The Good, the Bad & the Ugly: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. #10 (The Bad). Orient-Express Hotels v Generali
Welcome to the latest in the series of blogs from Fenchurch Law: 100 cases every policyholder needs to know. An opinionated and practical guide to the most important insurance decisions relating to the London / English insurance markets, all looked at from a pro-policyholder perspective.
Some cases are correctly decided and positive for policyholders. We celebrate those cases as The Good.
Some cases are, in our view, bad for policyholders, wrongly decided, and in need of being overturned. We highlight those decisions as The Bad.
Other cases are bad for policyholders but seem (even to our policyholder-tinted eyes) to be correctly decided. Those cases can trip up even the most honest policyholder with the most genuine claim. We put the hazard lights on those cases as The Ugly.
At Fenchurch Law we love the insurance market. But we love policyholders just a little bit more.
#6 (The Bad)
Orient-Express Hotels v Generali – an update
This note is an update to that which we provided on Orient Express on 1 July 2019. The Commercial Court considered Orient Express during the FCA Test Case in July 2020. The Test Case concerned the business interruption losses that arose following the outbreak of Covid-19 in the UK. Orient Express was a hotly contested issue, and we look here at how the Test Case may affect its application.
In Orient Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni Generali SPA t/a Generali Global Risk [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that the ‘but for’ causation test applies under standard BI policy wordings where there are two concurrent independent causes of loss, and there could be no indemnity for financial loss concurrently caused by: (1) damage to the insured premises – a luxury hotel in New Orleans, and (2) evacuation of the city as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Orient Express Hotels Ltd (OEH) was owner of the Windsor Court Hotel (the Hotel), which suffered significant hurricane damage in August and September 2005 leading to its closure for a period of two months. The surrounding area was also devastated by the storms, with the entire city shut down for several weeks following the declaration of a state of emergency, and the imposition of a curfew and mandatory evacuation order.
The arbitral Tribunal held that OEH could only recover in respect of loss which would not have arisen had the damage to the Hotel not occurred, and this meant that OEH was to be put in the position of an owner of an undamaged hotel in an otherwise damaged city. Since New Orleans itself was effectively closed for several weeks due to widespread flooding, with no-one able to visit the area or stay at the Hotel even if it had (theoretically) been undamaged, OEH could not recover under the primary insuring provisions for BI loss suffered during this period. A limited award of damages was made under separate Loss of Attraction and Prevention of Access extensions to the policy.
OEH appealed to the Commercial Court, arguing that the Tribunal’s approach was inappropriate given the wide area damage to the Hotel and the vicinity caused by the same hurricanes. OEH sought to rely upon principles established in: Miss Jay Jay [1987] and IF P&C Insurance v Silversea Cruises [2004], that, where there are two proximate causes of a loss, the insured can recover if one of the causes is insured, provided the other cause is not excluded; and Kuwait Airways Corpn. v Iraqi Airways Co. [2002], that, where a loss has been caused by two or more tortfeasors and the claimant is unable to prove which caused the loss, the Courts will occasionally relax the ‘but for’ test and conclude that both tortfeasors caused the damage, to avoid an over-exclusionary approach.
Mr Justice Hamblen dismissed the appeal, concluding that no error of law had been established in relation to the Tribunal’s application of a ‘but for’ causation test under the policy on the facts as found at the arbitration hearing, whilst recognising “as a matter of principle there is considerable force in much of OEH’s argument”. The insurance authorities mentioned above were distinguished as involving interdependent concurrent causes, in which case the ‘but for’ test would be satisfied. The Court did appear to accept that there may be insurance cases where principles of fairness and reasonableness meant that the ‘but for’ causation test is not applicable, but OEH was unable to establish an error of law by the Tribunal where this argument had not been raised at the arbitration hearing. Given these evidential constraints on an appeal limited to questions of law, OEH was unsuccessful in the Commercial Court.
Permission to appeal was granted, indicating that the Court considered OEH’s grounds for further challenge had a real prospect of success. Settlement on commercial terms was agreed between the parties prior to the Court of Appeal hearing, however.
The decision in this case has been criticised by commentators as unfair, giving rise to the surprising result that the more widespread the impact of a natural peril, the less cover afforded by the policy. The High Court appears to have agreed in the Test Case that concluded in July 2020.
