them based on exclusive jurisdiction clauses (‘EJC’s) in favour of the Russian courts. The Commercial Court held that it was unlikely the claimants would receive a fair trial in Russia, in circumstances where the Russian state had a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation, and several claimants are from the UK and EU, which Russia had designated as ‘Unfriendly Foreign States’. The Court had regard to the multiplicity of proceedings and the risk of inconsistent judgments, as additional factors supporting its decision. This is a rare example of the English courts deciding that there are strong reasons not to apply an EJC.
AerCap Ireland v PJSC Insurance [2024] EWHC 1365 (Comm)
By contrast, the defendant reinsurers in this case were successful in obtaining a stay of English court proceedings on grounds that the policies, containing all risks and war risk coverage, included an EJC in favour of the Ukrainian courts. The Commercial Court held that the jurisdiction clauses were binding and enforceable, and the ongoing conflict was unlikely to result in substantial delays or other issues in litigating these claims in Ukraine.
‘PAY FIRST’ CLAUSES
MS Amlin v King Trader (“the Solomon Trader”) [2024] EWHC 1813 (Comm)
The policyholder chartered a ship, which became grounded in the Solomon Islands. The owner of the vessel, King Trader, obtained an arbitration award against the charterer in excess of $47 million. The charterer entered insolvent liquidation and King Trader sought to recover the loss from the charterer’s insurers, under the TPRIA 2010. The charterer’s liability insurance contained a clause stating: “it is a condition precedent to the Assured’s right of recovery … that the Assured shall first have discharged any loss, expense or liability.”
The insurers were successful in obtaining a declaration that they were not liable to indemnify the claim, because the insolvent charterer had not discharged the underlying liability. The High Court held that the ‘pay first’ clause was not repugnant to the purpose of the insurance or inconsistent with the other policy terms (including the right to terminate on insolvency, while preserving the insured’s right to indemnity for prior incidents). The clause was clearly worded and prominently stated, not a “fox in the henhouse … hidden away in the thickets of the Policy”.
The decision is a salutary reminder for policyholders to be wary of similar provisions. The Judge acknowledged that: “The state of English law on this issue in the light of the 2010 Act is not particularly satisfactory… Prudent operators seek to insure against those liabilities, and a range of third parties who suffer loss and damage as a result of accidents at sea will look to insurances of this kind to be made whole. ‘Pay first’ clauses reduce the efficacy of that protection when it is most needed”.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Hamilton Corporate Member v Afghan Global [2024] EWHC 1426 (Comm)
Following seizure of a US military warehouse by the Taliban, the owners sought to claim under a political violence reinsurance policy. The insurers declined cover in reliance on an exclusion for loss: “directly or indirectly caused by seizure, confiscation, nationalisation … expropriation, detention … nor loss or damage to the Buildings and/or Contents by law, order, decree or regulation of any governing authority, nor for loss or damage arising from acts of contraband or illegal transportation or illegal trade.”
The Commercial Court held that ‘seizure’ in this context was not restricted to seizure by law, order, decree or regulation of any governing authority, and the cover was limited to physical damage or destruction – not loss by way of deprivation. It was noted that ‘seizure’ has a settled legal meaning, namely “the act of taking forcible possession either by a lawful authority or by overpowering force”, following Kuwait Airways [1999]. The Judge rejected the claimant’s submission that the clause should be construed in light of factual matrix evidence addressing the market’s understanding of the differences between political risks and political violence insurance, and the history of similar clauses.
PROFESSIONAL INDEMNITY
Axis Specialty Europe v Discovery Land [2024] EWCA Civ 7
Discovery Land became interested in acquiring and developing Taymouth Castle in the Scottish Highlands. The solicitor instructed by Discovery Land on the purchase fraudulently misappropriated surplus client funds and then, nine months later, secretly mortgaged the castle to a third party.
The fraudulent solicitor was senior partner in a two-partner firm, which became insolvent, and Discovery Land pursued a claim against the firm’s PI insurers pursuant to the TPRIA 2010. A dispute arose as to whether the second partner in the firm had ‘condoned’ the dishonest acts of the fraudster, which would have engaged the following exclusion under the SRA Minimum Terms: “The insurer shall have no liability for … any claims … involving dishonest or fraudulent acts … committed or condoned by the insured, provided that: (a) the policy shall nonetheless cover the civil liability of any innocent insured; and (b) no dishonest or fraudulent act … shall be imputed to a body corporate unless it was committed or condoned by all directors of the company … or [LLP] members”.
The trial judge held that, while the second partner’s standards fell well below those required in the profession, he was not aware of and had not approved the fraud, or other acts in the same pattern of dishonest behaviour leading to the claim and nor was there any ‘blind-eye knowledge’ on his part. Further, the Court rejected insurers’ argument that the claims relating to (i) surplus funds and (ii) the secret mortgage should be aggregated, for purposes of the limit of indemnity.
