First decision on s11 Insurance Act (causation test for breach of warranty)

Ever since the introduction of the Insurance Act 2015, there has been debate about how causation works in the context of section 11 and in particular the provision in sub-section 11(3) whereby the policyholder is excused from the usual consequences of a breach of warranty if it can show that its “non-compliance with the [warranty] could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred.”

Policyholders had thus argued, despite the Law Commission having said this was not what it had intended, that this introduced a strict causation test.  For example,  where the policyholder had warranted that it had a burglar alarm but it failed to set it, it would (it argued) be open to it to show that this particular burglary was undertaken by thieves so sophisticated that setting the alarm would have made no difference - even if setting the alarm would decrease the risk of burglary in general.

Likewise, a policyholder would wish to argue that, on the actual facts of its loss, a warranty had been breached in only a minor respect, which made no difference, even if a more serious non-compliance would unquestionably have affected the likelihood of that particular loss.

This argument has now been considered, and rejected, by Mrs Justice Dias in her decision on 26 July in Mok Petro v Argo.  This was a highly complex case concerning contaminated commodities, and the breach of warranty issue features only briefly at the end of the judgment.  On that issue, the Judge said as follows:

“There is nothing in the wording of the section to suggest that where a term can be breached in more than one way, it is only the particular breach which must be looked at. On the contrary, it seems to me that section 11 is directed at the effect of compliance with the entire term  and not with the consequences of the specific breach. …  I therefore conclude that [Counsel for the Insurers] is right about this. There was no serious dispute that compliance with the warranty as a whole was capable of minimising the risk of water contamination … and that therefore non-compliance could have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred.”

The full judgment is here: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2024/1555.pdf

Jonathan Corman is a Partner at Fenchurch Law.


CrowdStrike Outage - Insurance Recoveries

Many businesses have suffered losses following a catastrophic IT failure when an update released on 19 July by US cybersecurity firm, CrowdStrike, caused crashes on Microsoft Windows systems globally.

We are recommending that policyholders review the scope of coverage available under their cyber and property damage/business interruption insurance.

What to look out for:

  • Is there cyber cover for system failure that responds to accidental (i.e. non-malicious) events such as this?
  • Are there any relevant business interruption waiting periods to consider?
  • What other losses are covered – such as the cost of data restoration, incident response and voluntary shutdown?
  • Is there cover for supply chain failure?
  • In the context of PD/BI policies, the ‘damage’ trigger will need careful consideration.

What steps do you need to take?:

  • Ensure timely compliance with notification provisions and other claims conditions
  • Have steps been taken to mitigate losses so far as possible?
  • Make sure accurate records are kept of the sequence of events and the losses that have been incurred as a result of the outage.

Please get in touch if we can be of any assistance, or if you have any queries.

Joanna Grant is the Managing Partner of Fenchurch Law


Policy Cover for Cladding “Damage”

A combustible cladding crisis has engulfed the construction sector in recent years, with tragic fires in apartment blocks in London, Melbourne, Dubai and Valencia indicative of systemic global risks. External wall panels, widely used since the 1990’s to reface high-rise buildings, have been exposed in many cases as hazardous and unsuitable, compounded by fire stopping and compartmentation defects, resulting in an avalanche of claims against developers, owners, contractors, consultants and insurers.

 

Rectification costs are potentially recoverable under latent defects policies, covering structural or safety issues affecting new build developments, or under professional indemnity policies, in response to third party claims against designers arising from negligence in the course of their professional duties. This article focuses on recent authority in common law jurisdictions which suggests that the incorporation of defective cladding panels may constitute physical damage for the purpose of other types of liability or property insurance.

 

Owners v Fairview

 

In Owners - Strata Plan No 91806 v Fairview Architectural (No.3) [2023] the defendant (“Fairview”) manufactured and supplied combustible Vitrabond panels, installed on two high-rise residential buildings in Sydney. Following an order by the local council to remove the panels, the owner commenced representative proceedings against Fairview alleging that the panels were not of acceptable quality, in breach of statutory requirements. The owner applied to join Fairview’s liability insurer to the claim, on the basis that Fairview’s potential liability arose from “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” (defined in the policy as an event resulting in property damage that was neither expected nor intended).