In a judgment handed down on 15 September 2020, Flaux LJ and Butcher J said at paragraph 523:
“We consider that there are several problems with the reasoning in Orient Express. First and foremost, as we see it, there was a misidentification of the insured peril… It seems to us that the error in the reasoning may have come about because the judge focused only on the “but for” causation issue and, to our minds surprisingly, did not pose the question of what was the proximate cause of the loss claimed…”
The judgment continues at paragraph 529:
“It follows that, if we had thought that the decision in Orient Express somehow dictated the consequences in terms of cover and the counterfactual analysis for which the insurers contend in the present case, we would have reached the conclusion that it was wrongly decided and declined to follow it…”
This is welcome news for policyholders. It is clear that Flaux LJ and Butcher J disagreed with the principles that underpinned the decision in Orient Express, and this can only be positive for the adjustment of insurance claims moving forward. However, importantly, the Court’s comments regarding the correctness of the decision in Orient Express are strictly obiter, since the case was distinguished from the fact under consideration in the Test Case. On that basis the ‘wide area damage’ principle set down in Orient Express, at least as applied to property-linked BI claims, remains good law and it is likely that Insurers will continue to rely on it unless and until the decision is overturned by a superior Court.
That said, readers will likely be aware that there is a chance that the insurers that participated in the FCA Test Case will appeal. We anticipate that we will learn of any such appeal on 2 October 2020, with the leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court being heard in December 2020 / January 2021. While it may be frustrating for policyholders that there remains a risk that Orient Express could have some application moving forward, the possibility of the Supreme Court deciding the outcome one way or another must be welcomed. The law as it stands as now unsettled and ultimate clarification from the Supreme Court will provide the finality required by all stakeholders.
Say hello, waive goodbye – waiver in insurance disputes
Waiver involves a party abandoning some or all of its rights under a contract. The concept is broad, and arguments about its application arise frequently in insurance disputes, in relation to both the creation and operation of a policy.
This article will outline situations where waiver arguments most commonly occur.
Waiver of disclosure
Under the Insurance Act 2015 (“the Act”), an insured must make a fair presentation of the risk. This requires disclosure of every material circumstances which the insured knows or ought to know, and in a manner which would be reasonably clear and accessible.
An insurer’s failure to ask questions has always risked being treated as a waiver of the insured’s duty of disclosure. That situation is now codified in s3(4)(b) of the Act, which confirms that it is only necessary for an insured to disclose “sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances.” The insurer therefore has a duty to make enquiries when it requires further information – it cannot simply sit on the disclosure provided and ask questions only once a claim is made.
Absent enquiry by the insurer, the Act provides that an insured does not need to disclose a circumstance if, amongst other things, it is something about which the insurer waives information. This can happen expressly, or impliedly.
Express waiver
Numerous forms of agreement can be reached between an insurer and an insured whereby the latter’s duty of fair presentation is restricted. This may be by way of agreement which restricts materiality to knowledge held by specific individuals. Alternatively, they may agree that specific types of information need not be disclosed.
Implied waiver – asking limited questions in a proposal
An insurer may, in some circumstances, be taken to have waived the scope of disclosure by asking a limited question in a proposal. By way of example; suppose an insurer asks a proposer, “have you been made insolvent during the last 5 years?” which the proposer correctly answers “no”. Then, following the making of a claim, the insurer refuses to pay on the basis that the insured failed to disclose that it entered into administration 8 years ago. On those facts, there is an unanswerable argument of waiver. The insurer could easily have asked the proposer about insolvencies occurring more than 5 years prior, and by not doing so indicated that it had no interest in those insolvencies. These types of argument are fact-sensitive, and will depend on the proper construction of the proposal as a whole. The question to be asked, as MacGillivray says, is:
“Would a reasonable man reading the proposal form be justified in thinking that the insurer had restricted his right to receive all material information, and consented to the omission of the particular information in issue?”
If the answer to that question is “yes”, an insurer cannot subsequently use that non-disclosure as a reason to avoid paying a claim.
Waiver of the insurer’s remedy for breach of the duty of fair presentation
This type of waiver is known as waiver by election. In short, where an insurer discovers that there has been a non-disclosure entitling it to avoid the policy, it has a choice between two inconsistent rights: it can either affirm the policy (i.e. treat it as continuing), or it can avoid it. If the insurer, having knowledge of those inconsistent rights, makes an unequivocal representation that it will affirm the policy, the right to avoid will be lost.
