Webinar - Broker Top Tips!
Agenda
The Top Tips presentation will provide an overview on the scope of brokers’ duties with reference to case law including Infinity Reliance v Heath Crawford [2023], George on High v Alan Boswell & New India Assurance [2023], Bellini v Brit UW [2024] and ABN Amro v RSA [2021]. Addressing common pitfalls to avoid around underinsurance, named insured entities, non-damage BI extensions and DSU reinstatement, we will highlight best practice for brokers to manage potential E&O exposures, in light of recent claims experience.
Speaker
Joanna Grant, Managing Partner, and Amy Lacey, Partner
No clear mistake and no clear cure – disappointing result in the Court of Appeal for W&I policyholder
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal, Project Angel Bidco Ltd (In Administration) v Axis Managing Agency Ltd & Ors [2024] EWCA Civ 446, provides guidance in relation to the interpretation of exclusion clauses and alleged drafting errors in warranty and indemnity (“W&I”) policies.
Background
The Parties
The Appellant, Project Angel Bidco Ltd (“PABL”), was insured under a W&I policy (“the Policy”).
PABL had purchased the shares in Knowsley Contractors Limited (trading as King Construction) (“King”). The Share and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) included a number of warranties, listed in a Cover Spreadsheet to the Policy, including in relation to anti-corruption legislation.
King in fact became embroiled in allegations of corruption. It went into liquidation and PABL itself went into administration. PABL had paid £16.65 million for the shares. It claimed that the warranties had been incorrect, such that the true value of the shares was negligible or at most £5.2 million, and accordingly made a claim against the Respondents, Axis Managing Agency Limited and others (“Insurers”), for an indemnity under the Policy.
The Cover Spreadsheet
The Cover Spreadsheet contained a list of “Insured Obligations” which included warranties 13.5 (a) to (h) (“Warranty 13.5”). The spreadsheet contained the following rubric:
“Notwithstanding that a particular Insured Obligation is marked as “Covered” or “Partially Covered”, certain Loss arising from a Breach of such Insured Obligation may be excluded from cover pursuant to Clause 5 of the Policy.”
The Insured Obligations at Warranty 13.5 were all marked as “Covered”.
ABC Liability
The Policy stated that:
“The Underwriters shall not be liable to pay any Loss to the extent that it arises out of…
5.2.15. any ABC Liability” (“the ABC Liability Exclusion”).
ABC Liability was defined as "any liability or actual or alleged non-compliance by any member of the Target Group or any agent, affiliate or other third party in respect of Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Laws”. [Emphasis added.]
The Overarching Issue
This appeal was concerned with the conflict between the “Covered” Insured Obligations at Warranty 13.5 and the ABC Liability Exclusion.
PABL argued that the scope of the Insured Obligations at Warranty 13.5 contradicted the ABC Liability Exclusion, as no loss arising out of a breach of Warranty 13.5 would ever be covered by the Policy. The Court explored the alleged conflict by asking four questions:
- Was there an inconsistency as alleged by PABL?
- If there was inconsistency, did the Policy resolve it?
- Was there something wrong with the language of the ABC Liability Exclusion?
- If a mistake had been made, was there a clear cure?
Was there an inconsistency?
Insurers argued that Warranty 13.5(e) (that the company maintained a record of all entertainment, hospitality and gifts received from a third party) and 13.5(h) (in relation to the award of contracts under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006) fell outside the exclusion. However, the Court of Appeal accepted there was a conflict between the entirety of Warranty 13.5 and the ABC Liability Exclusion.
Did the Policy resolve the inconsistency?
Insurers argued the structure of the Policy meant that the Cover Spreadsheet was subordinate to the ABC Liability Exclusion. This relegated the Cover Spreadsheet to being a “summary document”, purely intended to show which warranties were in scope of the Policy. The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting that the definition of “Insured Obligations” was linked to the Cover Spreadsheet.