 

Justice Wigney acknowledged that the question of coverage was “not easyinvolving matters of degree and characterisation”, with many of the authorities turning on their own unique facts and the more contentious cases involving alleged physical damage based on a loss of functionality. Notably the New South Wales Court of Appeal has rejected an argument that the blockage of a grain silo by grain constituted physical damage (Transfield v GIO (1996)).

 

The Federal Court held that it was at least arguable the liability policy would respond to the underlying claims, since the affixation of cladding panels “had an instant and damaging effect on the building because the panels posed an immediate and unacceptable danger to the residents of the building”. Physical damage to the facade occurred during the period of insurance, when the panels were attached by insertion of nails and screws into the walls of the building using a top hat structure. It was held that this could be characterised as an “occurrence” because Fairview did not expect or intend the panels to be combustible or defective, nor that the panels would have to be removed.

 

In reaching this conclusion, Justice Wigney considered Australian Plywoods v FAI (1992), where the Queensland Court of Appeal held that physical damage to the hull of a boat occurred at the time that defective plywood was attached using screws and glue; and R & B Directional Drilling v CGU (2019), where the Federal Court determined there was no physical injury to a tunnel by accidental filling of a conduit pipe with concrete, as the pipe could be removed leaving the tunnel in the same physical state as before the defective work.

 

Justice Wigney distinguished the decision in Pilkington v CGU [2005], where the English Court of Appeal held that installation of a small number of defective glass panels in the Waterloo Eurostar Terminal had not caused physical damage to the terminal building, to trigger cover under the manufacturer’s products liability policy. In that case, the owner did not remove the affected panels (so there was no physical damage associated with access, to replace defective components) and chose instead to implement safety measures to avoid the risk of shattered glass falling.

 

Fortuity

 

In English law, damage is a fortuitous change in physical condition that is adverse. The requirement for an altered physical state is crucial to distinguish between damage and defects. The fact that something is rendered less valuable or useful does not in itself constitute damage; but where the subject matter is added to, defaced or contaminated by some other substance, it is a matter of degree whether this will be regarded as affecting the physical condition of the property. Product liability insurance is triggered by personal injury, or physical loss or damage to third party property, during the period of insurance, as opposed to economic impacts such as loss of goodwill (Rodan v Commercial Union [1999]).

 

In Pilkington, the first instance decision - that the terminal was not physically damaged by an Occurrence which consisted of no more than the intentional installation of the product designed to be installed - was upheld on appeal. The policy wording made clear that damage or deterioration confined to the product itself was excluded, i.e. the policy would only answer in respect of physical damage suffered by third party property in relation to which the product had been introduced or juxtaposed.

 

Lord Justice Potter observed:

 

Damage requires some altered state, the relevant alteration being harmful in the commercial context. This plainly covers a situation where there is a poisoning or contaminating effect upon the property of a third party as a result of the introduction or intermixture of the product supplied … difficulties of application of such a test may arise in cases where a product supplied is installed by attachment to other objects in a situation in which it remains separately identifiable, but by reason of physical change or other deterioration within it, it requires to be renewed or replaced.”

 

American Cases

 

The Court of Appeal in Pilkington considered various American authorities including Eljer Manufacturing v Liberty Mutual (1992), in which Circuit Judge Posner in a majority judgment decided that the installation of a defective product or component into property of the buyer, in circumstances where the defect does not cause any tangible change in the property until years later, can be regarded as physical injury from the time of installation. Judge Posner considered that the presence of a potentially dangerous ‘ticking time bomb’ should be construed as injury to the structure from the time of incorporation, based on the commercial intent of the parties to the insurance contract.

 

The outcome seems analogous with the limitation period in tort for claims where inherent design defects give rise to economic loss in the absence of physical damage, commencing at the latest on practical completion, as discussed in URS v BDW [2023].