The Court of Appeal upheld the first Instance decision as entirely rational. The aggregation clause in the policy provided that: “similar acts or omissions in a series of related matters or transactions will be regarded as one claim”. Applying the Supreme Court decision in AIG v Woodman [2017], it was necessary to consider whether the degree of similarity was real or substantial, and whether the claims fitted together, based on a thorough analysis of the underlying facts. Here, the trial judge had reviewed the evidence ‘painstakingly’, and while the two claims involved the same property and affiliated company victims, this was insufficient to provide the necessary link between the two transactions.
SUBROGATION
Dassault Aviation v Mitsui Sumitomo [2024] EWCA Civ 5
Dassault supplied aircraft to Mitsui Bussan Aerospace (‘MBA’) pursuant to a contract governed by English law including a non-assignment provision, as follows: “… this Contract shall not be assigned or transferred in whole or in part by any Party to any third party, for any reason whatsoever, without the prior written consent of the other Party”.
Following a delay in supply of aircraft on to the Japanese coastguard, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (‘MSI’) indemnified MBA for a liquidated damages claim from the coastguard and then sought to recover the loss by subrogated proceedings against Dassault. It was common ground that MBA’s claims against Dassault would be transferred to MSI by Article 25 of the Japanese Insurance Act, reproduced by the insurance policy, subject to operation of the non-assignment clause.
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the insurer’s appeal against the High Court decision, concluding that the language of the sales contract, in prohibiting an assignment ‘by any party’, did not prevent an assignment that took place by operation of law.
RSA Insurance v Textainer Group [2024] EWCA Civ 547
Textainer, a global supplier of shipping containers, incurred a loss of around $95 million following the collapse of Hanjin Shipping, in respect of thousands of missing and damaged containers and lost rental income. Textainer secured $70 million from primary and excess layer insurers and later recovered $15 million in Hanjin’s liquidation.
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the well-established principle that recoveries are allocated on a ‘top-down’ basis, not proportionately (applying the House of Lords decision in Lord Napier and Ettrick [1993]). Sums obtained from third parties were therefore to be applied towards uninsured losses first, then paid down from the highest to the lowest layer of cover, before reimbursing the policy deductible. This approach applies to aggregate or excess layer placements and unitary losses alike. It confirmed that the concepts of under-insurance and average have no relevance to insurance written in layers.
WARRANTY & INDEMNITY
Project Angel Bidco v Axis Managing Agency [2024] EWCA Civ 446
The claimant sought indemnity under its buyer-side W&I policy for loss in value of the shares in a target company, on the basis that warranties given by the seller were alleged to be untrue. The relevant warranties stated that the company was not involved in legal proceedings or under investigation and had not committed any breach of contract or acts of bribery or corruption (‘ABC warranties’).
After the transaction completed, the target company became the subject of police investigations relating to compliance with anti-corruption and bribery legislation, and lost its key client, Liverpool City Council, resulting in insolvency of the target company and the policyholder. The insurers declined cover in reliance on a policy exclusion for “any liability or actual or alleged non-compliance with … [anti-bribery or anti-corruption laws]”. The policyholder argued that there was an obvious mistake in drafting of the exclusion, as it contradicted coverage provided in a cover spreadsheet listing the ABC warranties as insured obligations.
By a 2:1 majority, the Court of Appeal upheld the Commercial Court decision, that the policyholder’s proposed correction to the exclusion clause should not be permitted. While accepting that there was an obvious contradiction, the Court held it was not clear any mistake had been made in the drafting and nor did any clear remedy exist to correct the alleged mistake. There was a plain commercial rationale for the broad effect of the exclusion, from the insurer’s perspective, and the ordinary meaning of the words applied. In a dissenting judgment, Phillips LJ preferred the policyholder’s argument and would have allowed the appeal, based on the commercial purpose and intended effect of the insurance in the overall context of the Sale & Purchase Agreement.
This case illustrates the high bar for establishing a mistake in the drafting of commercial contracts, particularly a bespoke W&I policy, to justify rectification of a disputed provision.
Authors:
Catrin Wyn Williams, Associate
Pawinder Manak, Trainee Solicitor
The Sky is the limit: Developments in relation to damage under CAR policies
On 16 December 2024 the Court of Appeal delivered judgment in the case of (1) Sky UK Ltd and (2) Mace Limited vs Riverstone Managing Agency Ltd and Others, a decision which will provide welcome clarity to the construction community, as well as being of interest to the insurance market more widely in terms of its analysis of the nature of an indemnity policy. The judgment discusses a number of important points, notably the rights of insured parties under a Construction All Risks (“CAR”) policy to recover in respect of “deterioration and development damage” which occurred after the policy period as a result of damage which had occurred during the policy period.
The factual background
The claims were in respect of extensive water damage to the roof of Sky's global headquarters building in West London, which was constructed for Sky in 2014 to 2016 by Mace as main contractor under a JCT 2011 Design and Build Contract dated 17 March 2014. Sky and Mace were named insureds under the Policy.
The roof was comprised of 472 wooden cassettes, into a substantial number of which water had entered before final waterproofing had taken place and had remained for periods of construction, leading to wetting and, so Sky and Mace alleged, irreversible swelling and structural decay by the end of the period of insurance (or “POI”, which ran from commencement of the project to one year after practical completion).