Secondly, Insurers argued that the ABC Liability Exclusion was a heavily negotiated term and therefore more significant than the Cover Spreadsheet. The Court of Appeal accepted this, since the definition of ABC Liability was “detailed and wide ranging”, whereas the classification of warranties as “Covered”, “Excluded” or Partially Covered” was much broader.
Thirdly, Insurers argued the rubric in the Cover Spreadsheet showed that the ABC Liability Exclusion would take precedence, and the Court of Appeal agreed.
Was there something wrong with the language?
The Court of Appeal emphasised that, in order to correct an alleged error in a contract, it has to be clear there has been a mistake. In the first instance decision, the Judge had interpreted the ABC Liability Exclusion as follows:
“As drafted the definition would appear to cover three different species of ABC liability being:
- i) Any liability … in respect of Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Laws;
- ii) Any … alleged non-compliance by any member of the Target Group or any agent, affiliate or other third party in respect of Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Laws; and
iii) Any … actual … non-compliance by any member of the Target Group or any agent, affiliate or other third party in respect of Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Laws.”
PABL objected to this interpretation on the grounds that a reasonable reader would expect the word “liability” to be used in the sense of liability “for” something, suggesting that the word “or” had been included by mistake and the ABC Liability definition should be interpreted as "any liability [f]or actual or alleged non-compliance …”.
The Court of Appeal concluded that, although liability would often be referred to in the context of responsibility “for” something, it would not be unusual to refer to liability “in respect of”, “arising from” or “in connection with” an excluded peril. Therefore, despite the apparent contradiction, there was nothing wrong with the language of the ABC Liability Exclusion and no drafting error could be established.
Was there an obvious cure?
For completeness, the Court of Appeal went on to consider whether there was a “clear cure” for the alleged mistake. Assuming that there was a contradiction between the ABC Liability Exclusion and Warranty 13.5 because of a drafting mistake, Insurers had a coherent and rational reason for wanting to avoid liability for loss arising out of ABC Liability, and it was unclear whether any supposed error was in the drafting of the ABC Liability exclusion or the Cover Spreadsheet. It was held therefore that no clear cure existed for the alleged mistake.
The Decision
In summary, the Court of Appeal by majority (Lewison LJ, with whom Arnold LJ agreed) found in favour of Insurers and the appeal was dismissed.
In a dissenting judgment, Phillips LJ found in favour of PABL, concluding that there was a “fundamental inconsistency” between the ABC Liability Exclusion and Warranty 13.5. This was highlighted by the fact that the Policy exclusion did not define “liability” and losses arising from non-compliance were excluded.
Impact on policyholders
The decision illustrates the importance of careful drafting of policy wordings to avoid ambiguity, with particular attention to the interaction of potentially overlapping insured and excluded perils. The scope of coverage may be significantly impacted by minimal changes to punctuation or connecting words.
The English Courts are likely to uphold the literal effect of contract terms even in the face of apparent inconsistency, in the absence of compelling evidence for a clear cure in respect of an obvious drafting error.
Ayo Babatunde is an Associate at Fenchurch Law
Bellini v Brit: The Court of Appeal serves up a slightly sour COVID-19 decision
Bellini (N/E) Ltd trading as Bellini v Brit UW Limited [2024] EWCA Civ 435
The Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in a case that will have significant repercussions for business interruption cover and should be on every policyholder and broker’s radar.
Non-damage endorsements commonly supplement the predominantly damage-based cover afforded by business interruption insurance policies. However, as this case demonstrates, care must be taken to ensure that the policy wording reflects the intention for the endorsement to be triggered without the need for actual damage – or the policyholder might find itself without the cover the endorsement appears to provide.