 

In a dissenting judgment in Eljer, Circuit Judge Cudahy rejected the majority view, and this reasoning was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Pilkington as better reflecting the approach of an English court. Lord Justice Potter referred to the comments of Stuart-Smith LJ in Yorkshire Water v Sun Alliance [1997] as follows:

 

“… the American Courts adopt a much more benign attitude towards the insured … based variously on the “folly” argument … or that insurance contracts are: “contracts of adhesion between parties who are not equally situated” … or because the Courts have … adopted the principle of giving effect to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured for the purpose of rendering a fair interpretation of the boundaries of insurance cover … For the most part these are notions which reflect a substantial element of public policy and are not part of the principles of construction of contracts under English law.”

 

Arguably this benevolent approach is reflected in recent US decisions on defectively mixed concrete, suggesting that “any bad effect” may qualify as damage in the context of LEG defect exclusion clauses under Construction All Risks policies (South Capitol Bridgebuilders [2023]; Archer [2024]).

 

Contamination

In determining the issue in Fairview, Justice Wigney was influenced by cases concerning the harmful effects of asbestos, observing that:

 

The affixation of combustible panels to a residential building can … be compared with the integration of a dangerous or toxic substance, such as asbestos, into a building. Just as the integration into a building of a potentially hazardous material such as asbestos resulted in physical injury to the building at the time of installation (even if at that time the dangers were not realised, or the toxic substances had not been released) … so the affixation to a building of potentially hazardous combustible panels can be seen to result in physical damage to the building at the point of installation.” 

As noted by Paul Reed KC in Construction All Risks [at 14-014] some English and Australian authorities suggest that the courts may be willing to treat contamination as a separate category of damage that does not require an obvious physical change in characteristics of the property insured.

 

Applying the courts’ reasoning in The Orjula [1995] and Hunter v Canary Wharf [1996] it may be possible to infer that the property has undergone a change in physical condition, where remedial costs have been incurred.

 

Conclusion

Insurers would typically argue that no fortuitous physical damage has occurred in respect of combustible cladding panels, in the absence of a fire or other adverse event post-installation, and any need for replacement following identification of harmful characteristics represents, at most, an economic loss to owners.

 

By contrast, recent authorities in Australia and the US lend support for the proposition that damage may be established based on changes in condition through physical attachment of cladding panels, involving integration of dangerous substances with a ‘contaminating’ effect, given the adverse unexpected consequences and need for remedial works. Each case will depend on its individual facts in terms of the location of insured property, type of external wall system(s), and applicable policy wording.

 

The argument remains largely untested in the English courts, presenting a novel potential route to recovery under insurance policies triggered by physical damage.

Amy Lacey is a Partner at Fenchurch Law


Climate Risks Series - Part 1: Climate litigation and severe weather fuelling insurance coverage disputes

The global rise in climate litigation looks set to continue, with oil and gas companies increasingly accused of causing environmental damage, failing to prevent losses occurring, and improperly managing or disclosing climate risks. Implementation of decarbonisation and climate strategies is subject to scrutiny across all industry sectors, with claims proceeding in many jurisdictions seeking compensation for environmental harm as well as strategic influence over future regulatory, corporate or investment decisions.

Evolving risks associated with rising temperatures have significant implications for the (re)insurance market as commercial policyholders seek to mitigate exposure to physical damage caused by severe weather events; financial loss arising from business interruption; liability claims for environmental pollution, harmful products or ‘greenwashing’; reputational risks; and challenges associated with the transition towards clean energy sources and net zero emissions.

Litigation Trends

Cases in which climate change or its impacts are disputed have been brought by a wide range of claimants, across a broad spectrum of legal actions including nuisance, product liability, negligence, fiduciary duty, human rights and statutory planning regimes. Approximately 75% of cases so far have been commenced in the US, alongside a large number in Australia, the EU and UK.

Science plays a central role and can be critical to determining whether litigants have standing to sue. The emerging field of climate physics allows for quantification of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emitters’ responsibility, with around 90 private and state-owned entities found to be responsible for approximately two-thirds of global carbon dioxide and methane emissions. Recent advances in scientific attribution may provide evidence for legal causation in claims relating to loss from climate change or severe storms, flooding or drought.