In the period between expiry of the POI and the drying out works (which arrested any further damage) the condition of the timber already damaged had worsened, and moisture had spread to other parts of the roof construction. The Court of Appeal termed these types of damage as “deterioration damage”; i.e. damage, such as further swelling, in parts of the timber already damaged, and “development damage”; i.e. damage to additional, previously undamaged timber by way of spread.
It is important to note, as the Court of Appeal stated, that the vast majority of water ingress had occurred during the POI and there was little, if any, ingress after the POI. Secondly, there was no allegation by the defendant insurers that Sky or Mace had failed to mitigate their loss prior to the hearing, given the complexity of designing, agreeing and implementing a remedial scheme.
The underlying decision
In the underlying decision, HHJ Pelling held that Sky was only entitled to damage which had occurred during the POI, and not development or deterioration damage which occurred thereafter. In reaching this decision, the Judge relied on the House of Lords decision in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co [2009] and statements in that decision that in a policy covering losses occurring during a policy period, the cover does not extend to damage occurring before or after the policy period.
The Judge had found that the entry of moisture into the cassettes during the POI was a tangible physical change to the cassettes as long as the presence of water, if left unremedied, would affect the structural strength, stability or functionality of the cassettes during the POI.
The arguments on appeal
All of the parties were granted permission to appeal on numerous grounds, but in this article we discuss the primary point of contention, which was whether Sky could claim for deterioration and development damage.
On this point, the cover identified in the insuring clause of the policy was in respect of “damage to Property Insured occurring during the Period of Insurance” and insurers argued that damage occurring after the POI was not covered. Insurers relied on the decision in Wasa as authority for the proposition that, under “time policies”, the cover is in respect of damage occurring during the period of cover, and not occurring before or after.
In summary, Sky and Mace’s arguments in reply were that:
- An insurance claim is a claim for unliquidated damages and, as such, the measure of recovery is for all the loss suffered by reason of the insured peril occurring during the POI, including loss caused after the POI.
- The Policy contained a Basis of Settlement clause, as below, and the measure of recovery contended for was supported by the underlined words in the clause:
“Basis of Settlement
In settlement of claims under this Section of the Contract of Insurance the Insurers shall, subject to the terms and conditions of the Contract of Insurance, indemnify the Insured on the basis of the full cost of repairing, reinstating or replacing property lost or damaged (including the costs of any additional operational testing, commissioning as a result of the physical loss or damage which is indemnifiable hereunder) even though such costs may vary from the original construction costs …."
The Court of Appeal decision
Development and deterioration damage
Lord Justice Popplewell delivered the leading judgment, which was rooted in the principle, long established in the authorities, that a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity, often described as a contract to hold someone harmless. Such a contract was not, however, a promise by the insurer to pay money upon the happening of the insured event, but rather a promise to hold harmless, i.e. a promise that the insured will not suffer the damage in the first place. This promise to hold harmless was the insurer’s primary obligation and, when breached, it was under a secondary obligation to pay damages for breach of the primary obligation.
In light of this, damages payable under an insurance policy fell to be assessed on the basis of established common law principles as to foreseeability, remoteness and mitigation that applied to any other contract; namely damages to put the innocent party in the position it would have been but for the breach, subject to express terms in the policy modifying the general position (e.g. limits or deductibles, exclusions such as for consequential loss or if caused by certain perils), but only if such modification was excluded by clear wording.
Lord Justice Popplewell found that the temporal limit in the insuring clause was insufficiently clear to modify the ordinary rule that insurers were liable to pay the reasonably foreseeable costs of remedying development and deterioration damage.
This conclusion was supported by the wording of the Basis of Settlement clause.
Further, Lord Justice Popplewell found that the authorities, including the House of Lords’ decision in Wasa was distinguishable on the facts, predominantly because it did not relate to development or deterioration damage of the type suffered in this case.
Investigation Costs
Mace also claimed the costs of “lifting the lid”, namely the upper surface of the cassettes in the roof upslope above the gutters, as reasonable investigation costs. The trial Judge, at first instance, denied these costs as being recoverable under the Policy and characterised them as “speculative opening up works”. Additionally, the Judge found that any investigation costs not revealing physical damage would not be recoverable under the CAR Policy.
Nevertheless, based on the normal common law principles that apply to contractual damages claim, aimed at putting the innocent party back in the position it was before the breach (to hold harmless), the Court of Appeal found that reasonable costs of investigation were recoverable if they were reasonably incurred in determining how to remediate the insured damage which has occurred. This was the case, even if the result of the investigation may be to identify the absence of damage in certain areas.
Meaning of physical damage
On a separate point, the Court of Appeal also rejected insurers’ appeal in relation to the meaning of “damage”, and upheld the trial Judge’s findings that damage meant any change to the physical nature of tangible property which impaired its value or usefulness to its owner or operator. There was no need for the physical change to compromise the performance of an individual cassette, as insurers argued.
Retained Liability
The Policy contained a deductible (or “Retained Liability”) of £150,000 “any one event but this will only apply to those claims which are recoverable under DE5…”. It was common ground that the claim was recoverable under DE5 by reason of defective design being a proximate cause, and the trial Judge had found therefore that a single deductible of £150,000 applied to the whole of the claim, as opposed to applying separately in respect of damage to each cassette.