The Background
The case related to the proper interpretation of a ‘Murder, suicide or disease’ extension (the “disease clause”), as set out below:
We shall indemnify you in respect of interruption of or interference with the business caused by damage, as defined in clause 8.1, arising from:
- a) any human infectious or human contagious disease (excluding [AIDS] an outbreak of which the local authority has stipulated shall be notified to them manifested by any person whilst in the premises or within a [25] mile radius of it;
- b) murder or suicide in the premises; […]
Many similar disease clause wordings, giving cover for cases of Covid-19 at the premises or within a certain vicinity, have been the subject of litigation arising out of the pandemic.
The core issue here was, whether on a true construction of the disease clause there could be cover in the absence of damage, as defined in the policy.
At first instance, the court had held that, on the wording of the disease clause, there was no cover without damage. Our article on that decision can be found here.
The Common Ground
It was common ground between the parties that standard business interruption insurance is contingent on physical loss or damage to the insured premises or other property, but that non-damage-based cover is typically available as an extension. Such extensions may take various forms and the FCA Test Case considered a number of examples which did not require physical damage to be triggered.
It was also common ground that there had been no physical loss of or damage to the premises or property used at the premises.
It is also worth noting that it was assumed for the purposes of the preliminary issues trial that the insured was able to establish that Covid-19 was manifested either at the premises or within the 25-mile radius. It was further assumed that the premises were closed by reason of government intervention, and this intervention amounted to "interruption or interference" within the meaning of the disease clause, resulting in financial loss.
The Principles
The principles of contractual interpretation are by now a well-trodden path in recent insurance coverage disputes. The concept of “correction of mistakes by construction” was considered in East v Pantiles (Plant Hire), where the Court found that two conditions must be satisfied: “…first, there must be a clear mistake on the face of the instrument; secondly, it must be clear what correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake. If those conditions are satisfied, then the correction is made as a matter of construction.”
The principles of contractual interpretation in the context of insurance policies were neatly summarised by the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case: “The core principle is that an insurance policy, like any other contract, must be interpreted objectively by asking what a reasonable person, with all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties when they entered into the contract, would have understood the language of the contract to mean. Evidence about what the parties subjectively intended or understood the contract to mean is not relevant to the court's task.”
The Arguments
The policyholder argued that the disease clause should be understood as if the words "caused by damage, as defined by clause 8.1" were deleted. The words "in consequence of the damage", according to the policyholder, should instead read as "in consequence of the insured perils set out above at paragraphs (a)-(e) above". It was argued that this was the only way to make sense of the policy, and reflected how the court had interpreted the trends clause in FCA Test Case.
In addition, it argued that the words "damage, as defined in clause 8.1" made no sense on the basis that Damage was not defined in clause 8.1, which simply provided for business interruption coverage subject to certain defined provisos.
The court was invited to rewrite the policy in the most sensible way that accorded with the obvious intention of the parties (i.e. that the disease clause provided non-damage rather than damage cover).
The insurer asserted that such an approach was impermissible. They argued that it did not matter that the disease clause provided only very limited extensions of cover for disease, nor did it matter that it was hard to imagine how liability could ever arise under the disease clause on their interpretation: the parties should be held to their bargain.
The Decision
The Court of Appeal considered the well-established principles and held that it would only be permissible to rewrite the clause if something had gone wrong with the language used.
In circumstances where it was not clear that something had gone wrong, and where the clause was not ambiguous on its face, the court identified the correct approach as one that gave the clause its natural meaning - even where the end result was the provision of only limited, if any, additional cover.
In applying the principles to the facts of the case, the court considered that when objectively viewed, and taking into account the policy in its entirety, it did not provide non-damage business interruption cover as asserted by the policyholder.
The court’s reasoning can be summarised as follows:
- The standard business interruption cover clearly required damage to property. The extensions to the standard cover effectively provided cover for various things caused by physical damage;
- The same phraseology (which stated “Damage, defined in clause 8.1”) was used in most of the other extensions to the standard cover, and the reference was not a mistake, but instead made clear that the damage-based business interruption coverage in clause 8.1 was being extended to the indemnity clauses in clause 8.2;
- The policy must be interpreted as at 20 October 2019 when it incepted, and therefore cannot be interpreted through the telescope of Covid-19; and
- The fact that the disease clause provided limited additional cover does not in and of itself make it absurd. The court acknowledged that insurance policies are often somewhat repetitive and also sometimes clumsily drafted.