Directors of high-profile companies may be personally targeted in such claims as liable for breach of fiduciary duties to the company or its members, in failing to take action to respond to climate change, or approving policies that contribute to harmful emissions.

Recent Cases

An explosion of ‘climate lawfare’ has kicked off in recent years, with the cases highlighted below indicative of key themes.

Smith v Fonterra [2024]

The New Zealand Supreme Court reinstated claims, struck out by lower courts, allowing the claimant Māori leader with an interest in customary land to proceed with tort claims against seven of the country’s largest GHG emitting corporations, including a novel cause of action involving a duty to cease materially contributing to damage to the climate system. This was an interlocutory application and the refusal to strike out does not mean that the pleaded claims will ultimately succeed on the merits. However, the judgment is significant in demonstrating appellate courts’ willingness to respond to the existential threat of climate change by allowing innovative claims to be advanced and tested through evidence at trials.

R v Surrey County Council [2024]

In a case brought by Sarah Finch fighting the construction of a new oil well in Surrey, the UK Supreme Court (by a 3:2 majority) ruled that authorities must consider downstream GHG emissions created by use of a company’s products, when evaluating planning approvals. The Council’s decision to grant permission to a developer was held to be unlawful because the environmental impact assessment for the project did not include consideration of these “Scope 3” emissions, when it was clear that oil from the wells would be burned.

Verein KlimaSeniorinnen [2024]

An association of over 2,000 older Swiss women complained that authorities had not acted appropriately to develop and implement legislation and measures to mitigate the effects of climate change. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that Article 8 of the European Convention encompasses a right for individuals to effective protection by state authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health and wellbeing. Grand Chamber rulings are final and cannot be appealed: Switzerland is now required to take suitable measures to comply. While not binding on national courts elsewhere, the decision will be influential.

ClientEarth v Shell [2023]

The English High Court dismissed ClientEarth’s attempt to launch a derivative action against the directors of Shell plc in respect of their alleged failure to properly address the risks of climate change, indicating that claims of this nature brought by minority shareholders will face significant challenges. The Court noted that directors (especially those of large multinationals) need to balance a myriad of competing considerations in seeking to promote the success of the company, and courts will be reluctant to interfere with that discretion, making it harder to establish that directors have breached their statutory duties.

US Big Oil lawsuits

Following lengthy disputes over forum, proceedings against oil and gas companies in the US are gaining momentum, paving the way for the claims to be substantively examined in state courts. Many actions against the fossil fuel industry seek to establish that defendants knew the dangers posed by their products and deliberately concealed and misrepresented the facts, akin to deceptive promotion and failure to warn arguments relied upon in other mass tort claims in the US, arising from the supply of tobacco, firearms or opioids.

Implications for Policyholders

With increasing volatility and accumulation risk, insurers will look to mitigate exposures through wordings, exclusions, sub-limits and endorsements. The duty to defend is the first issue for liability insurers, given the number of policyholders affected and the potential sums at stake in indemnity and defence costs.

In 2021, the Lloyd’s Market Association published a model Climate Change Exclusion clause (LMA5570). Property policies exclude gradual deterioration, with express wording or impliedly by the requirement of fortuity, and liability insurance typically excludes claims arising from pollution.

Lawsuits have been filed in the US over insurance coverage for climate harm, including Aloha Petroleum v NUF Insurance Co of Pittsburgh (2022), arising from claims by Honolulu and Maui, and Everest v Gulf Oil (2022), involving energy operations in Connecticut. Policy coverage may depend on whether an “occurrence” or accident has taken place, as opposed to intentional acts or their reasonably anticipated consequences (Steadfast v AES Corp (2011).

Policyholders should review their insurance programmes with the benefit of professional advice to ensure adequate cover for potential property damage, liability exposures and legal defence costs.

In the following instalments of our Climate Risks Series, we will examine the impact of reinsurance schemes and parametric solutions, and coverage for storm and flood-related perils in light of recent claims experience.

Authors

Amy Lacey, Partner
Ayo Babatunde, Associate
Queenie Wong, Associate