For example; suppose an insurer, during the course of its investigations following a claim, discovers that the insured had failed to disclose that it has an unsatisfied CCJ. If the insurer expressly affirm cover, it cannot go back on that choice.
That example can be contrasted with implied affirmation i.e. where the insurer’s conduct amounts to an unequivocal communication that it has chosen to affirm the policy. Such conduct might include the actual payment of a claim under a policy, or accepting future premiums.
Waiver of the insurer’s remedy for breach of condition
Where an insured breaches a policy condition, the only form of waiver available is waiver by estoppel (Kosmar Villa Holdings PLC v Trustees Syndicate 1243 [2008] EWCA Civ 147).
As with waiver by election, waiver by estoppel rests on an unequivocal representation that a party will not rely on its rights; however, the insured must also show detrimental reliance i.e. that it has relied on the insurer’s representation, such that the insurer’s withdrawal of that representation would be unjust.
As an example; say there is a fire at an insured’s premises, and the insurer then discovers that the insured had breached a condition precedent regarding the storage of combustible materials. Ordinarily, no liability would attach to the insurer for the claim, as the condition precedent was breached. However, in this case the insurer chooses to act in a manner only consistent with it having waived the insured’s breach, by asking the insured to provide information about the repair costs. If the insured can show that it relied on the insurer’s representation to its detriment (e.g. by starting to repair the premises), the insurer will be estopped from relying on the breach.
Estoppel by silence?
Recent case law has raised the potential for the court to find, in some circumstances, that an insurer’s silence or acquiescence may give rise to an estoppel.
The case in question, Ted Baker v AXA Insurance UK plc [2017] EWCA Civ 4097, concerned a claim by the clothing retail company, Ted Baker, following a theft. AXA refused to pay the claim because, amongst other reasons, Ted Baker had breached a condition precedent in the policy requiring it to produce certain information.
Ted Baker argued that AXA was estopped from relying on its breach, because AXA had known that Ted Baker believed, albeit mistakenly, that the obligation to produce the information had been “parked”. Although Ted Baker’s claim failed on other grounds, the Court of Appeal agreed that Ted Baker was entitled to expect AXA, acting honestly and responsibly, to speak up if it regarded the information as outstanding, and if it realised that Ted Baker had wrongly believed otherwise.
Summary
Waiver arguments arise in a number of different guises in insurance disputes, and are likely to be hotly contested. Although the availability of any waiver argument will be fact-specific, relevant considerations include the conduct and knowledge of the insurer, and whether the insurer had reserved its rights.
If an insured is able to establish that the insurer has waived its rights, the law will hold the insurer to its choice, and any alternative choice will be lost.
You have to be pulling my LEG(3)
An unwelcome consequence of the London Market’s preference for including arbitration clauses in most types of commercial insurance policies, is that disputes regarding the meaning of clauses in those policies are frequently resolved in private, rather than in a public forum where the decision of a Court could assist policyholders and insurers in avoiding similar disputes in the future.
In a Construction All Risks context, insurers’ preference for arbitration clauses has had the remarkable effect that in the nearly 25 years since the London Engineering Group (“LEG”) first introduced its suite of defects exclusions, there has not been a single Court decision, anywhere in the world, on the meaning of the defects exclusion which LEG intended to be the most favourable for policyholders: LEG3.
So, if there are no reported cases on LEG3 then where can one look for guidance? The current (2nd) edition of Paul Reed QC’s excellent book “Construction All Risks” doesn’t consider LEG3 in any detail. Whilst we understand that the omission will be corrected in the forthcoming 3rd edition, at present Mr Reed’s book refers to LEG3 as being an equivalent of the most favourable of the “DE” defects exclusions: DE5. That equivalence, however, is not accepted in all parts of the insurance market.
As noted in an article published by Iftikhar Ali of DWF in 2019, the absence of the word “additional” from LEG3 (as opposed to DE5, which explicitly excludes “additional costs of improvement”) has encouraged some to interpret LEG3 as excluding all costs which relate to works which have the effect of improving the original works. If this interpretation was correct then it would produce particularly harsh results for policyholders where the contract works have suffered damage as a result of defects in design, as in one sense all remedial works carried out according to a different design must necessarily be an improvement if the remedial works are defect-free as a result. For that reason Mr Ali (correctly in our view) reaches the view that such an interpretation, whilst consistent with a literal reading of LEG3, would be “a commercial nonsense”. Unfortunately, in our experience, that does not always prevent insurers from running the argument, to the surprise and disappointment of any policyholder or broker who is familiar with how the market ordinarily approaches the clause.