The Court of Appeal also upheld the trial Judge’s findings on this point that, based on the long established authorities, an event refers to the cause of the damage, and not the damage itself, supported by the fact that the deductible was specifically linked to the cause of the loss being defective design.
Comment
As the Court of Appeal stated, on the principal point of contention, the fact that development and deterioration damage was recoverable, would accord with business common sense. In the context of a major construction claim, an insured party would reasonably expect to be compensated for the consequences of insured damage which occurred during the policy period, to a part of the works already damaged (deterioration) or to some other part of the building not yet damaged (development), after this period had expired, in the absence of any policy terms limiting recovery. This is especially so in relation to complex claims where a remediation scheme may not be finalised until sometime after expiry of the policy period, and where the state of the building may deteriorate in the meantime.
Of course, development or deterioration damage would be unlikely to be covered under a buildings policy, since this would exclude damage which first occurred prior to the building policy period, meaning the Court of Appeal judgment is crucial in helping insureds to transfer this risk to the insurance market.
The outcome is consistent with the approach taken in recent cases on non-damage business interruption claims, that provided the policy “trigger” occurs within the indemnity period, the totality of loss is covered including that which continued to be suffered after the policy period (UnipolSai Assicurazioni SPA v Covea Insurance plc [2024]).
The Court of Appeal decision will therefore be welcomed by employers and contractors alike. It remains to be seen whether permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted.
Authors
Camden Contribution Curtailed: TPRA 2010 Developments
Recent cases highlight potential difficulties for insurers in handling claims under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (“the TPRA”).
By way of reminder, the TPRA allows a third party claimant to pursue a recovery directly against an insolvent insured’s liability insurer, both to establish the insured’s liability to the claimant, and coverage under the policy, in the same action, without the need to join the insured to the proceedings. In relation to the underlying liability claim, the insurer is permitted to rely, as against the third party, on any defences that would have been available to the insolvent insured.
In Riedwig v HCC International Insurance plc & another [2024], the High Court (Master Brightwell) dismissed a liability insurer’s application to bring a Part 20 claim against the claimant’s professional advisors, seeking a contribution in respect of the insurer’s potential liability to the claimant under the TPRA.
The claim arose from alleged negligence by Goldplaza Berkeley Square Ltd (“Goldplaza”) in producing a valuation of property on Camden High Street. The claimant sought to recover her consequent losses from Goldplaza, and subsequently its professional indemnity insurers, HCC, following Goldplaza’s insolvency in 2021.
HCC applied to join the solicitors who had acted for the claimant on the original property transaction to the TPRA proceedings. The parties agreed that Goldplaza and the solicitors were potentially liable for the “same damage”, based on section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (“the CLCA”), which provides that:
“any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise)”
However, the Court held that the insurer and the solicitors were not liable for the same damage. The insurer was potentially liable under the policy, while the solicitors were allegedly liable for financial loss resulting from the property transaction. Following Bovis Construction v Commercial Union [2001], approved by the House of Lords in Royal Brompton Hospital v Hammond [2002], “an insurer does not inflict damage on anyone … the only damage it is capable of inflicting is in refusing to meet its obligations under the policy of insurance”.
The Judge noted that the purpose of the TPRA is to enable a claimant to pursue an insurer directly in respect of the liability of its insured, and for the claimant to stand in the insured’s place for that purpose, not the insurer. The insurer does not become liable for damage caused by its insured, and the fact that the insured might have a contribution claim against third parties does not mean that the insurer also has that right.
Depending on the type and stage of insolvency proceedings, insurers may be able to apportion loss with third parties by a more convoluted route of joining the insolvent insured to TPRA proceedings (as HCC had intimated an intention to do) or else by way of subrogated recovery, after settling a policy claim. Alternatively, an assignment of the insured’s contribution rights could potentially be made to the insurer, through policy wording or subsequent agreement.
Liability insurers are generally required nowadays to take a more proactive approach to defence of litigation against an insolvent insured, since judgment in default may suffice to establish liability under the TPRA, even if it does not follow consideration on the merits of the underlying claim. This was confirmed by the Scottish Inner House, Court of Session, in the recent appeal decision Scotland Gas Networks plc v QBE [2024], upholding the first instance findings considered in our previous article.
While the intention behind the CLCA is to broaden the class of potential contributing parties, where a number of defendants share responsibility for a claimant’s loss, the ability of an insurer to seek contribution from third parties is limited in the context of TPRA claims.
Authors:
The F1: A closer look at the Bacardi principle and section 11 of the Insurance Act
The Facts
MOK Petro Energy FZC v Argo (No. 604) Limited, The F1 [2024] EWHC 1935 (Comm) concerned a cargo of 11,800 MT of 92 RON unleaded gasoline (“the Cargo”) that had been loaded onto the tanker F1 (“the Vessel”) in Sohar, Oman. The Cargo was insured under an all-risks marine open cover on the ICC(A) wording (“the Policy”).