Comments
This judgment, while undeniably sound in its reiteration of well-established legal principles, still manages to feel particularly ugly for policyholders.
The disease clause in question, in all other respects, is a typical non-damage endorsement, and in our view should have been read as affording non-damage cover. We do not agree, as the court found, that a “reasonably informed small-business-owning policyholder” would conclude that they had only damage-based cover. Au contraire. Rather, we suggest, they would share the view of court in the FCA Test Case in finding the reference to “damage” inapposite and requiring of a wider interpretation in a non-damage context. Not least where the outcome is that the extent of cover the “extension” actually provides is so limited as to verge on being illusory.
Undoubtedly policyholders are swayed when making purchasing decisions by the idea that some policies are more extensive than others. This appeal serves as an apt reminder to policyholders and brokers that there is a real need to be alive to standard form wordings and extensions, which as this case shows, may not provide the policyholder with anything tangible.
As a parting comment, there is a theme emerging in the reporting of Covid-19 insurance disputes, including this judgment, which we find unpalatable as a concept: namely that where clauses are included automatically and no “additional” premium is paid, the policyholder is getting something it has not paid for. That cannot be right. The insurance market is not in the business in handing out “free” cover, and policyholders are not being provided with extensions free of charge. There has been and always will be a calculation of risk by insurers, for which a policyholder pays a premium and the insurer provides the end product. Free, it is not.
Authors
Joanna Grant, Managing Partner
Anthony McGeough, Senior Associate
Fenchurch Law announces key leadership changes as it enters next phase of growth
Fenchurch Law has announced that Joanna Grant has been appointed Managing Partner of the firm, with predecessor and founder David Pryce taking on new Senior Partner role, leading the firm’s expansion into Singapore. In addition, Daniel Robin will step into the role of Deputy Managing Partner.
Joanna Grant joined Fenchurch Law as Partner in 2016 and has since led the firm’s expert Construction and Property Risks team, advising clients on some of the most high-profile commercial insurance disputes in the UK. She steps into the role of Managing Partner following the 14-year tenure of founder and predecessor David Pryce. David now takes up the role of Senior Partner, where he will oversee the firm’s global expansion strategy, starting with the opening of its recently-announced Singapore office later this year.
Joining Joanna on the firm’s senior management team is the head of the firm’s Leeds Office Daniel Robin, who becomes Deputy Managing Partner, supporting and overseeing Fenchurch Law’s continued growth strategy in the UK market.
These leadership changes signify an exciting growth milestone for the firm, which has represented clients in some of the most high-profile and complex policy disputes in recent years, including Stonegate Pub Company’s Covid-19 Business Interruption (BI) claim, which remains the highest-value Covid-19-related BI claim to pass through the English courts.
This announcement also follows recent news that the firm has transitioned to an employee-owned business model through the launch of an Employee Ownership Trust (EOT), which saw 60% of its shares awarded to its people.
Fenchurch Law becomes one of the few female-led law firms in the UK.
David Pryce, Senior Partner at Fenchurch Law, commented: “It’s a hugely exciting time for Fenchurch Law, and I’m so proud of what we’ve achieved since our inception in 2010. I’m absolutely delighted that Joanna and Daniel will be leading the firm into its next stage of growth, as we look to expand our footprint even further.”
Joanna Grant, Managing Partner at Fenchurch Law, added: “I’m delighted to be leading the charge for Fenchurch Law in its ongoing mission to level the playing field for policyholders, with a particular focus on complex and high value coverage disputes in the UK.”
Daniel Robin, added: “I’m very proud to be able to support the further growth of Fenchurch Law and give even more policyholders in the UK access to the wealth of expertise we have across the team.”