Whilst other texts and commentaries are consistent with the guidance notes produced by the London Engineering Group itself, that LEG3 was intended by the underwriters who drafted it to provide the “the widest form of cover, for physical damage caused by defects”, none of the texts or commentaries discuss how, precisely, one should determine: (i) what constitutes an improvement for the purposes of LEG3; and (ii) what cost is thereby excluded. This article attempts to address that gap.
What is an improvement for the purposes of LEG3?
For the purposes of this article the relevant part of LEG3 provides that:
“the cost of replacement or rectification which is hereby excluded is that cost incurred to improve the original material workmanship design plan or specification” (our emphasis).
It seems to us that for remedial works to constitute an improvement as compared with the original works:
- The remedial works must be different in some way from the original works; and
- That difference must be more than an equally valid way of performing the works, and must produce a tangible benefit (for instance an improved factor of safety, or a longer design life, or superior functionality - in all cases as compared with the original works as completed, as opposed to the outcome desired by the employer).
The requirement for the difference to produce a tangible benefit in order to constitute an “improvement” is important. The fact that remedial works are different to the original works does not on its own mean that they are an improvement, even if the remedial works are more expensive.
In the context of a Construction All Risks claim, if an insurer cannot identify a tangible benefit produced by the remedial works as compared with the original works, then it will not be able to show that the remedial works are an improvement, and any difference in cost between the remedial works and the original works will be irrelevant, and should not result in a deduction under LEG3. It is only if the insurer is able to identify a tangible benefit produced by a way in which the remedial works are different from the original works that one is required to consider what cost is thereby excluded by LEG3.
What cost is excluded?
Once one has a taken a view not just on how the remedial works are different from the original works, but also in what way that difference relates to a tangible benefit (i.e. what is the “improvement”), one can then try to identify the cost that relates to that improvement. Pausing there, it is of course entirely possible that there may be no “cost” of improvement, because a policyholder may find a different way of approaching the remedial works which, although producing a tangible benefit as compared with the original works, is nevertheless cheaper than the original works. In that situation whilst there is an “improvement”, there would be no “cost incurred to improve”, but rather a saving.
Any other interpretation would be precisely the “commercial nonsense” referred to by Mr Ali, and we doubt that there is a single CAR underwriter who, when writing a risk, would want to encourage their policyholder to carry out remedial works more expensively than a cheaper and better alternative if one was available.
Assuming, then, that remedial works are both an improvement, and are more expensive than the original works, it seems to us that the “cost incurred to improve” can then be identified in one of the two following ways.
Item by item comparisons
Depending on the facts, it may be possible to identify excluded costs on an item by item basis. For instance, there will be occasions when:
- Some elements of the remedial works are different to the original works, but produce no tangible benefit (“Differences”);
- Some elements of the remedial works are exactly the same as the original works; and
- Some elements of the remedial works are different to the original works, and do produce a tangible benefit (“Improvements”).
In that situation, the Differences may occasionally be cheaper than the comparable items of the original works. However, there wouldn’t be any justification, in our view, for offsetting any such savings against the cost of the Improvements if those were more expensive than comparable items of the original works. Rather, the cost excluded by LEG3 in that situation would be the un-discounted difference in cost between the Improvements, and the comparable items of the original works.
Equally, if the Differences are more expensive than the comparable items of the original works we can see no justification for excluding the difference in cost relating to them: what is excluded by LEG3 remains the difference in cost between the Improvements, and the comparable items of the original works.
It should be obvious, we hope, that any differences in cost which relate to elements of the remedial works which are exactly the same as the original works, are unaffected by LEG3.
The approach of separating Differences and Improvements should, in our view, be applied not only to separate items of work, but where required by the facts can also be used to identify the excluded costs where individual items of work may contain both Differences and Improvements.