The Cargo consisted of a blend of gasoline and methanol. The gasoline and methanol used for the Cargo were drawn from four shore tanks (two gasoline, two methanol). They were loaded onto the Vessel via connecting pipelines and then blended in a tank on board the Vessel.
All gasoline-methanol blends have a phase separation temperature (PST), i.e., a temperature at or under which the blend will separate into a gasoline-rich upper layer and a methanol-rich lower layer. Phase separation is undesirable as phase-separated blends have a lower octane value and may damage the engine in which they are used. Put another way: the lower the PST, the better for the blend.
Also relevant is the fact that water increases the propensity of a gasoline-methanol blend to under phase separation. Unwanted water contamination therefore increases the PST of a blend.
The Cargo specifications, per the sale and purchase contract between MOK (the buyer) and PetroChina (the seller), required the Cargo to have a PST of 1°C or below. However, when the Vessel arrived at the discharge port, the Cargo was found to have a PST of 29°C. The Cargo was rejected by MOK’s end purchaser and ultimately sold by MOK to a salvage buyer. MOK claimed an indemnity under the Policy for the difference between (i) the value of the Cargo had it complied with specifications and (ii) the value at which it was actually sold.
Insurers declined the claim. In the ensuing trial, the Commercial Court upheld insurers’ declinature. While much of the judgment turned on the specific facts of the case, the Court’s findings on the following two issues carry wider implications for policyholders:
- Whether the mere fact that the Cargo had been defectively blended could constitute damage.
- How should a Court assess whether compliance with a warranty would reduce the risk of loss, as required under section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015.
Whether the mere fact of defective blending could constitute damage
Clause 1 of the ICC(A) wording provides that the insurance “covers all risks of loss of or damage to the subject-matter except as provided in Clauses 4, 5, 6 and 7 below”.
A policyholder seeking to obtain cover under the ICC(A) wording must generally establish (i) a fortuitous event which (ii) caused loss or damage to the insured cargo. Insured cargo is damaged only where it undergoes an adverse change in physical state.
In this case, one of MOK’s arguments was that (i) PetroChina’s decision to blend the gasoline and methanol in the proportions actually used was fortuitous, and (ii) this blending caused damage by resulting in a product that had a propensity to phase separate at 17°C, which was higher than the contractually stipulated PST of 1°C (although the blend did not actually undergo phase separation).
The question that arose was – could the blend be regarded as damaged merely because it was defective from the moment of its creation? Dias J held that it could not as there had never been a change to the physical state of the blend. The facts were on all fours with the well-known Bacardi Breezers case: Bacardi-Martini Beverages Ltd v Thomas Hardy Packaging Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 549 (“Bacardi”).
- In Bacardi, a drinks manufacturer mixed cardon dioxide which it did not appreciate had been contaminated with benzene with water and concentrate to form light alcoholic drinks. Unsurprisingly, the contaminated drinks were unmarketable. The issue was whether there had been “physical damage” to the drinks for the purpose of a limitation of liability clause. The English Court of Appeal held that there had been no damage – the drinks had not been subject to damage, but were merely defective from the moment of their creation.
- Similarly, in the present case, the blend was formed through the mixing of gasoline and methanol, and had a propensity to phase separate from the moment of its creation. It had never existed without this propensity. Since there was no change in the physical state of the blend to speak of, it could not, held the Court, be said to have suffered damage.
How should a Court assess whether compliance with a warranty would reduce the risk of loss?
Section 11 of IA 2015 applies to (among others) warranties which, if complied with, would tend to reduce the risk of loss of a particular kind. The general effect of section 11 is that, where an insured has breached a warranty to which section 11 applies:
- if the insured can show that “the non-compliance with the warranty could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred”, per section 11(3); then
- the insurer would not be able to rely on the insured’s breach to exclude/limit/discharge its liability.
Put another way, section 11 obviates an insured’s breach of warranty where the warranty is not relevant to the insured’s actual loss.
In the present case, the Policy contained an express warranty requiring a surveyor to inspect and certify the connecting pipelines between the Vessel and the shore tanks. On the facts, MOK’s surveyor had done the former but not the latter. Accordingly, the Court found that MOK had not complied with the express warranty.
The issue then became whether section 11 negated MOK’s breach of warranty. This would be the case if MOK could show that “the non-compliance with the warranty could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred”.
MOK’s primary case had been that the blend had been fortuitously contaminated with water either when the gasoline and methanol were loaded onto the Vessel via connecting pipelines, or when they were blended on board the Vessel. This water contamination in turn increased the PST of the blend (see above). The Court therefore assumed, for the purposes of its section 11 analysis, that the “loss which actually occurred” was the contamination of the blend with water as alleged by MOK.
On the facts, MOK’s surveyor had inspected the pipelines and found no water contamination, but had not issued a certificate in respect of the inspection. Arguably, the requirement to issue a certificate (when an inspection had already been carried out and no trace of water contamination had been found) was a mere formality and the failure to issue a certificate could not have increased the risk of loss (water contamination). The question then arose – in considering whether “the non-compliance with the warranty could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred”:
- Should the Court consider only the effect of the particular breach of warranty committed by MOK (i.e., only the effect of its surveyor’s failure to issue a certificate)? If so, MOK’s breach arguably would not have increased the risk of water contamination, and MOK would be able to rely on section 11 to negate its breach of warranty.
- Alternatively, should the Court consider the effect of non-compliance with the warranty as a whole (i.e., the effect of both not inspecting and not certifying the pipelines)? If so, non-compliance with the warranty as a whole would probably have increased the risk of contamination, and MOK would not be able to rely on section 11.
Dias J preferred the second view, holding that section 11 was directed at the effect of compliance with the entire warranty and not with the consequences of the specific breach by the insured, and that paragraph 96 of the Explanatory Notes to IA 2015 supported this reading. Accordingly, MOK’s breach of warranty would have been fatal to its claim.
Implications for policyholders – English law
Neither of the findings discussed are policyholder-friendly.
That said, Dias J’s finding that the mere fact of defective blending cannot constitute damage intuitively accords with the reason why mere defects are not covered under all-risks insurance – namely, that all-risks insurance is not meant to guarantee the proper manufacture or construction of the property insured. A parallel can be drawn with construction all-risks policies, which typically do not cover the costs of rectifying defects in design or workmanship. Apart from this, the F1 is also significant for being the first case to explicitly endorse the applicability of Bacardi in an insurance context (Bacardi having been concerned with a dispute under a supply of goods contract).
As for section 11 of IA 2015, this case (as noted in an earlier article) is significant for being the decision to consider that section. That said, Dias J’s observations (i.e. that it is the effect of non-compliance with the entire warranty, rather than the insured’s particular breach, that should be taken into account) were obiter and it remains to be seen whether another Court would agree with her. In our view, notwithstanding Dias J’s observations, the use of the definitive article in section 11(3) (“the non-compliance”) might suggest on the contrary that it is the insured’s particular breach that should be looked at.
Implications for policyholders – Singapore Law
The authors – both of whom are APAC-based – will briefly consider the implications of this decision for Singapore law, a commonwealth jurisdiction whose law of insurance substantially reflects the English position prior to IA 2015.
There do not appear to be strong reasons why a Singapore Court would not consider Dias J’s findings on the issue of defective blending persuasive.
However, Dias J’s observations on section 11 of IA 2015 have less relevance. Under Singapore law, a breach of warranty has a draconian effect – the insurer is discharged from liability from the date of an insured’s breach of warranty: see section 33(3) of the Singapore Marine Insurance Act 1906. There is no equivalent of section 11 of IA 2015 that a policyholder can look to negate the breach of warranty. The Singapore law position accords with what had been the English law position prior to 2015, and its harshness was the reason behind the English reforms to insurance warranties as set out in the IA 2015.
Authors:
Toby Nabarro, Director Singapore
Reinsurance Cover for Covid BI Losses Upheld on Appeal
In UnipolSai Assicurazioni SPA v Covea Insurance PLC [2024] EWCA Civ 110, the Court of Appeal has upheld the first instance finding that the reinsured (Covea), having paid out substantial sums in respect of Covid business interruption (BI) losses, were entitled to indemnity under property catastrophe excess of loss policies with reinsurers. The decision provides clarification on the operation of aggregation clauses and the proper interpretation of a “catastrophe” in treaty reinsurance arrangements.
Covea provided cover for a large number of children’s nurseries which were forced to close between 20 March 2020 and July 2020, as a result of the pandemic. The factual background and outcome at first instance are explained in detail in our earlier article. The decision was appealed by reinsurers and the following questions arose for re-evaluation:
1. Whether Covid-19 losses arose out of, and were directly occasioned by, a “catastrophe”; and
2. Whether the “Hours Clause” - by which the duration of any “Loss Occurrence” was prescribed depending on the nature of the underlying peril - meant that:
(i) an “individual loss” occurs on the date the covered peril strikes, including where the insured peril is the loss of ability to use premises; and
(ii) where the (re)insured first sustains indemnifiable BI loss within a nominated 168-hour period, subsequent losses after that period fall to be aggregated as part of a single “Loss Occurrence”.
Meaning of Catastrophe
At first instance, Mr Justice Foxton held that Covid-19 did amount to a “catastrophe,” as required under the reinsurance wording. On appeal, the reinsurers argued that a catastrophe must be a sudden or violent event, capable of causing physical damage, whereas the pandemic was an ongoing state of affairs.
The Court of Appeal rejected these submissions, highlighting the absence of any reference to an “event” within the policy wording, and noting that the unities test in Axa v Field [1996] is merely an aid to be used with broad application. Their Lordships also rejected the argument that “suddenness” was a pre-requisite for all catastrophes, and, in any event, the “exponential increase in Covid 19 infections in the UK […] did amount to a disaster of sudden onset.” The attempt by reinsurers to rely on an ejusdem generis argument, in relation to the alleged need for physical damage, was flawed, as the types of catastrophes mentioned in the policy were not intended to be a prescribed class. The expert evidence that BI cover may include cover for non-damage BI was unchallenged.