Items of work containing both Differences and Improvements
How this would work in practice in relation to individual items of work can be illustrated by considering a length of steel pipe which was under-specified, has suffered damage by becoming deformed under expected pressure, and has been replaced by thicker steel pipe. In that situation:
- There is a difference between the original works and the remedial works, in that a thicker steel pipe has been used in the remedial works; and
- The fact that the steel pipe used in the remedial works is thicker than that used in the original works produces a tangible benefit, in that is more robust and less likely to become deformed under expected pressure (i.e. the pipework constitutes an Improvement in that it is thicker).
Suppose the thicker steel pipe used in the remedial works is more expensive for two reasons:
- Because more steel has been used to make it thicker; and
- Because the cost of steel has increased since the original works were carried out.
In that situation LEG3 would only exclude the cost of making the pipe thicker by using more steel, as it is only that cost which is related to the way in which the thicker steel pipe is superior to the original steel pipe. The increased material cost is not related to the way in which the thicker steel pipe is superior to the original steel pipe, and so that difference in cost is not, in our view, excluded by LEG3.
Holistic comparisons
There will be other occasions where individual items of remedial work cannot sensibly be compared with any items of the original works (for instance, where the remedial works follow a substantially re-designed scheme). In that situation it will be necessary to compare the overall (remedial and original) schemes with each other.
Even in that situation, however, care needs to be taken not simply to subtract the cost of the original works from the cost of the remedial works in order to identify the cost excluded by LEG3, because that would risk including Differences (i.e. which don’t relate to the way in which the remedial works improve the original works). Rather, the cost of any Differences (e.g. fluctuations in material costs), need to be identified and disregarded.
Ordinarily the most appropriate way to do so in order to produce a reliable holistic comparison, is to compare the cost of the remedial works against not the cost of the original works, but against the cost that would have been incurred if the original works had been re-performed (in exactly the same way) following the occurrence of damage instead of the remedial works which were actually done.
Authors:
Rob Goodship, Associate Partner
FCA Test Case Update – Judgment
Today’s judgment in the FCA’s Test Case on Covid-19 Business Interruption coverage has provided some welcome good news for many policyholders – as well as disappointing findings for others. The court’s findings were very clearly divided between the policyholders seeking coverage under Disease clauses, and those claiming under Prevention of Access or similar extensions.
Disease
With the exception of two of the QBE wordings under consideration, it is unquestionable that the judgment is favourable for those policyholders that have one of the Disease Wordings that has been assessed as part of the FCA Test Case. Critically, the court found that the occurrence of the disease did not need to occur only within the radius contemplated in the policy. Provided that the occurrence of the disease extended into the specified radius, the coverage would be triggered. This has been one of the first coverage issues that policyholders have had to overcome, and which insurers have strongly resisted.
Furthermore, for those policyholders that do not have the benefit of the specific Disease Wordings looked at the FCA Test Case, but instead some other Disease wording, the consistency of the findings is likely to provide persuasive authority to support the ongoing claims under those other wordings.
Prevention of Access and Public Authority wordings
The position, however, is surprisingly less favourable for the majority of those policyholders with Prevention of Access and Public Authority Wordings that were considered as part of the FCA Test Case.
The starting point for these particular wordings appears to be that they would only in principle respond to localised occurrences of the disease. Interestingly, the Court reached a very different and narrower conclusion on the meaning of the term ‘vicinity’ in the context of the Prevention of Access wordings, compared to that under the Disease clauses. Each particular wording will have to be closely scrutinised, however, as the judgment affects different wordings in different ways, as may the application of the facts pertaining to individual policyholders.
While it is clear that this aspect of the judgment is unhelpful for affected policyholders, it remains to be seen whether the FCA will appeal any aspect of it, and whether the judgment is as unhelpful for those policyholders that have Prevention of Access/Public Authority wordings other than those specifically looked at as part of the FCA Test Case.
Causation
A striking aspect of the judgment is the way the Court neatly dispatches with the complicated causation arguments raised by insurers, by making it a part of their very clear finding on the construction of the coverage clause. Because, the court says, the insured peril is the composite peril of interruption or interference with the Business caused by the national occurrence of COVID-19, the causation arguments ‘answer themselves’. There is only one cause of loss. For the same reasons, trends clauses are largely irrelevant and the principle in Orient Express has no application.
The court’s finding that Orient Express was wrongly decided and that they would not have followed it even had they not found it to be distinguishable, will certainly raise eyebrows, and will surely lead to an appeal from Insurers on this issue at least. In deciding whether also to appeal on the policy trigger issues, Insurers will have to weigh up the potential further reputational damage they may suffer from being seen to resist the Court’s very clear findings.