Operation of the Hours Clause
The central question for consideration under the Hours Clause was when the relevant loss occurred. If it fell outside the period stipulated, then it would not be recoverable. It was also noted that the term “Loss Occurrence” was defined in the policy to mean “individual losses”. Discussing this further, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the term “occur” means when a loss first happens during a period of time. In relation to BI specifically, it was held that when the covered peril is the loss of an ability to use the premises, the individual loss occurs at the same time, regardless of how long the financial loss continues - consistent with the approach taken by Mr Justice Butcher in Stonegate and Various Eateries. Provided the individual loss occurs within the indemnity period, the totality of that loss is covered and all of its financial consequences. An apportionment of financial loss would give rise to considerable practical difficulties and was deemed to be incorrect.
Implications for Policyholders
The decision is welcomed by cedants with the benefit of similarly worded reinsurance policies. The implications are far-reaching, with total payouts for Covid BI claims estimated in the region of £2 billion, according to the Association of British Insurers. This policyholder-friendly precedent is particularly helpful, since most reinsurance disputes are resolved in confidential arbitrations.
Authors:
Pawinder Manak, Trainee Solicitor
Climate Risks Series, Part 3: Aloha v AIG - Liability Cover for Reckless Environmental Harm
Aloha v AIG - Liability Cover for Reckless Environmental Harm
Increasing numbers of claims are proceeding around the world alleging that the public were misled about the risks associated with climate change, resulting from fossil fuels and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.
A recent decision in the Supreme Court of Hawaii, Aloha Petroleum Ltd v National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh and American Home Insurance Co. [2024], held that an “occurrence” in this context included the consequences of reckless conduct, and GHG emissions were a “pollutant” for purposes of a pollution exclusion under a commercial general liability policy.
Background
The Appellant, Aloha Petroleum Ltd (“Aloha”), was insured with two subsidiaries of AIG under a series of liability policies, in respect of its business as one of the largest petrol suppliers and convenience store operators in Hawaii.
The counties of Honolulu and Maui sued several fossil fuel companies, including Aloha, claiming that the defendants knew of the effects of climate change and had a duty to warn the public about the dangers of their products. It was alleged that the defendants acted recklessly by promoting climate denial, increasing the use of fossil fuels and emitting GHGs, causing erosion, damage to water infrastructure and increased risks of flooding, extreme heat and storms.
Aloha sought indemnity under the policies and AIG refused to defend the underlying claims, alleging that the harm caused by GHGs was foreseeable and therefore not “accidental”; and alternatively, seeking to rely upon an exclusion to cover for losses arising from pollution.
Aloha issued proceedings seeking a declaration that the policies would respond, and the District Court of Hawaii referred the following questions to the Supreme Court, to assist with determining the parties’ motions for summary judgment:
- Does an “accident” include recklessness, for purposes of the policy definition of “occurrence”?
- Are greenhouse gases “pollutants” within the meaning of the pollution exclusion?
Policy Wording
The policies provided occurrence-based coverage, with two different definitions of “occurrence” for the relevant periods:
- “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions”, or
- “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured”
The pollution exclusion clauses varied across the policies, but the differences were immaterial for purposes of the issues before the Supreme Court.
The 2004-2010 policy excluded cover for:
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of “pollutants” at any time.
. . . .
“Pollutants” [mean] “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.”
Is Reckless Conduct Accidental?
Aloha argued that it was entitled to indemnity, as the allegations of recklessness were sufficient to establish an “accident” and therefore an “occurrence” under the policies. Aloha relied on Tri-S Corp v Western World Ins. Co. (2006), which held - in the context of unintentional personal injury resulting from proximity to high voltage power lines - that reckless conduct is accidental, unless intended to cause harm, or expected to with practical certainty.
AIG claimed that Aloha understood the climate science, and the environmental damage was intentional, not fortuitous. It relied on AIG Hawaii Ins. Co. v Caraang (1993), which held - in the context of torts involving obvious physical violence - that an “occurrence” requires an injury which is not the expected or reasonably foreseeable result of the insured’s own intentional acts or omissions.
The Supreme Court agreed with Aloha, ruling that:
“when an insured perceives a risk of harm, its conduct is an ‘accident’ unless it intended to cause harm or expected harm with practical certainty … interpreting an ‘accident’ to include reckless conduct honors the principle of fortuity. The reckless insured, by definition, takes risk.”
Are GHGs “Pollutants”?
Aloha argued that GHGs are not pollutants, because they are not “irritants” (applicable in the context of personal injury, not property damage) or “contaminants”. The drafting history was said to indicate that the exclusion should be limited to clean-up costs for traditional pollution caused by hazardous waste from the insured’s operations, not liability resulting from its finished products.
The Supreme Court held that a “contaminant”, and therefore “pollutant” for purposes of the exclusion, is determined by whether damage is caused by its presence in the environment. Although a single molecule of carbon dioxide would not be viewed as pollution, a fact-specific analysis is required, and the Supreme Court was satisfied that Aloha’s gasoline production is causing harmful climate change. This approach was supported by the regulation of GHG emissions in Hawaii and the federal Clean Air Act.
Not all of the policies contained a pollution exclusion clause, however, and the question of whether AIG is required to indemnify Aloha for that policy period (covering 1986 to 1987) will now be considered by the District Court.
Impact On Policyholders
The finding that reckless conduct is covered by liability policies in the context of climate harms is highly significant and will be welcomed by energy companies.
While the issues are yet to be fully explored in European jurisdictions, it is interesting to compare the UK Supreme Court decision in Burnett v Hanover [2021], where merely reckless conduct was insufficient to engage a ‘deliberate acts’ exclusion in a public liability policy; and the recent decision in Delos Shipping v Allianz [2024], confirming that a defence based on lack of fortuity requires the insurer to establish that consequences of the insured’s actions were inevitable, i.e. “bound to eventuate in the ordinary course”.
The precise wording of any pollution or climate change exclusion should be carefully considered prior to inception of the policy period. The causative language used can significantly alter the scope of coverage and prospects of indemnity (see, for example, Brian Leighton v Allianz [2023]).
Authors:
Climate Risk Series:
Part 1: Climate litigation and severe weather fuelling insurance coverage disputes
Part 2: Flood and Storm Risk – Keeping Policyholders Afloat
Will someone think of the Lenders? Co-insurance issues for funders
Recent Court decisions such as Sky UK Ltd & Mace Ltd v Riverstone Managing Agency Ltd (which we wrote about previously in more detail here) have discussed “Project Insurance” policies taken out by employers in relation to construction projects, confirming the principles by which contractors, sub-contractors and other consultants may become insured under these policies. However, such policies normally also name lenders as insured parties (either specifically by name, or by general description) and in this article we discuss how these principles apply to lenders and what lenders need to do to ensure they are entitled to claim under the policies.
By way of recap, a Project Policy or OCIP normally covers insured parties in respect of physical damage to the “works”, as well as providing third party liability cover (both in respect of negligence and “non-negligence” under JCT 6.5.1). The employer, and/or any lenders, will frequently also want the policy to provide Delay in Start Up cover, which covers financial loss in the event that practical completion is delayed by damage[1] to the works.
A policy will normally define the “Principal Insured” as the employer, being the party who contracts with insurers when the policy is taken out. As I say, contractors, sub-contractors and lenders may also be named under the policy although, as was stated by Eyre J in RFU v Clark Smith Partnership [2022]:
“Being named as an insured does not without more make a person a party to the insurance contract. A person who is named as an insured but who is not otherwise a party to the insurance contract does not become a party to the contract simply by reason of having been named in it. That person remains a third party unless and until it becomes a party in a way recognised as constituting it in law a party to the insurance contract or obtains the benefit of the policy in question in some other way. … Similarly, the editors of Colinvaux rightly say at 15-018 “the mere fact that a policy states that it covers the interests of named or identifiable third parties does not of itself give those third parties the right to enforce the contract or to rely upon its terms (e.g. the benefit of a waiver of subrogation clause)”.
Where a third party insured, such as a contractor or lender, becomes an insured by agreement between an insurer and a Principal or contractual insured, the existence and scope of the cover the third party insured enjoys under the policy depends on the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the Policy and the terms of any contract between the contractual assured and the relevant third party insured.
In a construction context, the Courts have stated that a third party insured contractor can become a party to the policy:
- If the employer taking out the policy is authorised to insure on the third party’s behalf (the “agency” route); or
- On the basis there is a standing offer from the project insurers to insure persons described in the policy such as “Main Contractor” or “Sub-Contractor”, which offer is capable of being accepted by those persons upon execution of a building contract, provided it is not inconsistent with the standing offer (this was the approach which the Court said was relevant in Haberdashers’ Aske Federation Trust Ltd v Lakehouse Contracts Ltd).
Whether a (sub) contractor becomes insured because of agency principles or accepting a standing offer, as well as looking at the policy, it will therefore be necessary to look at the (sub) contract to determine the extent to which the (sub) contractor is entitled to claim, and also to determine the extent to which the (sub) contractor will benefit from a waiver of subrogation.
For similar reasons, a lender will not be insured under a project policy where that policy has been arranged by a principal insured, unless the lender has provided authority to the principal insured to arrange insurance on its behalf and, even then, the lender will only be insured to the extent of the authority provided (even if the cover provided under the policy is wider than the authority provided).
In many cases, this will not cause any issues for a lender to a development finance project since the loan agreement with the borrower will authorise the borrower to arrange insurance in respect of the works, naming the lender as co-insured and first loss payee. Where the borrower is the principal or contracting insured in these circumstances, it will have the requisite authority to insure and the lender will be insured to the extent that the policy reflects the authority.
However, if for some reason the borrower is not the contracting insured, the lender may need to grant authority to the contracting insured via means other than the loan agreement. Further, if the lender wants to benefit from certain bespoke coverage not normally catered for in standard LMA facility agreement drafting (such as DSU cover), it will need to ensure that the principal insured is specifically authorised to obtain such cover on its behalf, and to the extent required.
A final point to note is that these principles will also apply where lenders are looking to be insured under other types of insurance policy in addition to project policies, which the lender has not taken out directly with insurers, such as latent defects or rights of light policies.
Christopher Ives is a Partner at Fenchurch Law
[1] Policies normally contain certain non-damage triggers as well, such as murder, suicide and disease.