Our detailed analysis of the judgment and commentary on next steps will follow.
Fenchurch Law launches Fenchurch Advocacy Services
Fenchurch Law, the UK’s leading firm of solicitors focused exclusively on representing policyholders in insurance coverage disputes, is delighted to announce the launch of a unique claims advocacy service for insurance brokers, Fenchurch Advocacy Services, which will be available from 1st September 2020.
Fenchurch Advocacy Services is a non-legal insurance service designed to replicate the high quality, specialist claims advocacy currently only provided by the “Big 3” brokers and the Nationals.
Fenchurch Advocacy Services will provide brokers and their clients with access to an experienced ACII qualified and chartered status insurance claims professional, to offer brokers support, advice and assistance, as and when required, on claims-related issues, for a fixed monthly fee.
Announcing the launch David Pryce, Fenchurch Law’s Managing Partner, commented that: “For several years the brokers who we work with have been telling us that they really value the services we provide to them, and would like us to support them in other ways. Fenchurch Advocacy Services allows us to do just that, by providing brokers outside the “Big 3” brokers and “Nationals” with the same high quality claims advocacy that those larger brokers are able to provide to their clients. As a firm our purpose is to help level the playing field between policyholders and their insurers, and the launch of Fenchurch Advocacy Services is an important milestone in that journey”.
Fenchurch Advocacy Services will be headed up by Phil Taylor, Insurance Consultant. Phil joined Fenchurch Law after 15 years as Regional Claims Director at a leading broker, dealing with a wide portfolio of clients in relation to major and complex losses, and coverage disputes on first and third party claims. Prior to broking, Phil’s background was in Liability Loss Adjusting specialising in EL, PL, Products and Professional Indemnity claims. Phil has 35 years of experience in the insurance industry, is ACII qualified, and holds Chartered Status with the CII.
For further information please click here or contact Phil Taylor.
Fenchurch Law opens new office in Leeds
Fenchurch Law, the UK’s leading firm of solicitors specialising exclusively in representing policyholders in insurance coverage disputes, is delighted to announce its further expansion with the opening of a new office in Leeds from 1 September 2020, which will provide improved access to policyholders in the North of England, and their insurance brokers.
Founded in 2010, Fenchurch Law was created to allow policyholders access to specialist and high quality insurance advice that insurers have received for decades.
Fenchurch Law is now the largest specialist team of solicitors in the UK dedicated to serving the needs of policyholders. We focus exclusively on representing policyholders in insurance coverage disputes, specialising in high value and complex disputes.
The firm comprises five main practice areas, each of them partner-led by lawyers with a reputation for innovation and excellent client care:
· Professional Risks
· Financial & Commercial Risks
· Construction Risks
· Property Risks, and
· Products & Environmental Risks
Whilst Fenchurch Law has always acted for policyholders across the UK, as well as internationally, we have recognised an increasing demand among policyholders based in the North of England to have access to solicitors who are based closer to them. Our Leeds office has been launched in response to that demand.
David Pryce, Fenchurch Law’s Managing Partner is excited about the next stage of the firm’s expansion:
“For some time we’ve recognised not only that policyholders outside London often like to be able to instruct solicitors who are based closer to them, but also that there is a great pool of talented insurance disputes solicitors who are based outside the City. The launch of our Leeds office is the first step in helping to connect policyholders in the regions with solicitors who are not only based near them, but are genuine insurance disputes specialists with deep insurance market knowledge and experience”.
The Leeds Office will be headed up by Senior Associate, Daniel Robin. Dan has wide ranging experience of the insurance market, having previously worked as a panel solicitor for insurers, as a broker, and as a claims handler for insurers. He now uses his knowledge of how insurers operate to help policyholders to achieve the best outcomes from their insurance disputes. Dan has a particular focus on professional liability, property and financial lines risks.
Working alongside Dan is Phil Taylor, Insurance Consultant. Phil joined Fenchurch Law after 15 years in Broking as Regional Claims Director dealing with a wide portfolio of Clients, major and complex losses, and coverage disputes on first and third party claims. Prior to Broking, Phil’s background was Liability Loss Adjusting specialising in EL, PL, Products and Professional Indemnity claims. Phil has 35 years of experience in the insurance industry, is ACII qualified, and holds Chartered Status with the CII.
